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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between institutional factors 
and FDI inflows in Tanzania using time series annual data over the period 1996 to 
2015. Multiple linear regression models, unit root test using Augmented Dickey 
Fuller test was employed to test whether each data in series had a unit root thereby 
testing the stationarity.  Co integration test using Johansen co integration test was 
employed to test for co integration of variables, while Granger causality test was 
employed to test causality between the variables. It was revealed that regulatory 
quality, voice and accountability had significant positive influence on FDI inflows, 
while control of corruption had significant negative influence on FDI inflows. Rule 
of law and political stability had insignificant positive influence on FDI inflows, 
while government effectiveness had insignificant negative influence on FDI inflows. 
Access to land had insignificant positive influence on FDI inflows.  Granger-
Causality test revealed that political stability granger-caused FDI, implying that the 
direction of the relationship between the two variables was unidirectional.  On the 
other hand corruption granger-caused FDI, implying that the direction of the 
relationship between the two variables was unidirectional.  Based on empirical 
findings the study concluded that, over the period 1996-2015, voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality had significant positive influence on FDI 
inflows while control of corruption had significant negative influence on FDI 
inflows. Government effectiveness had insignificant negative influence on FDI 
inflows, political stability and rule of law had insignificant positive impact on FDI 
inflows. The study suggests that, measures should be adopted to combat corruption, 
in order to improve the investment climate for attracting FDI inflows in the country.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Overview of the Chapter  
This chapter includes background of the study, statement of the research problem, 
general and specific objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the 
study, scope and limitations of the study. 
 
1.2   Background of the Study  
Globally and historically, there have been various sources of external financing for 
developing countries, but currently FDI has become an important external financing 
source for developing countries. Developing countries have made and are still 
implementing economic and structural reforms to attract more FDI inflows in their 
countries (Bayar and Alakbarov, 2016). FDI inflows as a source of external 
financing are preferred by majority of developing countries due to possible positive 
effects of FDI inflows on their economies. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as a source of capital and a major catalyst towards  
achieving  economic growth and development  is associated with benefits such as 
new technologies, enhanced management skills, increased employment 
opportunities, access to global markets, and revenues to the government(Viksiz, 
2013; Binsaeed, 2009; OECD, 2002; Loungani et al., 2001). According to Hill 
(2000) FDI occurs when a firm usually a MNC/MNE invests directly in facilities to 
produce and/or market a product or a service in a foreign country. Punnett and Ricks 
(1997) define FDI flow as movement of capital across borders. Such movement 
usually is accompanied by transfer of management, technical or other specialized 
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personnel, technology or other expertise, or equipment. 
 
 Quazi (2007) and Smith (1997) pointed out that FDI is a key factor of globalization, 
stimulates productivity enhancement, it brings about technological advancement and 
creates jobs. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as a factor that drives 
economic growth (Wang, 2009). Majority of governments from developed and 
developing countries accept that FDI can help them get through stagnation and even 
circumvent the poverty trap (Brooks et al., 2010). Many developing countries do not   
attract sufficient FDI inflow due to poor quality of public services, closed trade 
regimes, inadequate regulatory frameworks, lack of political stability, unreliable 
legal system, corruption, and rule of law, all of which prove to be disincentive to 
FDI flow (OECD, 2002; Binsaeed, 2009).  
 
One of the problems sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries are confronted with is low 
levels of investment. However, there are many reasons behind the problem and they 
may vary from country to country. Among in the list of the reasons is the influence 
of institutional factors on FDI inflows. Unfavorable regulations and ineffective legal 
systems, have progressively been forcing foreign investors to be increasingly 
selective as to where to invest (Fiodendji, 2016). On the other hand researchers agree 
that there is a significant link between institutional factors and FDI inflows in SSA 
countries, and that foreign investors pay a great deal of attention to the institutional 
framework of the countries in which they want to undertake an investment (OECD, 
2012). 
 
Tanzania in her history towards economic development has passed through three 
major time epochs, the 1961-1967 epoch, the 1967 Arusha Declaration to mid-1980s 
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epoch and the third epoch is from the mid-1980s reforms to the present time, 2017 
(Ngowi, 2009). After independence, the economy (i.e., industries, plantations, banks, 
mines and relatively large commercial activities) continued to be mainly within the 
hands of the British Colonial masters and Asian businessmen, mainly Arabs and 
Indians. The economy continued to be basically a market-oriented economy with 
private sector capitalism dominating (Ngowi, 2009). 
 
The 1967-1980 epoch, the political and economic landscape of Tanzania changed 
dramatically, a result of which was a political decision that gave birth to the Arusha 
Declaration which was proclaimed in1967. This was a blueprint that declared 
Tanzania would be following Ujamaa policy; it took place six years after 
independence. The policy implied that the country would be following socialist 
oriented economic policies. The state owned and controlled economy, replaced the 
capitalist, private sector market-led economy that was inherited from colonial 
administration at independence. All the major means of production in the country, 
(i.e. industries, plantations, commerce, mines, banks, insurance companies, 
wholesale businesses, hotels, large commercial buildings etc) were nationalized and 
put under the control of the state, laws, rules, regulations, and policies were 
introduced to suit the requirements of the new political ideology and new economic 
system (Ngowi, 2009; Wangwe et al.,2004). 
 
Ujamaa policy did not give any incentive to the private sector enterprises, private 
sector entrepreneurs were looked upon as exploiters and enemies of the state. 
Socialism had restrictive regulations, protective policies, even the rule of law was 
socialist oriented and in favor of socialist tendencies but unfavorable to private 
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investment both local and foreign. The system reduced individual initiative and 
creativity, which also discouraged entrepreneurship development in the country. 
Socialism created a large state bureaucracy and gave people less freedom in their 
lives economically. Almost everything was collectively owned and this hindered 
individual initiative and decision making in major spheres of life (URT, 2011). 
 
Few years later on most of these public owned enterprises started to perform poorly 
due to poor management in 1970s to 1980s. The government supported public 
enterprises through subsidies, later most of them collapsed as result of poor 
performance.  It is during this time, around 1980s Tanzania found that it could no 
longer cope with the ailing and ill-managed public enterprises and companies. 
Therefore, deliberate economic liberalization policies were initiated and 
implemented (ILO, 2005; Ngowi, 2009). This was during the mid- 1980s epoch; it is 
from this mid- 1980s and especially from 1985, another major political decision was 
made in Tanzania, which carried with it a package of economic reforms.  Generally 
the reforms were opposite of the 1967 political decision to embrace socialism. In this 
epoch, Tanzania’s political decision was to embrace the capitalist economy which is 
market-oriented and private sector led. This change involved establishment of new 
institutions and introduction of new laws, rules, regulations, and policies to suit 
another new political ideology and new economic system. The main aim was to 
create an enabling environment for private sector development (Ngowi, 2009). 
 
According to Mnali (2012) changes in a number of investments related policies and 
laws were undertaken such as trade liberalization policy, whereby import restrictions 
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were either relaxed or removed. The following laws were enacted, Tanzania 
Investment Act No 26 of 1997 aiming at guiding investment activities in Tanzania,  
Land Act No5 and No 4 of 1999, Banking and Financial Institutions Act No 12 of 
1991, which intended to harmonize the operations of all financial institutions in 
Tanzania, Capital Markets and Securities Act No 5 of 1995, Export Processing Zone 
Act No11 of 2002,Foreign Exchange Act No 1,of 1992,Corruption Prevention and 
Combating Act No 11 of 2007,and Immigration Act No 101 of 1997, just to mention 
a few amongst the changes in policies and laws introduced to facilitate foreign 
investments  in the country. 
 
Therefore, promotion of private investments in Tanzania can be traced from the late 
1980s, when the role of local and foreign private investment activities in the 
development process of the country gained recognition and importance (IPT, 2003; 
Mnali, 2012). The reforms in the financial institutions, public sector, civil service, 
and other areas were made and are still underway to fine tune the attraction of FDIs 
in the country. A law was passed in 1997 in order to promote local and foreign 
investments in the country (Ngowi, 2002).  
 
However, despite these attractive economic reforms already carried out in Tanzania, 
investment climate in Tanzania is not yet conducive for doing business. The 
following  areas  are identified as the most severe particularly to foreign investors: 
regulations, access to land, taxation and fees, corruption, labor laws, contract 
enforcement, law and order, bureaucracy, trade openness, infrastructure,  and 
restrictive laws (OECD, 2013; TPSF, 2015; Investment Climate Statement, 2015).     
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Foreign investors face obstacles in obtaining and enforcing land titles, moreover 
majority of foreign investors complain that land tenure security for agricultural 
investors is uncertain (Tanzania Governance Review; 2014; Donovan, 2015). 
Complaints presented by the Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI) (2013) 
allege that regulatory quality in Tanzania had negative impact on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflow in Tanzania. The complaints further allege that much as the 
enterprises in the food processing sector in Tanzania understand the importance of 
regulations and laws, however the complaints by the Confederation of Tanzania 
Industries (2013), allege that there were multiple laws and regulations governing 
food processing sector in the country and are overlapping, as result increase 
regulatory costs payable by business ventures in the sector. They allege that instead 
of facilitating compliance with regulations, regulators focused at maximizing 
revenue collections from business operators in the sector.  
 
The complaints further alleged that the sector was the most regulated with 22 laws 
and regulations, governing business registration, licensing, permits and inspections. 
These laws and regulations were enforced by various regulatory bodies which also 
were found to be overlapping in various areas of their activities. For example; the 
responsibility of inspecting premises was assigned to six (6) regulatory authorities 
namely; Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS), National Environmental Management 
Council (NEMC), Tanzania Dairies Board (TDB), Tanzania Food and Drugs Agency 
(TDFA), Fire and Rescue Force (FRF), and Local Government Authority (LGA);  
TDB, TFDA, TBS and  Weights and Measures Agency (WMA) were responsible to 
inspect production; TDB, TFDA, Vertinary Department were charged with the duty 
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to inspect product transportation while  TDFA, TBS, LGA, NEMC, Occupational 
Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) were assigned to inspect premises and 
equipment. The labeling function was undertaken by TDFA, TDB, and WMA. The 
registration was carried out by TDB and Business Registration and Licensing 
Agency (BRELA), licensing was undertaken by TFDA, TBS, LGA and the related 
government ministry. It must be noted that these regulatory bodies were located in 
different locations and the duties were done separately or on individual basis. 
 
Regardless of the good intention behind formulation of these laws, regulations and 
regulatory bodies, their impact on the sector was huge and ultimately affected the 
performance and development of the sector in the country. Moreover it discouraged 
foreign direct investors (FDI) and development of the private sector. It was also 
killing the private initiative and spirit towards industrialization. This tendency of 
having unnecessary, redundant and proliferation of institutions, regulations and laws 
in the country was found to be detrimental towards attracting FDI in the country. 
 
In another survey study by Tanzania Investment Climate Statement also (2015) 
alleged that regulatory quality was an obstacle to FDI inflow in the country. Availed 
evidence tells that fees and charges for registering foreign companies were extremely 
high when compared with the local companies; also terms and conditions for 
competing in the market happened to affect foreign companies more that they affect 
local companies, for example in Tanzania The Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation 
(TBC), it is said that it enjoys favorable business conditions and terms if compared 
with other private media companies.  
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Sometimes foreign investors complained about availability of skilled labor in the 
country, but the current immigration and labor laws and regulations restrict 
employment of foreigners in foreign companies up to five people in senior posts 
only, the remaining positions should be filled or sourced from within the country. 
The importation of sugar, which is frequently done by the government to supplement 
local production, causes frustration among the domestic millers who are foreign 
investors.  
 
Investors ’complaints are on the grounds that sugar imports have been affecting their 
sugar sales and their cash flows, as a result smallholders cane growers are not paid in 
time. The perception of investors is that this unfavorable business climate or 
environment is due to poor policies and business regulations in the country 
(Tanzania Governance Review, 2014). The survey of business leaders’ in Tanzania 
alleged that, factors that make it difficult for businesses to grow include; tax 
administration, power (electricity), levels of taxes, corruption and access to finance. 
This gives an impression that it is difficult to do business and that the government is 
making insufficient effort to address any of the issues which are frustrating investors 
in the country (TPSF, 2015).  
 
It is well known that Tanzania has undertaken many far-reaching institutional 
reforms including reforms in the political systems; economic management; and 
government administration (Ngowi, 2002; Mnali, 2012; CTI, 2013). These reforms 
were deliberately undertaken to facilitate FDIs inflows into the country. Institutional 
factors matter in influencing economic behavior generally and institutional reforms 
are important in attracting more FDIs into a country (Ngowi, 2002).  
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1.3 Statement of the Research Problem 
The quality of institutional factors has significant effect on foreign direct investors’ 
decisions when choosing location for investments in foreign countries. Quality 
institutional factors are important determinants of FDI inflows (Kurul and Yalta, 
2017; Fiodendji, 2016; Babayan, 2015; Chab and Siham, 2014). According to OECD 
(2013), Tanzania Investment Climate Statement (TICS) (2015) and TPSF (2015), 
foreign direct investors in Tanzania have been complaining about corruption, 
bureaucracy, restrictive laws and regulations, labor laws, contract enforcement, 
access to land, taxation, and fees as the most severe challenges facing them. This is 
to say the quality of institutional factors in Tanzania is still not favorable for FDI 
inflows.  
 
However, contrary to the complaints as raised by OECD(2013), Tanzania Investment 
Climate Statement (TICS) (2015) and TPSF (2015), on FDI inflows in Tanzania, the 
surveys on foreign private investments inflows conducted by the Bank of Tanzania 
(BOT), the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), and Tanzania Investment Centre 
(TIC) in 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2010 and five sample surveys in 2005, 2007, 2009, 
2012 and 2013, revealed that there have been an increase of FDI inflows into the 
country in recent years (TIR, 2013).  
 
These findings show that FDI inflows grew sharply by 46.6% in 2012 to USD 
1799.6 million from USD 1229.4 million recorded in 2011; this was the highest in 
East African region. According to African Economic Outlook report (2017) between 
July 2016 and March 2017 Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) registered a total of 
242 projects worth US dollars 2billion. Tanzania’s share in Africa FDI inflows 
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improved to 3.4% in 2012 from 2.5% recorded in 2011(TIR, 2013).Against this 
background and circumstances what factors might be responsible for increase in 
FDIs inflows in Tanzania?  
 
This study aspired to examine the relationship between institutional factors and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in Tanzania. 
 
1.4 The General Objective of the Study 
To examine the relationship between institutional factors and FDI inflows in 
Tanzania. 
 
1.4.1 The Specific Objectives of this Study 
The general objective for this study was supported by the following specific 
objectives which were:  
i. To examine the relationship between regulatory quality and FDI inflows in 
Tanzania. 
ii. To assess the relationship between rule of law and FDI inflows in Tanzania.  
iii. To determine the relationship between government effectiveness and FDI 
inflows in Tanzania 
iv. To assess the relationship between control of corruption and FDI inflows in 
Tanzania. 
v. To determine the relationship between Political stability and absence of 
Violence and FDI inflows in Tanzania. 
vi. To assess the relationship between Voice and Accountability and FDI inflows 
in Tanzania. 
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vii. To examine the relationship between land accessibility and FDI inflows in 
Tanzania. 
 
1.4.2 Research Questions 
i. Was regulatory quality related with FDI inflows in Tanzania? 
ii. Was rule of law related with FDI inflows in Tanzania? 
iii. Was government effectiveness related with FDI inflows in Tanzania? 
iv. Was control of corruption related with FDI inflows in Tanzania? 
v. Was political stability and absence of violence related with FDI inflows in 
Tanzania? 
vi. Was Voice and Accountability related with FDI inflows in Tanzania? 
vii. Was Land accessibility related with FDI inflows in Tanzania? 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Despite the abundant literature on the relationship between institutional factors and 
FDI inflows globally, not much is known about the relationship between institutional 
factors and FDI inflows in Tanzania. There is scanty literature on the relationship 
between institutional factors and FDI inflows in Tanzania. It should be made clear 
that since the adoption of economic reforms almost twenty two (22) years ago no 
comprehensive study has been done to find out the contribution of institutional 
factors in attracting FDI inflows in Tanzania. The few studies carried out did not 
specifically focus on Tanzania and most of them focused on a few types of 
institutional factors (Basemera, et al., 2012).  
 
Through this study, government and policy makers would be able to know to what 
extent each institutional factor is related with FDI inflow in Tanzania and to what 
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extent Tanzania investment climate had improved over the past ten years. Moreover, 
the study would also help the government and policy makers to know if there is 
anything more that needs to be addressed in order to improve the investment climate 
in the country. 
 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
This study covered the period between 1996 and 2015, and it dealt with seven (7) 
institutional factors, namely regulatory quality, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, voice and accountability, including 
access to land. This study employed time series data from World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann et al, (1999) which is the primary 
source of empirical research on institutions. It also employed time series data 
obtained from the bank of Tanzania (BOT). The study considered the period between 
1996-2015.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview  
This chapter covers reviewed literature on the relationship between institutional 
factors and FDI inflows. It is structured as follows: the first section comprises 
conceptual definitions as used in this study, followed by theoretical literature review, 
and empirical literature review. The research gap follows after empirical literature 
review and lastly conceptual framework and description of variables.  
 
2.2 Conceptual Definitions 
The frequently used concepts in this study include: institutions, institutional factors, 
control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
political stability and absence of violence, voice and accountability, and foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  
 
2.2.1 Institutions  
North (1990)define institutions as the rules in a society, the constraints that human 
beings impose on human interactions, or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interactions. Moreover institutions are imposed 
procedures, regulations, rules, laws, practice, traditions, values, taboos, sanctions, 
customs which prohibit, permit, or lead to specific type of behaviors, socially, 
politically, and economically. Moreover, North (1990) states that institutions are  
rules, constitution, laws, property rights, sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, 
beliefs, attitudes, customs, values which prohibit, or permit, or lead to specific type 
of behavior within a society or market. They are critical for reducing or increasing 
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transaction costs, by improving or denying accessibility to information, property 
rights and other resources.  
 
Institutional factors are a sort of framework of laws and regulations with the major 
role of reducing uncertainty by establishing a stable structure for human interaction. 
Institutional factors are systems of established and prevalent social rules that 
structure social interactions in a society (Hodgson, 2006). Institutions are  policies, 
legal frameworks, norms and codes of conduct that create the incentives that drive 
government decisions in shaping the behavior of public sector workers, in resource 
allocation and ultimately in the exercise of power within the state bureaucracy 
(Unsworth,2010). 
 
2.2.2 Institutional Factors  
According to Kurul and Yalta (2017), Kaufmann (2010), Erkekoglu and Kilicarslan 
(2016), Wernick, et al., (2014) institutional factors refer to control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability and 
absence of violence, and voice and accountability. This study adopted this definition, 
because the study was pursued to find out the relationship between institutional 
factors and FDI inflows. The following are the definitions of institutional factors 
according to Kurul and Yalta (2017), Kaufmann (2010), Erkekoglu and Kilicarslan 
(2016). 
 
2.2.2.1 Control of Corruption 
 Captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the 
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state by elites and private interests. 
 
2.2.2.2 Government Effectiveness 
Captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. 
 
2.2.2.3 Regulatory Quality 
Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
 
2.2.2.4 Rule of Law 
Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 
2.2.2.5 Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically 
motivated violence. 
 
2.2.2.6 Voice and Accountability 
Capture perceptions of the extent to which country’s citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free press. 
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2.2.2.7 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Worthington and Britton (2006) define FDI as an establishment of production 
facilities in overseas countries representing a more direct involvement in the local 
economy with a longer term relationship. Hill (2000) FDI occurs when a firm invests 
directly in facilities to produce and/or market a product or a service in a foreign 
country. Punnett and Ricks (1997) define FDI flow as movement of capital across 
borders. Such movement usually is accompanied by transfer of management, 
technical or other specialized personnel, technology or other expertise, or equipment.  
 
FDI is defined as a net inflow injected by an investor to acquire a 10% or more 
lasting management interest in a company that operates in an economy other than 
that of the investor (World Bank, 2014; Almfraji and Almsafir, 2014). An 
investment into a foreign country is considered an FDI if it establishes a lasting 
interest. A lasting interest is established when an investor obtains at least 10% of the 
voting power in the firm. The key to foreign direct investment is the element of 
control.  
 
Control represents the intent to actively manage and influence a foreign firm’s 
operations. For this reason, a 10% stake in the foreign company’s voting stock is 
necessary to define FDI.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as a case where 
a resident entity in one economy (creditor) acquires lasting interest in an enterprise 
in another economy (recipient) with significant degree of influence. Usually FDI is 
in the form of ownership of means of production like factories or equity share 
including equity purchase, reinvested earnings and intercompany loans and debt 
transactions (TIR, 20013). 
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Advantages (benefits) of FDI to foreigner (MNCs/MNEs) Include:- 
i. Access to markets/market diversification 
ii. Access to resources/raw materials 
iii. Reduced costs of production/lower labor costs 
iv.   Preferential tariffs 
 
The following are some of the benefits/advantages for the host country; 
i. Economic stimulation 
ii. Development of human capital 
iii. Increase in employment 
iv. Access to management expertise, skills, and technology. 
 
For businesses, most of benefits are based on cost cutting and lowering risk. For host 
countries, the benefits are mainly economic. 
 
Disadvantages of FDI: Despite benefits there are still some disadvantages such as:  
i. Displacement of local businesses 
ii. The entry of large firms may displace local businesses that cannot compete 
with their prices. 
iii. Profit repatriation 
 
There are two main types of FDI, horizontal and vertical, however Dunning (1993) 
describes types of FDI based on the motive behind the investment from the 
perspective of the investing firm. 
The first type is called natural resource seeking FDI; The key driver in this case 
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is the non existence of natural resources in the home country of the foreign investor. 
The focus of this form of FDI is to gain access to specific natural resources, cheap 
labor and also skills such as marketing, operational and technology, etc. 
 
The second type is called market-seeking FDI: This is where the MNC/MNE enters a 
new market in search for new clients and export markets in order to provide goods 
and services  to the host country. Market-seeking FDI have preference to invest in 
large domestic markets that are growing at a faster pace (Kinda, 2010). 
 
The third type is called efficiency seeking FDI: In this case, the motive is to 
reduce production costs using new technologies and cheaper production inputs. The 
idea is to take advantages of economies of scope, scale and risk management. 
 
 The fourth type is called strategic asset seeking FDI: The aim here is to gain 
access to strategic assets located in the host country to obtain a competitive position 
and enhance skills in regional and global markets. Examples of these types of assets 
are brands, distribution channels and new technologies. 
 
Determinants of FDI: The following factors have been identified and discussed as 
determinants of  FDI inflow( Jadhar, 2012; Luiz and Charalambous, 2009; Chang 
Lo, 2013; Busse, 2007):  
i. Market size 
ii. Trade openness 
iii. Natural resources 
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iv. Exchange rate considerations 
v. Labor considerations 
vi. Geographical proximity 
vii. Economic agglomeration 
viii. Institutional factors 
 
FDI flow: Is a movement of private investments between two countries in specified 
period. 
 
FDI inflow: Is an increase in international indebtedness (liabilities) to a country’ 
private sector during a specified period of time, usually one year. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework  
According to Abend (2008) theoretical framework refers to concepts together with 
their definitions and reference to relevant scholarly literature, existing theory that is 
used for a particular study. It involves understanding of theories and concepts 
relevant to the topic of the research and that relate to the broader areas of knowledge 
being considered. Theoretical literature review helps to establish what theories 
already exist, the relationship between them, to what degree the existing theories 
have been investigated, and to develop new hypotheses to be tested.  
 
Often this form is used to help establish a lack of appropriate theories or reveal that 
current theories are inadequate for explaining new or emerging research problems 
(Baumester and Leary, 1997). The theory employed to guide this study is Dunning’s 
theory (2006) of Institutional factors, propounded by him by extending his 
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prominent Dunning’s (1993) eclectic paradigm/theory.  
 
2.3.1 Background of the Theory  
Before Dunning’s theory (2006) of Institutional factors and Dunning’s eclectic 
paradigm/theory there were various theories developed since 1960s trying to explain 
factors that determine FDI inflows. Their explanations were mainly based on micro 
organizational aspects and macro resource allocation dimensions (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). In 1960s, Hymer out of his dissertation developed a theory which 
stated that foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows occurred mainly in oligopolistic 
industries rather than in industries operating near perfect competition. This implied 
that the firms in these industries must possess advantages which are lacking in local 
firms in the host country. Hymer (1960) stipulated that for FDI to move or surge in a 
foreign market those advantages should include superior technology, superior 
knowledge in marketing, management, and finance. On the other hand this theory 
which was branded a name as the monopolistic advantage theory stated that, foreign 
direct investment is made by firms in oligopolistic industries possessing technical 
and other advantages over indigenous firms. 
 
In expanding Hymer’s theory (1960), Caves (1971) introduced what he called 
Product and Factor market Imperfections to show that superior knowledge gave 
chance the investing firm to produce a variety of products that customers would 
prefer to similar locally or home made goods and thus would enable the firm to 
enjoy some control over the selling price and an advantage over local firms. But such 
activities were possible through research and marketing effort. 
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According to neo-classical micro-economic theory as examined by Aggrawal (1984) 
the price of capital is determined by the interest rate and therefore capital movements 
are driven by what appears to be the difference in interest rates which exists between 
countries. Neo-classical theory viewed capital as a commodity which its price 
determines supply as well as its demand and its allocation. Iverson (1953) concluded 
that capital would thus flow freely from countries with low rates of return to that 
location with relatively high rates of return under conditions of perfect competition. 
However the limitation of this theory was its inability to explain the role of Trans-
National Corporations (TNCs) in capital mobility because it limited itself to 
explaining how and where firms decide to obtain the capital needed to finance their 
global plans. Moreover, other critics also hold the view that because the theory was 
silent about the purpose of its investment its role was suited only to explanation of 
portfolio investments rather than on FDI (Fiodendji, 2013). 
 
Intangible capital approach theory is another theory which tried to explain factors 
related to FDI inflow. According to this theory, the possession by a firm of specific 
monopolistic advantages or intangible assets was a sine qua non (absolute essential) 
for its overseas production (Lal, 1980). These advantages include production 
techniques, managerial skills, industrial organization, and knowledge of the product 
as well as the factor markets. The theory outlined three useful purposes which these 
advantages would serve.  
 
First, advantages must provide a competitive edge to the firm concerned and they 
must outweigh those of foreign rivals as well as those in the perspective country in 
which it plans to invest, this kind of an arrangement was referred to as Ownership 
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advantage (O). Second, the monopolistic advantage that the firm possesses must be 
transferable abroad and should be employed most economically at the foreign 
location. This arrangement was referred to as Location advantage (L).  
 
Thirdly, the firm itself must profit from the exploitation of these advantages rather 
than licensing or selling them out to an independent firm, this kind of an 
arrangement was referred to as Internalization advantage (I). Rugman (1986), 
attempted to provide another explanation of FDI based on internalization theory, 
however his theory was criticized that it was only focused at examining FDI from 
the point of view of a need to internalize transaction costs in order to improve 
profitability and to explain the emergency of FDI effectiveness. 
 
A critical review involving nine previous theoretical models of FDI was presented 
and discussed early studies of determinants of FDI.  The findings of the discussion 
revealed that there was no single theory that could adequately explain determinants 
of FDI on its own, but were a variety of theoretical models trying to explain FDI and 
the location decisions (Faeth, 2008). The theories were not capable to explain 
satisfactorily why the FDI investors chose to invest in a country rather than in 
another and particularly the marginalization of African continent. 
 
After a long time of dissatisfaction on the inadequate explanation of determinants of 
FDI inflows by a series of existing theories, Dunning through a series of publications 
in 1980, 1981, 1988, and 1992, and later in 1993, introduced a single theory referred 
to as Dunning’s (1993) Eclectic Paradigm, abbreviated as OLI paradigm. OLI was 
referring to the three main elements namely Ownership (O) advantages, Location (L) 
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advantages, and Internalization (I) advantages. The theory considered the three 
factors as determinants of international activities of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs).  
 
According to theory, Ownership (O) advantages, included; superior technology, 
managerial skills, trademarks, brand name, corporate identification and other 
tangible and intangible assets. Location (L) advantages, these are economic and 
political characteristics that make a country attractive such as: cheap labor costs, 
lower cost of transport and communication, size of the domestic market, political 
stability, and taxation policy that encourage investments.  Internalization 
(I)advantages, that the company or companies should be able to use such benefits or 
advantages of ownership and location on its authority through protection of its 
technology, quality, and brands. There should also be liberalization of trade regime 
or openness to international trade to allow companies externalize their operations by 
licensing manufacturing of their products to other companies.  
 
Thus, Dunning’s eclectic paradigm theory suggests that MNEs develop competitive 
Ownership advantages at home and then transfer these abroad to specific countries 
(depending on Location advantages) through FDI, which allows the MNEs to 
internalize the ownership advantages. It should be clearly understood that Dunning’s 
Eclectic Paradigm (1993), did not consider institutional factors as important 
determinant of FDI inflows. 
 
2.3.2 Emergency of Dunning’s Institutional Factors Theory 
According Kersan-Skabic, (2013) and Babayan, (2015) it was observed that the role 
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of institutional factors caught researchers’ attention sometime around 1990s. 
Fiodendji (2016) obseved that a growing interest to study the link between 
institutional factors and FDI inflows emerged since 1990.   Fiodendji (2013) noticed 
that researchers felt that there was a need for the host country to provide other 
incentives in order to improve and support advantages already available in host 
countries for attracting more FDIs in their countries. This led to the emergency of the 
concept of institutional factors to Dunning’s eclectic paradigm or OLI paradigm. 
 
Moreover the development of the concept of ‘institutional factors’ also emerged 
from the studies by Rodrik, (1999); Acemoglu et al(2001); Sachs,( 2003),Glaeset et 
al,(2004) these studies concluded that economic development of a country is 
explained mainly by its institutional factors, resources, and  economic policies. 
According to Acemoglu et al., (2001), Asiedu, (2003), Asiedu and Lien, (2011); 
Banga, (2003); Busse, (2003); Gleser et al., (2004); it was revealed that institutional 
factors were important for FDI inflows. It was pointed out those institutional factors 
as a concept became the focus of any economic reforms (Sachs, 2003).  
 
Moreover, Dunning (2002) argued that institutional factors, such as good governance 
and economic freedom are becoming highly popular determinant of FDI as the 
priorities of multinational companies (MNCs) are shifting from market and resource 
seeking to efficiency seeking. It was after these observations Dunning suggested an 
extension of his theory, popularly known as Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm (1993) by 
inclusion of institutional factors (Kersan-Skabic, 2013, and Babayan, 2015). He 
realized that his eclectic paradigm theory was not yet a perfect theory to adequately 
explain determinants of FDI inflows.  
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Dunning’s Institutional factors theory (2006), as it stands now is comprised of six 
variables which include: Government effectiveness, Regulatory quality, Control of 
corruption, Rule of law, Voice and accountability, and Political Stability and absence 
of violence (Stein and Daude, 2004; Babayan, 2015; Kurul and Yalta, (2017); 
Wernick, Haar, and Sharma, 2014; Erkekoglu and Kilicarslan, 2016; Dehshir and 
Sameti, 2012). Dunning (2006) Institutional factors theory which has been clearly 
stated and explained by Babayan (2015), Fiodendji (2016), and Kersan-Skabic 
(2013), points out that the key factors that influence investment decisions of foreign 
direct investors (FDI) are those institutional factors which are attractive for policy 
implementation.  
 
They are the most important factors influencing foreign direct investment decisions 
existing in the recipient country. Effective institutional factor allow foreign investors 
to conduct their business in an environment based on clearly defined rules. Highly 
attractive institutional factors reduce uncertainty and risks of investing in a foreign 
country, thus, giving investors’ confidence for the future. Dunning (2006) 
Institutional factors theory states that:  FDI inflow in a specific foreign market is 
positively associated with attractiveness of the institutional factors in a host country.  
 
Dunning’s (2006) institutional factors theory include control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability and 
absence of violence, and voice and accountability. The major role of these 
institutional factors in the society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable 
structure to human interaction. Institutional factors provide an environment through 
which investors emerge and operate. Institutional factors structure incentives in 
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human exchange, in social, economic and political arenas.  
 
According to Bull and Willard (1995) as cited by Nkya (2002), behavior of an 
investor depends heavily on the reward structure in the economy as given by the 
existing institutional framework which is characterized by a particular rule and norm 
structure. Nkya (2002) argued that changing the rule and norm structure or 
institutional arrangements can modify the behavior of investors. The decision and 
behavior of investors is determined by institutional factors arrangement in the 
country. Engelmann (1994) as cited by Nkya (2002) said regulations and laws should 
be credible and enforceable because their enforcement is a critical link between 
institutional factors and investment flows.   
 
Table  2.1: Studies which Used Dunning’s Institutional Theory 
 AUTHOR STUDY THEORY YEAR 
Bellos, S. and 
Subasat, T.  
Governance and FDI inflow in Latin 
America 
Dunning’s 
Institutional factors  
theory 
2013 
Nunes, P. and  
Castro, C 
Does corruption inhibit FDI? Dunning’s  
Institutional factors 
theory 
2013 
Kersan-
Skabic, I. 
Institutional Development as a 
determinant of FDI attractiveness in 
South -east Europe 
Dunning’s 
Institutional factors  
theory 
2013 
Polat,B. and 
Payashoglu, C. 
Determinants of FDI in Turtey: A 
setoral Approach 
Dunning’s  
Institutional factors 
theory 
2014 
Salem, M. and 
Baum, A. 
Determinants of FDI in Real Estate 
Investment in selected MENA 
countries 
Dunning’s 
Institutional factors   
theory 
2015 
Babayan, G. The Impact of Institutional factors on 
attracting FDI flow 
Dunning’s 
Institutional theory 
2015 
Hailu, G.Y. et 
al 
Does institutional quality matter in 
FDI: Evidence from Sub- Saharan 
African countries 
Dunning’s 
Institutional factors   
theory 
2016 
Phung, H. Impact of Institutional and political 
variables on FDI in developing 
countries. 
Dunning’sInstitutional 
factors  theory 
2017 
Source: Researcher, 2018 
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Institutional factors arrangement is an important determinant of economic 
opportunities and changes in economic opportunities. Institutional factors reduce 
chances for the abuse of power; reduce bureaucracy and corruption and lowers 
transaction costs to foreign investors. If these are realized they will tend to motivate 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flow across the country’s economy.  
 
2.3.3 Choice of the Theory 
This study employed Dunning’s (2006) theory of Institutional factors, which 
stipulates that FDI inflow abroad is influenced by attractive institutional factors 
available in a particular location. The researcher considered it to be appropriate for 
this study due to its ease of application, and explanatory power as it was able to 
capture all the variables involved and link them with the study. Dunning’s (2006) 
theory of Institutional factors is strong since it was able to link the study with the 
environment in which the study was taking place. Another good quality of this 
theory was its ability to strengthen the study by connecting the researcher to the 
existing knowledge about the variables; guided by the relevant theory a researcher 
was given a basis for hypotheses and choice of research methods. 
 
Moreover the theory was able to articulate the theoretical assumptions of a research 
study and it forced the researcher to address questions of why and how. It permitted 
the researcher to intellectually transition from simply describing a phenomenon s/he 
had observed to generalizing various aspects of that phenomenon. Having this theory 
helped the researcher identify the limits to the generalizations. Moreover this theory  
helped the researcher specify which key variables influence the phenomenon of 
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interest and highlights the need to examine how those key variables might differ and 
under what circumstances. 
 
2.3.4 Weakness of the Theory 
 Despite Dunning’s (2006) Institutional factors theory being a popular theory in the 
study of FDI; however this theory is still rigid, as it does not keep pace or align with 
the current changes in the international business environment. Consistent with the 
above observation Tihanyi, et al. (2012) argued that Dunning’s (2006) institutional 
factors theory is likely continue owing to several recent and ongoing trends in 
business practices and academic research, the growing number of MNEs in the 
global marketplace, the growing political, and economic importance of emerging 
country groupings, and the growing need for managers and firms to understand the 
regulations, customs and norms in different countries.   
 
In agreement with observations by Tihanyi et al. (2012), Acemoglu, et al., (2001), 
Easterly and Levine (2002), Sachs (2003), Glaeset, et al. (2004) as quoted by 
Fiodendji (2016), concluded that economic development of a country is to a greater 
extent explained by its institutional factors, its resources, and its economic policies. 
Basing on the above conclusion of the previous studies it is vividly seen that there is 
a theoretical gap in Dunning (2006) institutional factors theory. This study suggests 
filling the theoretical gap by adding another construct. The study selected 
‘accessibility to land’ as a new construct or variable to be included in the Dunning 
(2006) theory of institutional factors.  Land is the basic factor of production  it is 
critical and crucial for investments whether local or foreign.    
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2.4 Empirical Literature Review 
The relationship between institutional factors and FDI inflows has been explained by 
various studies including the following: Gastanaga et al (1998) investigated the role 
of contract guarantee, corruption, and risk of nationalization among other factors on 
FDI inflws; they found out that corruption positively influenced FDI. But contrary to 
Gastanaga and his colleagues, Wei (2000) and Asiedu (2005) found out that 
corruption affects FDI inflows negatively. Their results suggested that foreign direct 
investors generally avoid investing in highly corrupt countries because it leads  to  
operational inefficiencies. 
 
 Henisz (1998), Jensen (2003), Richard and Nwankwo (2005) argued that 
institutional factors particularly corruption, political restrictions and lack of 
protection of property rights were not attractive to FDI inflows.   Moreover, Henisz 
(2000), Henisz and Williamson (1999) argued that in countries where property rights 
are poorly protected Multi-National Companies’ (MNC) investments feared 
expropriation risks hence discouraging FDI inflows.  Kapuria-Foreman, (2007) 
found out  that greater assurances to conform or comply with contracts agreements 
and honor or respect for property rights were among the important determinants for 
attracting more FDI. 
 
Ali et al., (2010) concluded that property rights were more critical in attracting FDI 
inflows. Compos, Asiedu and Villamil, (2000) Liien and Pradhan (1999), confirmed 
that majority of investor surveys suggested that one of the most critical institutional 
factor that deters FDI inflows was corruption. Cuerzo-Cazura, (2006, 2008)   further  
argued that generally countries which are more corrupt received fewer FDI inflows, 
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and those with lower corruption index scores had positive relationship with 
investment inflows, as corruption levels would be lower. 
 
 Asiedu and Lien (2011),Banga (2003), Chan and Gamayel (2003), Buse (2003), 
Nsouli(2000), Wheeler and Mody(1992), Daude and   Stein (2007)  found out  that 
inward FDI was significantly influenced by institutional factors, while Mauro (1995) 
stressed that corruption lowers investment inflows and consequently lowers 
economic growth. Gomes-Casseres (1991) found out that intellectual property rights 
and political stability and absence of violence were considered crucial for 
guaranteeing conducive business environment in the country. Beavan et al. (2004)  
found out that institutional factors significantly influenced  FDI inflows, and there 
was a positive relationship between institutional factors and FDI inflows, particularly 
the rule of law.  
 
 Kersan-Skabic (2013), found out that among the institutional factors only corruption 
had a significant negative impact on FDI inflow. Government effectiveness, rule of 
law, and political stability had no significant impact on FDI inflow, though in fact 
they were expected to have a greater influence on FDI inflows. Maric and Kristina 
(2017) observed that countries with rigid regulations and high level of bureaucracy, 
corruption could help to remove barriers and accelerate the exercise or the process of 
investment in the host country. Kaufmann and Wei (1999) in a study of more than 
2000 firms found out  that firms spent longer time dealing with negotiations with 
authorities in countries with higher level of corruption while in countries with low 
level of corruption firms spent shorter time for negotiations.  
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Ngodi and Mburu (2016) found out that control of corruption, political stability, and 
rule of law were among the factors that attracted FDI inflow to East Africa.  
Manamba and Massawe (2017) noted that corruption was one of the greatest barriers 
to FDI inflow in many of low income countries. Rodriguez-Pose and Cols
1
 found out 
that institutional indicators such as; political stability, government effectiveness, 
lower level of corruption, voice and accountability, and rule of law were highly 
influential in attracting FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa. Erkekoglu and Kilicarslan (2016) 
carried out a study in 91 countries between 2002-2012 the results were that an 
increase in government effectiveness reduced FDI inflows while a study  by Daude 
and Stein (2004) found out and concluded that sometime unpredictable policies were 
a threat to FDI inflow. 
 
 Siddica and Angkur (2017) carried a study in 40 countries comprising developing 
and developed countries over the period of 1990-2010 employing panel econometric 
model and noted that rule of had positive effect on FDI while government 
effectiveness had negative effect and also statistically significant. Another study by 
Amal et al (2010) found out that government effectiveness was found to be 
negatively significant, implying a negative relationship with FDI inflows in eight 
Latin American countries for the period of 1996 to 2008. 
 
 The findings of the survey study conducted by the Tanzania Private Sector 
Foundation (2015) demonstrated that, government effectiveness (GE) was not 
favorable to FDI inflow in Tanzania. The findings categorically stated that, among 
                                               
1http://econ.geog. Uu.nl/peeg/peeg.html 
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the challenges facing foreign investors include bureaucracy, whereby investors spent 
a lot of time in processing licenses, property registration, in paying taxes, difficult in 
obtaining and registering land, enforcing contracts and starting business operations. 
Foreign investors also alleged that policy instability is among of the challenges 
affecting their investment decisions. Frequently and unpredictable changes in 
policies in various sectors interfere and frustrate foreign investors’ decisions. In this 
case GE appears to be deterrent and unfriendly to foreign direct investors.  
 
Moreover, consistently with the findings of the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation 
(TPSF) (2015), the findings of the survey study conducted by Tanzania Investment 
Climate Statement (2015) also revealed that government effectiveness (GE) was not 
favorable to FDI flow in Tanzania. The findings further explained that incentives 
offered to foreign investors were unpredictable and were offered on discriminatory 
basis, performance requirements were not considered. 
 
 Buse, and Goizard (2006), found out that in the most regulated economies, 
excessive regulations very often were restricting foreign direct investment inflow.  
Daude and Stein (2004), Buse and Goizard (2006) argued that multiplications of 
regulations very often happened to be barriers to foreign investors and it was 
difficult to comply with. On the other hand, Sedik and Seoudy (2012) conducted a 
study in 20 MENA countries in the period between 1999 and 2010; and revealed that 
regulatory quality seemed to have positive and significant effects on FDI inflows in 
MENA countries. Saidi et al (2013) investigated the relationship between 
institutional variables and FDI inflows in 20 developed and developing countries in 
the period between 1998 and 2011, the result showed that regulatory quality had 
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positive impact on FDI inflows. Yonis, Ochi and Ghadri (2013) also found out that 
regulatory quality had positive and statistically significant impact on FDI inflows. 
 
Lucke and Eichler (2016) performed a study on institutional determinants of FDI in 
94 countries between 1995 -2009 the result indicated that regulatory quality had 
positive impact on FDI inflow. Bellos and Subasat (2013) revealed that under certain 
circumstances regulatory quality deterred FDI inflows.  Mramba; (2015) found out 
that regulatory quality had no significant relationship with FDI inflows in Tanzania.  
Hailu (2016) found out that institutional factors had no statistical significant 
relationship with FDI inflows.  OECD (2013) found out that regulatory quality in 
Tanzania was still restrictive to foreign direct investors. Various studies including 
the following; Grosse and Trevino (1996), Tallman (1998), Zhoa (2003) pointed out 
that a better rule of law attracted more FDI, implying that there was a positive 
relationship between rule of law and FDI inflow.  
 
Jensen, N. (2003) concluded that rule of law had a positive effect on FDI. Daude and 
Stein (2004) also stressed that deficiency enforcement of property rights and lack of 
commitment on the part of the government seemed to play major role in deterring 
FDI flow. Asiedu (2005) concluded that reliable legal system has a positive impact 
on FDI inflow. Busse and Hefeker (2007) found out and concluded that rule of law 
was a determinant of FDI inflow. Mishra and Daly (2007) concluded that, the legal 
system in host countries had a direct impact on FDI inflows in those countries.  
 
Samini and Ariani (2010) studied the impact of political stability, control of 
corruption and rule of law; they found out and concluded that improvement of rule 
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of law had a positive impact on FDI inflows in MENA countries. Mengistu and 
Adhikary (2011) concluded that rule of law was one of the main determinants of FDI 
inflow in the host country. Aguiar et al., (2012) concluded that rule of law tended to 
attract FDI inflow. Dehshiri and Sameti (2012) studied the impact of human 
development index and rule of law to attract FDI in selected developing countries in 
the period between 2001 and 2010, the results showed that rule of law had positive 
and significant impact on attracting FDI in developing countries. Saidi, Ochi and 
Ghadri (2013) found out and concluded that a reliable legal system had a positive 
and a significant impact on FDI inflow I developing countries. 
 
Demirtus (2013) examined the effects of institutional factors on FDI flow using data 
from 71 developed countries and developing countries between the years 1995 and 
2002. The results of his study indicated that there was a positive relationship 
between rule of law and FDI inflow. Kunsch, et al., (2014), Tanzania Investment 
Climate Statement (2014, 2015), and Gangi, Y. (2017), had similar conclusion, that 
rule of law was one of the main institutional factors which attract FDI inflow in the 
host country.  
 
However, on the other hand Bayar and Alakbarov (2016) findings and conclusion 
showed that rule of law had statistical insignificant impact on attracting FDI in 
overall panel of emerging market economies. On the other hand, the studies by 
Dehshiri and Sameti, (2012),  Kunsch, et al.(2014), Wang, Xu and Zhu (2012),  
Wenick et al. (2014), LHRC (2013, 2015), Biglaiser and Staats (2010),  Haggard, 
Maclntyre and Tiede, (2008), Globerman and Shapiro (2003), La Porta et al.(2000 
found out  and offered explanation that rule of law was an important indicator which 
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must be given due consideration by an investor for FDI decisions, simply because 
investors want to know whether there would be  be protection for their investments 
in the foreign location or in the host country.  
 
Investors believe that is only through the presence of reliable rule of law protection 
of their investment is guaranteed. Therefore, it is logical to accept that one among of 
the risks to be assessed before investing in a foreign market should be the country’s 
rule of law. In the absence of rule of law investors have no confidence in security of 
various issues related with their business operations. Investors need to be certain of 
protection of their property rights, they need fair competition in the market, they 
need fair exchange in the market, and they need appropriate conformation and 
loyalty to contracts and contract supervision. They are interested to see a reliable 
legal system, in which there is sufficient independence of the judicial system and 
there is trust in the judicial system for resolving legal disputes.  
 
Kunsch et al. (2014), argued that foreign investors from countries with high-level 
rule of law indices do not prefer to invest in countries with low-level or mid-level 
rule of law indices, and foreign investors from countries with mid-level or low-level 
indices might not find it difficult to invest in countries with corresponding or similar 
circumstances. Wang and Swain (1997) found out and concluded that corruption 
harmed the business climate and deterred foreign direct investment inflow. Morisset 
(2000) concluded that corruption increases administrative costs and therefore 
reduced FDI inflow, while, Wei, (2000) found and concluded that corruption 
reduced FDI; and had a negative impact on capital structure and capital volume.  
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Jensen (2003) concluded that corruption has negative effect on FDI. Asiedu (2005) 
using panel data for 22 countries during the period 1984-2000 concluded that 
corruption has negative impact on FDI flow in Africa. Smith-Hilman and Omar 
(2005) accomplished a study employing survey to investigate the effects of 
regulations and political stability on 121 English firms between 1994 and1996. The 
findings from the study indicated that countries with weak governments and 
corruption received less FDI. Another study by Busse and Hefeker (2007) examined 
the relationship between political risk, corporations and FDI in 83 developing 
countries between 1984-2003, the results showed that corruption was detrimental to 
FDI inflow.  
 
Nilsson-Hakkala, et al. (2008) carried out a study on effects of corruption on FDI; 
using panel regression found out that corruption has negative effects on FDI inflows. 
Al-Sadig (2009), conducted a study to find out the impact of corruption on FDI 
inflows in 117 countries between 1984-2004 using regressions and found that 
corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows. Woo (2010) conducted study on the 
impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 90 countries during 1984-2004 period 
employing panel regression model and found out that corruption had negative impact 
on FDI inflows. Samini and Monfared (2011) examined the impact of corruption on 
FDI inflows in 16 organizations of Islamic cooperation countries between 2002-2008 
periods and concluded that there was negative correlation between corruption and 
FDI inflows. 
 
Mengistu and Adhikary (2011) concluded that corruption was one of the factors 
determining FDI location. Brada et al., (2012) in another study conducted a study on 
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the relationship between corruption and FDI in 84 countries during 2000-2003 
period, they found out and concluded that corruption had negative impact on FDI 
inflows.  On the other hand, Pupovic (2012) investigated the impact of corruption in 
FDI inflows in Montenegro using questionnaire method and concluded that 
corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows.  
 
Another study was conducted by Alemu (2012) to investigate the impact of 
corruption on FDI inflows in 16 Asian countries in the period between 1996-2009 
using panel data and found out  that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows. 
Another study by Kersan-Skabic (2013) on institutional determinants of FDI in 8 
South Eastern European countries between 2001-2010 periods found that corruption 
had significant impact on FDI inflows. Castro and Nunes (2013) did a study on the 
relationship between corruption and FDI inflows in 73 countries during 1998-2008 
periods and concluded that countries with lower corruption level attracted more FDI 
inflows. 
 
On the other hand, Quazi (2014) carried out a study on the impact of corruption on 
FDI in 14 South and Eastern Asian countries in the period between 1995-2011 and 
found out that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows. Tanzania Investment 
Climate Statement (2014, 2015), and TPSF (2015) found out that corruption had 
negative impact on FDI inflow. Ofori, Ato-Mensah and Jinsheng (2015) revealed 
that corruption was a social menace because it created social disorder and instability 
in the form of social unrest, poor provision of social services,and  poses threat due to 
the  high costs of business operations to both private and public sectors and business 
investment in the long run.  
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Peres, Ameer and Xu (2018), noted that one of the most important institutional 
factors that deters FDI inflows was corruption while, Yalta and Kurul (2018) noted 
that reducing corruption increased FDI. Bradhan (1997) noted that corruption had a 
significant positive impact on FDI inflows. Bellos and Subasat (2011) conducted a 
study to find out the relationship between FDI inflows and corruption in 15 transition 
economies during 1990-2005 employing panel gravity model, they found out that 
corruption had no statistically significant impact on FDI inflows. Bellos and Subasat 
(2012), Basemera and Mutenyo (2012), Gutierrez (2015), noted that corruption 
significantly did not deter or influence FDI inflow negatively.  
 
Demirtus (2013) carried out a study on the impact of institutional factors on FDI 
inflows in 71 developed and developing countries between 1995-2002, the results 
showed positive relationship between corruption and FDI inflows.  Mudambi et al. 
(2013) carried out a study on the relationship among corruption, government 
regulations in 55 countries in the period between 1985-2000 employing panel 
regression models their results demonstrated that corruption had no independent 
impact on FDI inflows.  
 
Helmy (2013) accomplished a study on the impact of corruption on FDI in 21 
countries of Middle East and North Africa (MENA countries) in the period between 
2003 -2009 and conluded that corruption had no significant impact on FDI inflows. 
Bayar and Alakbarov (2016) concluded that control of corruption had no statistical 
significant impact on attraction of FDI in 23 emerging market economies. Yalta and 
Kurul (2017) in their study revealed that voice and accountability (VA) had 
significant and positive impact on FDI inflows. 
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Another study with similar results is a study by Gangi (2017) who investigated the 
impact of governance or institutional factors on FDI inflow in 50 African countries 
in the period between 1996-2010, among the findings and conclusion of the study 
was that voice and accountability was statistically significant in attracting FDI in 
African countries. However, this study did not clearly explain the nature of the 
impact of governance or institutional factors on FDI inflow in Africa, whether it was 
positive or negative. On the other hand, Chaib and Siham (2014) found out and 
concluded that voice and accountability had the expected positive impact on FDI 
inflows in Algeria.   
 
Bannaga et al. (2013) carried out in 18 Arab countries in the period between 2000-
2009 and concluded that voice and accountability negatively and significantly 
affected FDI inflow in 18 Arab countries. Berden, et al. (2012) analyzed the impact 
of institutional factors in attracting FDI inflows in Algeria between 1995 and 2011 
and concluded that high level of voice and accountability reduced inward FDI in 
Algeria. Salem and Baum (2016) in their study revealed that political stability and 
absence of violence (PSV) had a positive impact on FDI inflows and was significant 
at 5% level; political stability and absence of violence was found to be significant 
determinant in attracting FDI inflows in real estate.  
 
On the other hand Yalta and Kurul (2017) revealed that improvements in political 
system, exercising policies that enhance participation of citizens in selecting their 
government, as well as protecting civil rights tended to increase FDI inflows in the 
country. Basu and Srinivasan (2002) revealed that political stability and absence of 
violence was a key determinant of FDI inflow. Erramilli and Rao (1993), Gastanaga, 
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et al. (1998), Wei (2000), Grosse and Trevino (2005), Demirhan and Masca (2008), 
Wyk and Lal (2008), found out that lack of political stability and prevalence of 
violence deters FDI inflow.  
 
Moreover, Grosse and Trevino (1996), Tallman (1998), Zhoa (2003), Aguiar et al. 
(2012) concluded that absence of political stability in the host country reduced 
foreign investment inflow in the host country. Reinforcing the above previous 
studies ; Wang and Swain (1997)Stevens (2000)Stein and Daude (2001) Asiedu 
(2005), Vadlamannati (2012), Lee and Rajan (2009), Krifa- Schneider and Matei 
(2010)Mishra and Daly (207),Samini and Ariani (2010), Saidi, et al (2013), Al-
khour and Khalik (2013), Demirtus (2013), Pan (2003),Baek and Qian (2011), 
Smith-Hilmaon and Omar (2005) concluded that political stability had a positive and 
significant impact on FDI inflow.  
 
Erkekoglu and Kilicarslan (2016) carried out a study on whether political stability 
had effect on FDI inflow in 91 countries in the period between 2002-2013; the 
findings were that an increase in political stability and absence of violence reduced 
FDI. On the other hand Wheler and Moody (1992), Noorbaksh, et al., (2001), Sedik 
and Seoudy (2012) found out that political stability had no effect on FDI flows. 
What has been revealed from the previous studies on the relationship between 
institutional factors and FDI flow; is that there is a substantial inconsistency in 
findings by different researchers. Jensen (2003) and Ahliquist (2006) state that more 
democratic countries attract more FDI than authoritarian countries because 
democratic regimes tend to reduce political risks of nationalization, expropriation 
and increase the credibility of the host country for foreign investors. Li and Resnick 
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(2003) on the contrary found that democracy in host country has a negative effect on 
FDI inflows because of the impact of the provision of a lower cost workforce, the 
repression of labor unions, entry deals, and operation affordance in authoritarian 
regimes. 
 
Studies by Bradhan (1997), Emery et al. (2000), Wei (2000), Kinoshita and Compos 
(2001), Bassu and Srinivasan,(2002), Meon and Sekkat,(2005),  Swaleheen and 
Stancel (2007) found out that corruption had significant positive effect on FDI, 
reduces bureaucracy and increases the speed of investments and FDI inflows, 
contrarily Morisset and Neso (2002),Fedderke and Romm (2006), found out that 
corruption  had a deterrent effect on FDI flow. Dupesquier and Osakwe (2006) 
revealed that, lack of good legal and judiciary systems were possible deterrent to 
FDI inflows in Africa. Quere et al (2007) revealed that institutions matter for 
attracting FDI.  
 
Poor institutions e.g. corruption, weaknesses regarding enforcement of property 
rights and poor domestic legal system were responsible for additional costs to FDI. 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) found out that law and order, quality of bureaucracy were 
highly significant in determining FDI inflows. Du et, al;(2008) argued that FDI in 
China preferred regions that had better protection of intellectual property rights, 
lower degree of governmental intervention in business operations and a lower level 
of corruption. Vadlamanati et al. (2009) confirmed that institutional factors were 
crucial determinants of FDI flow in South East Asia.  
 
Mottaleb and Kalirajan (2010) argued that good rules and regulations, motivated FDI 
flows while a study by Woo (2010), found out negative relationship between 
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corruption and FDI flow. Ballos and Subasat (2013a and 2013b), Mutenyo and 
Basemera (2012), using various categories of variables such as aggregate variables 
or macroeconomic variables ( ERR-economic risk rating, PRR-political risk rating 
and governance) and individual variables (corruption and law and order), with 
multiple sources of data (PRSG-political risk service group) and World Bank 
Development Indicators (WDI), found out that corruption had significant positive 
effect on FDI inflow in East African countries, governance, law and order were 
insignificant.  
 
In addition FDI was found to be influenced by other factors such as inflation, GDP 
per capita and openness to trade in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya).   However they 
suggested further studies on the impact of institutional factors on the FDI inflows. 
On the contrary Staats and Biglaiser, (2012); Arezki et al. (2012); found out that 
corruption had significant negative effect on FDI inflow. Another study by Jadhar 
(2012) found out that institutional factors had no significant impact on FDI flow in 
BRICS countries. Karim (2012) argued that several institutional variables, such as 
government stability, friendly policies, the level of corruption and bureaucracy were 
statistically significant in influencing the inflow of FDI in Malaysia. Anyanwu 
(2012) argued that there is a positive relationship between prevalence of rule of law, 
and FDI flows.  
 
The study by Amal et al. (2010) revealed that Government effectiveness had 
negative and significant impact on FDI flow while Koen Berden et al. (2012) found 
that Government effectiveness reduced the FDI inflows, on the other hand Sharma et 
al. (2014) countries with strong formal institutions such as independent judiciary, 
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effective legal systems, secure property rights tended to receive more FDI than 
others. Chaib and Siham (2014) found institutional quality to be an essential factor in 
attracting FDI in Algeria. 
 
Gutierrez (2015) conducted a research on the effects of corruption in Argentina and 
revealed that corruption in Argentina did not deter FDI inflows contrary to what 
most literatures suggested. Mramba (2015) investigated the relationship between 
government terms and regulations, technological and infrastructure factors, and 
abundant of natural resources in Tanzania (as independent variables)  and FDI (as 
dependent variable), the results of linear regression analysis showed that government 
regulations had no relationship with FDI inflow in Tanzania. However, Senkuku 
(2015) suggested further research on other factors that influence FDI inflows in 
Tanzania. Fiodendji (2016) basing on his findings suggested that the impact of 
institutional quality in host countries was more important determinant of FDI inflows 
than many other characteristics of host countries, such as macroeconomic stability.  
 
Hintosova, et al. (2016) found out that the higher corruption perception of a country 
led to lower FDI in Visegrad countries in Central European countries. Hailu et al. 
(2016) using panel data in 49 sub Saharan African countries (Tanzania inclusive), 
found out that there was no statistically significant relationship between institutional 
quality and FDI inflows to Sub-Sahara countries. In another study by Bayar and 
Alakbarov (2016) found out  that control of corruption and rule of law had no 
statistically significant impact on attracting FDI in 23 emerging market economies 
during the period 2002-2014.  
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Samini and Monfared (2011) investigated the impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 
16 Organization of Islamic Cooperation countries during 2002-2008 period using 
panel regression and found that out a negative relationship between corruption and 
FDI inflows. Buchanan, et al. (2012) investigated the interaction between FDI and 
institutional quality in 164 countries during 1996-2006 period using panel regression 
and found out that institutional quality had positive impact on FDI. Brada, et al., 
(2012) examined the relationship between institutional variables and FDI inflows in 
84 countries during 2000-2003 periods and found out that corruption had negative 
impact on FDI inflows.  
 
On the other hand Pupovic (2012) investigated the impact of corruption in FDI 
inflows in Montenegro using questionnaire method and concluded that corruption 
had negative impact on FDI inflows. Castro and Nunes (2013) examined the 
interaction among corruption and FDI inflows in 73 countries during 1998-2008 
period employing panel regression and found out that countries with lower 
corruption attracted more FDI flows. In another study by Mudambi et al. (2013) 
investigated the interaction among government regulation, corruption and FDI in 55 
countries during 1985-2000 period using panel regression and found out that 
corruption had no independent impact on FDI inflows.  
 
Consistent with Mudambi (2013), Helmy (2013) examined the impact of corruption 
on FDI inflows in 21 Middle East and North African countries during 2003-2009 
period and found out that corruption had no significant impact on FDI inflows in 
those countries. Kurul and Yalta (2017) using panel data in 113 developing countries 
(Tanzania inclusive) found out that control or reducing corruption, government 
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effectiveness and reducing the excessive burden of bureaucracy and improvement in 
the political system tend to increase FDI inflows in developing countries.  
 
Table  2.2: Summary of the Reviewed Studies 
Researcher Year Sample Empirical 
Approach 
Results 
Amal,  et al 2010 Latin 
American 
countries 
Panel data analysis Government effectiveness has a 
negative and significant impact on 
FDI flow 
Koen Berden, 
et al 
2012 124 OECD 
countries 
Gravity equation, 
OLS Method 
Government effectiveness and high 
level of accountability reduces the 
FDI inflows 
Turan Subasat 
and Sotios 
Bellos 
 2013a 
and 
2013b 
18 Latin 
American 
countries 
Panel data Gravity 
model 
There is a  statistically significant 
positive relationship between poor 
or weak institutions/poor 
governance indicators   and FDI 
inflows in selected Latin American 
countries 
Basemera and 
Mutenyo 
2012 East African 
countries 
Dunning’s eclectic 
model, Random 
effects and Fixes 
effect 
Corruption has significant positive 
effect on FDI inflows 
Gutrierrez 2015 Argentina  Corruption does not deter FDI 
inflow 
Hailu et al 2016 Sub-Sahara 
African 
countries 
Fixed effect 
technique 
There is no significant relationship 
between institutional factors and 
FDI inflow 
Bradhan 
 
1997 India  Corruption has a significant 
positive impact on FDI inflows 
Jadhar  2012 BRICS 
countries 
Panel data unit-
root test and 
multiple 
regression 
Institutional factors have no impact 
on FDI inflows 
Senkuku 2015 Tanzania Linear regression Regulations had no significant 
relationship with FDI 
Turan Subasat 
and Sotirios 
Bellos 
2012 14 Eastern 
European 
countries and 
South 
American 
countries 
Panel Gravity 
Model 
Weak or poor 
institutions/governance do not 
deter FDI inflows, instead it 
encourages FDI inflows 
Kurul and 
Yalta 
2017 113 
developing 
countries 
Dynamic Panel 
Approach 
Better quality institutions have 
significant positive effect on FDI 
inflows. 
Source: Researcher, 2018 
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Bimal (2017) found that improving institutional quality by controlling corruption 
was found to attract more FDI. Yimer (2017) observed that government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality, and better performance of the rule of law were 
found out to have positive effect on FDI inflows in Ethiopia. Phung (2017) argued 
that countries with less corruption and more effective governments tended to attract 
more FDI and were more appealing to investors. 
 
2.5 Research Gap 
This section addresses research gaps as identified in the reviewed empirical studies.  
 Overall there is a substantial literature highlighting the importance of institutional 
factors and linking them with FDI inflows, however, none of these studies focus on 
Tanzania and most of them tended to focus on a few types of institutional factors 
(Basemera, 2012). This study aimed to fill the existing gaps in the literature and in 
the body of knowledge. Moreover, reviewed previous studies show that there are two 
main views on the impact of corruption on FDI inflows. One view suggests that 
corruption affects FDI inflows negatively, because it increases costs and tends to 
weaken transparency, property rights and competitive environment and prevents 
efficiently functioning of governments (Wei, 2000;   Morisset, 2000).  
 
Contrarily the other views suggest that corruption affects FDI inflows positively, 
because corruption can eliminate problems arising from poor institutions and 
regulations (Bellos and Subasat, 2011).  The two views are reflected in the following 
previous studies. Studies by Udenzi (2014), Staats and Biglaiser, (2012); Arezki et 
al. (2012); and Woo, 2010), and Asiedu (2005) found out corruption to have a 
significant negative effect on FDI flow. While Gastanaga et al., (1998), Mutenyo and 
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Basemera (2012), Ballos and Subasat (2013a and 2013b), and Bradhan (1997) found 
out that corruption had a significant positive impact on FDI flow; Gutierrez (2015) 
conducted a research on the effects of corruption in Argentina and concluded that 
corruption in Argentina did not deter FDI inflows. 
 
Amal, et, al. (2010) in his study revealed that, Government effectiveness had a 
negative and significant impact on FDI inflow, Koen Berden et al.(2012) found out 
that Government effectiveness and high level of accountability reduced FDI inflows, 
Sedik (2012) found out voice and accountability was significantly and negatively 
related to the inward FDI. However, this review has observed that; there are findings 
which neither confirm nor contradict the theory, these include: studies by Jadhar 
(2012) on institutional factors revealed that there was no significant impact on FDI 
flow in BRICS countries. Hailu et al. (2016) in their study concluded that there was 
no statistically significant relationship between institutional quality and FDI inflows 
to Sub-Sahara countries in Africa. Mramba (2015) investigated the relationship 
between government regulations, and FDI. The results of his study suggested that 
government regulations had no relationship with FDI inflow in Tanzania.  
 
Dunning (2006) theory of institutional factors was criticized that it was lagging 
behind time due to its failure in capturing other variables.  Tihanyi et al. (2012), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), Easterly and Levine (2002), Sachs (2003), Glaeset et al. 
(2004) as quoted by Fiodendji(2016) in their studies concluded that economic 
development of a country is to a greater extent explained by its institutional factors, 
its resources, and its economic policies. Basing on the above conclusion of the 
previous studies it was clearly seen that there is a theoretical gap in Dunning (2006) 
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institutional factors theory.   This study aims to fill the existing theoretical gap by 
adding another construct as a new variable in this study. This study suggested 
“accessibility to land” to be included in the Dunning (2006) theory of institutional 
factors.  Land is among the critical and crucial resources in social and economic 
development in any country, among the foreign investors’ complaints were directed 
to land policy and land tenure system in Tanzania.    
 
 This study attempted to address  the relationship between Institutional factors and 
FDI inflows in Tanzania by empirically examining the linkage between Institutional 
factors(rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, voice and accountability, political stability and non-violence and 
accessibility to land) and Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in Tanzania by 
using institutional indicators (indices) from World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999), which is the primary source of 
empirical research on institutions. 
 
2.6 Conceptual Framework 
Conceptual framework refers to the specific ideas a researcher uses in the study. It 
consists of the ideas that are used to define research and evaluate data. Moreover 
conceptual framework identifies the necessary components of the study. FDI inflows 
in the foreign market (country) is influenced by the attractive  institutional factors 
(rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, 
voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, access to land) 
available in the recipient or host country  (Dunning, 2006). 
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Figure  2.1: Conceptual Framework 
Source: Researcher, 2019          
           
2.6.1 Description of Variables in the Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual model has been constituted by independent, dependent and control 
variables. Independent variables includes Institutional Variables, namely, rule of 
law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of corruption, voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, and land accessibility. 
Dependent variable includes only the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in 
Tanzania. The FDI is calculated using FDI inflows and measured as % of GDP. 
These are the variables which have been included in the conceptual framework of 
this study; they have effect similar to that of other independent variables, but were 
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not measured, instead they were held constant to avoid a biasing effect on the other 
variables, and also to avoid multicollinearity problems and biasness in the analysis 
results. In this study Trade openness and Infrastructure were the control variables. 
 
2.6.2 Independent Variables  
The independent variables are the institutional variables, which in case of this study 
include; rule of law, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, control of 
corruption, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, and 
land accessibility. 
 
2.6.2.1. Rule of Law (RL)  
Captures to the perceptions regarding the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, as well as the quality of contract enforcement, the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rule of society, property rights, the police, and 
the courts as well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Saleh and Baum, 2016; 
Bimal, 2017). 
 
2.6.2.2. Government Effectiveness (GE)  
Captures the perceptions of the quality of public services, quality of bureaucracy, 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressure, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies(Baum and Salem,2016; Bimal, 2017). 
 
2.6.2.3. Regulatory Quality (RQ)  
Captures  the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, it is believed to 
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positively influence FDI flow( Baum and Salem, 2016;  Bimal, 2017).   
 
2.6.2.4. Control of Corruption (CC)  
Captures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and 
private interest (Baum and Salem, 2016). 
 
2.6.2.5. Political stability and Absence of Violence (PS)  
Captures the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism. 
 
2.6.2.6. Voice and Accountability (VA)  
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, and a free media. 
 
2.6.2.7. Accessibility to Land (AL)  
Land policy is a factor which greatly affects the flow of FDI. Where land policy is 
transparent and security of tenure is guaranteed, FDI flows in at higher rate. The 
opposite seems to hold true for countries where land policy is clouded and where 
there is uncertainty about the security of tenure. Captures the perception that the 
process of land acquisition is not cumbersome and information about it can be freely 
accessed, not only that, but also security and certainty of land tenure is guaranteed. 
The issue of land cuts across many sectors and therefore touches interests of majority 
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of FDI investors. 
 
2.6.3 Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable for this study is the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows 
in Tanzania. The FDI as dependent variables is calculated using FDI inflows and 
measured as % of GDP.  
 
2.6.4 Control Variables 
These are the variables which have been included in the conceptual framework of 
this study; they have effect similar to that of other independent variables, but were 
neither measured nor analyzed, instead they were held constant to avoid a biasing 
effect on the other variables, and also to avoid multicollinearity problems and 
biasness in the analysis results. This approach was adopted from the previous studies 
including a study by Basemera et al.,(2012) and another study by Castro and Nunes 
(2013). 
 
In this study Trade openness and Infrastructure were the control variables. Moreover 
according to Salkind (2010), in observational design and data analysis, the term 
control variable refers to variables that are not of primary interest and thus constitute 
an extraneous or third factor whose influence is to be controlled or eliminated. The 
aim is to isolate their effect on the dependent variable.  Therefore in order to validly 
make the claim that independent variable A causes changes in outcome variable B, 
all other potential causes of changes in B must be ruled out. According to Schechter 
(2014) adding to the model a variable that is related to the predictor may result in 
less precise (i.e. higher standard error) estimation of the coefficient of the predictor 
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as it ‘steals’ variance from the predictor itself. A variable can be added to the model 
only for the purpose examining the joint effect of the Original predictor and the 
variable.  
 
Control variables are selected from a larger list of relevant variables many of which 
were excluded due to their high co linearity with institutional variables. The choice 
of control variables is motivated by the literature and the previous empirical studies 
on the determinants of FDI inflows and the availability of data. However, in essence 
the choice of control variables is determined by the related theoretical literature. 
 
2.6.4.1. Trade Openness  
According to Eclectic theory as developed by Dunning (1993), Trade openness is a 
socio-economic indicator which encourages FDI flow whereas trade restriction 
entices tariff- jumping FDI. It is measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and 
imports to GDP; it is often interpreted as the quantification of trade restrictions. TOP 
is one of the traditional determinants of FDI inflow (OECD, 2013).  
 
2.6.4.2. Infrastructure  
It reflects the perception of the extent or degree by which a country’s infrastructure 
is available and reliable to support economic and business activities in the country. It 
includes telecommunication systems, roads, ports, airports, electricity, and railways. 
Reliable infrastructure not only stimulates FDI inflows but it reduces operating costs 
for the foreign investor. It is one of the traditional determinants of FDI inflow, it is 
measured by infrastructure index (scaled from 1-100), the higher the better (World 
Bank Development Indicators, 2017; OECD, 2013). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter includes, research philosophy, research design, research approach or 
research strategy, data and sources of data, data analysis, multiple linear regression 
assumptions, model specification, unit root test, co integration test, error correction 
model, Granger Causality test, normality test, heteroscedasticity test, 
multicollinearity test, hypothesis, and ethical considerations.  
 
3.2. Research Philosophy  
This study employed positivism research philosophy. Positivism is a basic research 
philosophy which prefers scientific quantitative methods. It prefers quantitative 
methods such as structured questionnaires and official statistics because these have 
good reliability and representativeness. Positivism philosophy is relevant for this 
study because it tends to look for relationships between two or more variables. The 
emphasis is on quantifiable observations that lend themselves to statistical analysis 
(Saunders, e t al., 2012). 
 
3.3. Research Design 
This is an operational plan to undertake the various procedures and tasks required to 
complete the study. This operational plan ensures that the procedures are adequate to 
obtain valid, objective and accurate answers to the research questions (Kumar, 
2005). According to Kasaidi (2010) research design is also viewed as a conceptual 
framework or structure in which the study was conducted, it describes the way data 
were collected and measured and the way data were analyzed.  
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The research design enables the researcher to conduct the study easily and in an 
organized way since it is used as a road map for the study (Schindler, and Cooper, 
2008). Is a blueprint for the collection, measurement and analysis of data, it aids the 
researcher in allocation of limited resources by focusing on crucial choices in 
methodology. Is a plan and structure of investigation imagined or conceived by the 
researcher to obtain answers to the research question, (Cooper and Schindler, 2008).  
 
Is structure of research which puts together all elements in a research project 
together. It shows how all of the major parts of the research project work together in 
addressing the central research question. (Kombo and Tromp, 2006).  Is a scheme, an 
outline or plan that is used to generate answers to the research problem.  Is an 
arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims 
to combine relevance with the research purpose (Orodho, 2003). Is the conceptual 
structure within which research is conducted? It constitutes the blue-print for the 
collection, measurement and analysis of data (Kothari, 2006). Is a plan of action 
prepared by a research scholar for his study, is a catalogue of the various phases and 
facts relating to the formulation of a research effort (Kothari, 2006; Mustapha, 
2012). Research design is a plan, structure and strategy of investigation so conceived 
as to obtain answers to research questions or problems.  
 
The plan is the complete scheme or program of the research. It includes an outline of 
what the investigator does from writing the hypotheses and their operational 
implications to the final analysis of data (Keslinger, 1986). Is a blue print or detailed 
plan for how a research study is to be completed including activities such as 
operationalizing variables to be measured, selecting a sample of interest to the study, 
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collecting data to be used as a basis for testing hypotheses and analyzing the results 
(Thyer, 1993).  Is a procedural plan that is adopted by the researcher to answer 
questions validly, objectively and economically.  
 
An arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that 
aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure 
(Seltiz et al., 1962).The researcher employed time series research design, because the 
nature of the study required the use of time series data in order to achieve its 
objectives. The study observed FDI inflows over a specified period of time (1996-
2015). The problem confronting the researcher was   to determine whether the 
independent variables (X) have effect on variable (Y). To what extent this is possible 
partly depends on the problem, the number of observations, and the observed 
patterns (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). 
 
3.4. Research Strategy 
The study employed quantitative methods, because the emphasis is on quantifiable 
observations that lend themselves to statistical analysis (Saunders, M. et al., 2012). 
A research strategy is simply a plan of how researcher aims to achieve a research 
goal. Is a broad plan of action which provides direction to the researcher’s study. It 
helps in choosing the right methods for collecting and analyzing the data for the 
research. It entails such actions and activities that focus on the appropriate approach 
for data analysis. Generally there are two basic types of research strategies, namely 
qualitative and quantitative. Quantitative strategy looks at patterns in numerical data, 
which can only be analyzed using statistics. Usually the statistical, mathematical and 
numerical analysis of collected data comes under the quantitative strategy of 
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research. It focuses on when, where, what, how long and how often a specific 
phenomenon occurs. In quantitative strategy, the researcher plays with variables for 
the desired outcomes. Quantitative research data can be collected through 
questionnaire, polls, survey and sometime use secondary data. 
 
3.5. Data and Sources of Data 
In order to examine the relationship between institutional factors and FDI inflows in 
Tanzania this study used secondary quantitative data for institutional variables 
(Independent variables) which was drawn from the World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (w.w.w.govindicators.org) developed by Kaufmann et 
al.,(1999) which is the primary source of data for research on institutions and 
institutional factors. This data source has been used by various researchers including: 
Mutenyo and Basemera (2012), Kurul and Yalta (2017), Chain and Siham (2014), 
and Babayan (2015). The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators are 
categorized in six groups each of which represents a different aspect of institutional 
quality in a country.  
 
The variables for this study were; Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality, Government 
Effectiveness and Control of Corruption, Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and absence of Violence. All of these indicators take values from the scale 
between 2.5 and +2.5; the larger values indicate better institutional quality. The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators cover over 200 countries and territories, 
measuring six dimensions of governance starting in 1996: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. In addition to the above, data on 
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access to land variable obtained from WBG,  (2017) will also be included.   
 
The data reflect the views on governance of surveyed respondents and public, 
private, and NGO sector experts worldwide which  include the World Economic  
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, The Institute for Management 
Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, the World Bank/EBRD’s 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance surveys, the Gallup World Poll, 
Latinobarometro, Afrobarometro, and America barometer (Kaufmann, 2010). The 
study also used quantitative secondary data for FDI inflows (Dependent variable) 
drawn from the Bank of Tanzania (BOT), Tanzania Investment Report (TIR) (2012, 
2013, 2014, the data is also available at (w.w.w.bot-tz.org). The data used were 
annual time series data for the period 1996-2015 obtained from published sources. 
 
3.6. Data Analysis 
The quantitative institutional data were obtained from the secondary source (World 
Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, by Kaufmann, 1999), FDI data were 
obtained from the Bank of Tanzania (BOT). Multiple-Linear Regression Model was 
employed; this analysis is adopted when the study has one dependent variable which 
is presumed to be a function of two or more independent variables. The objective of 
this analysis is to make a prediction about the dependent variable based on its 
covariance with all the concerned independent variables. EVIEWS 10 software was 
used for running regression analysis in this study. Usually according to Greene 
(2002) and Gujarat (2009) multiple linear regression models is the appropriate model 
for estimating the relationship between the dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables. 
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3.7 Description of Variables and Measurement Procedures 
 In order to measure and analyze the relationship between institutional variables and 
the FDI flow variable the study used institutional indicators from World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann et al, (1999) which is the 
primary source of empirical research on institutions. The indicators can be 
categorized in groups each of which represents different aspects of institutional 
quality in a country. The indicators include: Control of corruption, Government 
effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, Voice and Accountability, and 
Political Stability and non- violence. These indicators are scaled between -2.5 and 
+2.5, where a higher score means better quality of institutions or institutional factors 
(Chaib and Siham; 2014). 
 
Table   3.1: Measurement of Variables     
Independent 
variables 
Measurement Indicators  
Control of 
Corruption(C) 
This variable was measured by control of corruption indicator, which   
measured perceptions of corruption, bribes, illegal activities of 
bureaucrats and protection of foreign investors from illegal payments to 
public officials (Kaufmann, et, al.(1999),World Bank Worldwide 
Governance Indicators; Siham an Chaib, 2014; Kurul and Yalta, 2017). 
Government 
Effectiveness 
(GE) 
The variable was   measured by government effectiveness indicator, the 
indicator measured the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil 
servants, the quality of public service provision, the credibility of 
government’s commitments to policies and the independence of civil 
servants from political pressures (Kaufmann, et, al. (1999), World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators; Siham and Chaib, 2014; Kurul and 
Yalta, 2017). 
Regulatory 
Quality (RQ) 
The variable was measured by regulatory quality indicator, the indicator 
measured perceptions of the ability of government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
(Kaufmann, et al. (1999) World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators;Siham and Chaib, (2014); Kurul and Yalta, (2017). 
Rule of Law 
(RL) 
The variable measured by the rule of law indicator; the indicator 
measured perceptions regarding the effectiveness and predictability of 
the judiciary, as well as the enforceability of contracts. (Kaufmann, et 
al. (1999). World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators; Baum and 
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Salem (2016), Kurul and Yalta, (2017). 
Political 
stability and 
Absence of 
Violence (PV) 
Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Was measured 
by political stability and absence of violence indicator. 
Voice and 
Accountability 
(VA) 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
Accessibility 
to Land (AL) 
Captures the perception that the process of land acquisition is not 
cumbersome and information about it can be freely accessed, not only 
that, but also security and certainty of land tenure is guaranteed. 
Measured by land accessibility indicator. 
Dependent 
variable 
 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(FDI) 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)as a dependent variable was   measured 
as a percentage (%) of FDI inflows to the GDP of a country (World 
Bank). 
Control  
Variables 
 
Trade 
Openness 
(TOP) 
According to Eclectic theory as developed by Dunning (1993), Trade 
openness is a socio-economic indicator which encourages FDI flow 
where as trade restriction entices tariff- jumping FDI. It is measured by 
the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP; it is often 
interpreted as the quantification of trade restrictions. TOP is one of the 
traditional determinants of FDI inflow (OECD, 2013).  
Infrastructure 
(IS) 
It reflects the perception of the extent or degree by which a country’s 
infrastructure is available and reliable to support economic and business 
activities in the country. It includes telecommunication systems, roads, 
ports, airports, electricity, and railways. Reliable infrastructure not only 
stimulates FDI inflows but it reduces operating costs for the foreign 
investor. It is one of the traditional determinants of FDI inflow, it is 
measured by infrastructure index (scaled from 1-100), the higher the 
better (World Bank Development Indicators, 2017; OECD, 2013). 
Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators developed by Kaufmann et, (1999) 
 
 
 
3.8 Assumptions of the Multiple Linear Regression Model 
The aim of this study was to find out the relationship between   FDI (dependent 
variable) and the institutional factors (independent variable). According to Greene 
(2003) and Gujarat (2009) the following are the assumptions of the multiple linear 
regression model on the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variables. 
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3.8.1. Linearity 
Linearity test usually aims to determine whether the relationship between 
independent variables and the dependent variable is linear or not. Regression model 
requires the data of independent and dependent variable to be linearly related. The 
model specifies a linear relationship between Y and X1…..Xk. Linearity in 
econometric analysis implies that the average or the mean of the response variable is 
a linear combination of the parameters (regression coefficients) and the predictor 
variables. Usually multiple linear regression analysis makes a number of key 
assumptions, among the assumptions is that there must be a linear relationship 
between the dependent or the outcome variable and the independent variables. 
Whenever there is a linear relationship between independent and dependent variables 
any given change in the independent variable will definitely produce a corresponding 
change in the dependent variable. 
 
3.8.2. Heteroscedasticity and no Autocorrelation 
The error term, ε, has an equal or constant variance, σ
2
 in each time and for all 
values of x, and is uncorrelated with every other disturbance, ε. By 
homoscedasticity, it is assumed that variance of error terms are similar across the 
values of the independent variables involved in the study. 
 
3.8.3.  Normal Distribution 
The disturbances are normally distributed. To comply with such assumptions 
diagnostic tests have been performed to verify and confirm or ascertain the 
assumptions of the linear regression model by performing a number of tests.  Among 
the tests performed include; normality test, heteroscedasticity test, multicollinearity 
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test, serial correlation or autocorrelation test and pair wise correlation test. 
 
3.9 Diagnostic Tests 
  Everitt (2002) and Dodge (2003) define diagnostic tests as set of procedures 
available for regression analysis that seek to assess the validity of a model in any of 
a number of different ways. This assessment may be an exploration of the model’s 
underlying statistical assumptions, an examination of the structure of the model by 
considering formulations that have fewer or different explanatory variables or a 
study of subgroups of observations looking for those that are either poorly 
represented by the model (outliers) or that have a relatively large effect on the 
regression model’s predictions. A regression diagnostic or diagnostic test therefore 
may take the form of graphical results, informal quantitative results or a formal 
statistical hypothesis test each of which provides guidance for further stages of 
regression analysis. 
 
Therefore to ensure that parameters are consistent and unbiased diagnostic test has 
been   carried out, for Normality, Heteroscedasticity, and Multicoullinearity tests.  
Diagnostic testing is a necessary process in economic analysis, since many time 
series data are faced by or confronted by multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and 
serial correlation just to name few of them. This test is crucial since it handles 
problems associated with time series data regression analysis. 
 
3.10 Normality Test 
Most statistical tests rest upon the assumption of normality. Deviations from 
normality called non-normality render statistical tests inaccurate, so it is important to 
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know if the data are normal or non-normal.  A normality test is a statistical process 
used to determine if a sample or any group of data fits a standard normal 
distribution. The importance of normality test dwells on the fact that most statistical 
tests rest upon the assumption of normality. Deviations from normality called non-
normality render those statistical tests inaccurate, so it is important to know if data in 
the study are normal or non-normal.   
 
Tests that rely upon the assumption or normality are called parametric tests, if data is 
not normal, then one would use statistical tests that do not rely upon the assumptions 
of normality, called non- parametric tests.  However, non –parametric tests are less 
powerful than parametric tests, which mean the non –parametric tests have less 
ability to detect real difference or validity in the data. In other words one would need 
to conduct parametric tests because he/she wants to increase the chances of getting 
or finding significant results. In this study, a normality test was performed; Jacque 
Berra test was used to test whether sample had skewness and kurtosis matching a 
normal distribution. The main aim for this test was to evaluate if the value of 
variables under study were normally distributed. The study tested the variables 
without natural logarithm and found that variables were not ‘normally distributed’. 
After realizing the study instituted all variables with the natural logarithm and tested 
for normal distribution using ‘Jarque Bera statistics and found that all variables had 
normal distribution. 
 
3.11 Heteroscedasticity Test 
The existence of heteroscedasticity is a problem that results from having variances of 
the error term that are not constant for each value of the independent variables. 
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Among the causes of heteroscedasticity include data sets that have a large range 
between the largest and the smallest observed values. Time series model can also 
have heterscedasticity if the dependent variable changes significantly from the 
beginning to the end of the series. Heteroscedasticity is a problem because ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression assumes that all residuals are drawn from a 
population that has a constant variance (homoscedasticity). Moreover 
heteroscedasticity is a problem because it makes coefficients estimates less precise, 
as a result this leads into biased standard errors and hence to statistical tests that are 
not correct. In order to satisfy the regression assumptions and be able to trust the 
results, the residuals should have a constant variance. 
 
Breusch-Pagan test was used to test whether the variance of the errors from a 
regression was dependent on the values of the independent variables. Testing for 
heterscedasticity is one of the most important assumptions in OLS or multiple 
regression models. Under linear regression model the study assumes (Vi) of 
regression analysis are homoscedastic. Homoscedasticity means they have the same 
variances, “homo” stands for equal and “scedasticity” stands for spread (equal 
spread variances). Therefore homoscedasticity means spreading of equal variances 
(Gujarat, 2009). It is important to note that, it is troublesome to employ OLS in 
estimation while there is heteroscedasticity.  
 
It is critical to check for heteroscedasticity in the linear regression model since 
failure to do so most likely the inference and conclusion drawn by the study will be 
misleading. In order to determine the heterscedasticity there are various techniques 
which include both formal and informal tests. According to Gujarat informal tests 
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usually employ graphical presentation where as formal tests use various techniques 
like “ Park test, Glejser test, Spearmann’s Rank Correlation test, Goldfeld-Quandt 
test, and  Breusch-Pagan Godfrey test” among others (Gujarat, 2009). However 
many studies employ formal test for heteroscedasticity. Breusch-Pagan- Godfrey test 
appears to be the most powerful of all tests named, this study preferred Breusch- 
Pagan-Godfrey test found in Eviews10 to be employed in this regression analysis. 
 
3.12 Serial Correlation or Autocorrelation Test 
Testing for autocorrelation is as important as testing for heteroscedasticity. Ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimates assume that the error term relating to any observation 
(variable) is not influenced by the error term relating to any other observation 
(variable) (Gujarati, 2004). By definition, serial correlation which is also   known as  
autocorrelation is a correlation between members of series of observations ordered in 
time [as in time series data] or space [as in cross-sectional data] (Gujarati, 2004, 
p.442).  
 
Koutsoyiannis (2010), defines autocorrelation or serial correlation as a special case 
of correlation, it refers to the relationship, not between two or more different 
variables but between the successive values of the same variable. According to 
Ngailo (2009) Serial correlation occurs when we have correlated consecutive errors 
or residuals. When consecutive residual values have the same sign, we have positive 
serial correlation while a negative serial correlation occurs when signs change for 
consecutive residuals. The serial correlation problem can be encountered when one 
is using time series data in which current year errors may be correlated with previous 
year errors because current year data are following previous year trend. 
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Serial correlation can be detected through the use of informal and formal tests. 
However the most appropriate test is the formal test from various ways or 
techniques.  The most popular tests are Durbin-Watson statistic and Bruesch-
Godfrey test. Moreover, Durbin-Watson statistic has some weaknesses as compared 
to Bruesch-Godfrey test. Durbin-Watson test assumes that the independent variables 
are nonstochastic as such if this condition is violated then the test is not valid in any 
sample (Gujarati, 2004). This condition was found to be difficult to hold under time 
series data. Therefore, in order to overcome this weakness, the study uses the 
powerful Bruesch-Godfrey test.  
 
Bruesch-Godfrey (BG) test which accommodates the weakness of D-W test. BG test 
is viewed as a general test since it allows for non stochastic independent variables 
even the lagged values of the dependent variable, ― high order autoregressive 
schemes like AR (1), AR (2), AR (3), AR (4) and so forth. BG also allows for ― 
simple or higher order moving averages (MA) of white noise error terms in 
computation. With this regard, BG test becomes more powerful than D-W test. The 
study estimates BG statistic using EViews 10 and inferences regarding 
autocorrelation are made from BG test statistic.  
 
Serial correlation results into biased standard errors, although the estimated 
regression coefficients might not be biased at all. This tends to exaggerate the values 
of t-statistic leading one to fail to reject the null hypothesis most often than not. In 
addition values of the R
2
and the F- statistic become unreliable as well. This problem 
can be overcome, or at least minimized, by running a first difference regression 
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model for both the dependent and the independent variables. If this does not work 
one may try to run a regression model without the constant term (Ngailo, 2009). 
 
3.13 Multicollinearity Test 
 According to Koutsoyiannis (2010), when any two explanatory (independent) 
variables are changing in nearly the same way, it becomes extremely difficult to 
establish the influence of each one regressor on Y separately. Therefore the term 
multicollinearity is used to denote the presence of linear relationships (or near linear 
relationships) among explanatory variables. If the explanatory variables are perfectly 
linearly correlated, that is, if the correlation coefficient for these variables is equal to 
unity, the parameters become indeterminate; it is impossible to obtain numerical 
values for each parameter separately and the method of least squares breaks down.  
 
Multicollinearity is a state of very high inter-associations among the independent 
variables. It occurs when two or more independent variables have high correlation 
coefficients amongst themselves. This situation creates redundant information, 
skewing the results in the regression model. It is a type of disturbance in the data the 
statistical inferences made about the data may not be reliable. It occurs when 
variables are highly correlated to each other and when there is repetition of the same 
variable. Multicollinearity makes it difficult to gauge the effect of independent 
variables on dependent variables.  According to Gensa, (2016), and Stephenie 
(2017), causes of multicollinearity include; insufficient data, variables in the 
regression that is actually a combination of two other variables, and two identical (or 
almost identical) variables. 
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It was tested using a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and other tests. As said above 
multicollinearity is the tendency of independent variables in the regression analysis 
to have close relationship or interrelated as such make the coefficients estmates 
indeterminate. It should be clearly understood that in testing for multicollinearity the 
test is dealing with the extent of interrelation among independent variables and not 
absence or presence of multicollinearity, since multicollinearity is there in every 
regression analysis.  What appears to be critical in this testing is to determine the 
lowest level, of interrelationship among the independent variables, since every 
technique employed in determining multicollinearity provides or gives a certain level 
of interrelationship among independent variables.  
 
The frequently employed techniques include Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), 
Pairwise correlation and Tolerance (Gujarat, 2009). The consequences of estimating 
the equation while there are high multicollinearity among  independent variables 
include: Even when the ordinary square (OLS) are best linear unbiased estimator 
(BLUE) but its estimates are not precise since the estimates are not precise then the 
confidence intervals become more wider as such very often may lead to acceptance 
of null hypothesis. Apart from widening the confidence interval but also r ratio 
statistics becomes statistically insignificant and R
2
 becomes extremely high (Gujarat, 
2009).  
 
Usually multicollinearity is detected by simply looking at the high R
2
 but few 
significant t ratios. For instance when R
2
 or adjusted R
2
 is high, exceeding 0.8 while 
F statistic after rejecting H0 and at the same time t ratios showing very few or no 
significant coefficients then the study suspects the presence of high interrelationship 
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among the independent variables. However, Gujarat (2009) points out that, 
multicollinearity test is exceptionally strong but is only regarded bad, when  any two 
explanatory variables are changing in nearly the same way, such that, it becomes 
extremely difficulty to establish the influence of each one regressor on Y separately. 
Hence apart from using coefficients of determination also the study dealt with 
multicollinearity using both pair-wise correlation test and tolerance and Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF). 
 
3.13.1. Pair wise Correlation Test 
Usually this test is employed to determine the correlation of independent variables if 
it is too high or too low. This test suggests that the pair-wise or zero-order 
correlation coefficient between two independent variables is high, if it exceeds 0.8, 
thus multicollinearity becomes a problem and if it is less there is no problem of 
multicollinearity among independent variables. Gujarat (2009) points out that high 
zero order correlations are a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence 
of multicollinearity because it can exist even when the zero order or simple 
correlations are comparatively low, (less than 0.5). Hence it important to remember 
that the effect of multicollinearity should not be judged only by looking at the high 
zero order correlation but also at its ability to explain the dependent variable. 
Therefore this study neglects or disregards this test and opts for variance inflation 
factor (VIF).  
 
3.13.2. Variance Inflation Factor  
Variance  Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance (Tol) are the widely employed 
techniques in detecting   multicollinearity due to their simplicity to use and provide 
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the degree of correlation among independent variables as such it  becomes easy to 
identify which variables are more collinear. The closer tolerance to 0 (zero) implies 
that there are problems of co linearity among independent variables; whereas closer 
tolerance to 1(one) implies that independent variables are not collinear to each other.  
Again VIF detects multicollinearity, VIF values exceeding 10 signifies that  
variables are collinear but if or when less than 10 then there is no problem of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables (Gujarat, 2009). 
 
In addition, proper solution for multicollinearity is still questionable or disputable. 
So far there are two possible answers or options.  1
st
 do nothing and 2
nd
 do 
something school of thought.  Generally speaking ‘do nothing school of thought’ 
under Blanchard argues that: when students run their first ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, the first problem they usually confront is that of multicollinearity.  
Consistent with Blanchard school of thought multicollinearity is in essentially a data 
deficiency problem (micronumerousity) and sometimes we have no alternative over 
the availability of data for empirical analysis. As stated by Gujarat (2009) it is not 
that all the coefficients in regression model are statistically insignificant.  
 
Furthermore, even if we cannot estimate one or more regression coefficients with 
greater accuracy or precision a linear combination of them can be relatively 
estimated efficiently. On the other hand, other schools of thoughts propose to do 
something regarding multicollinearity problems such as combining cross sectional 
and time series data to form pooled data or dropping some variables. However 
dropping some variables causes problems of specification bias or specification error.  
Moreover, they propose transforming variables through taking first difference or 
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dividing the variables with common root. Besides the study may add new data (new 
sample).  
 
Alternatively checking for co linearity can be done using the Durbin-Watson 
statistics. Normally Durbin-Watson statistic value lies between 0 and 4. A Value 
close to 2 suggests no problem of correlation whereas value close to 0 implies 
‘negative correlations. Values close to 4 implies positive correlations (Ayer, 2008). 
Notwithstanding all these techniques for answers are not devoid of weaknesses. This 
study relied much on Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in determining 
multicollinearity due its reliability and its simple decision criteria. 
 
3.14 Model Specification 
This is a stage in which a model which is expected to provide a convenient, useful 
and reasonably accurate description of the system that is to be studied is specified. 
While specifying the model, issues that need to be considered include: What type of 
variables were to be included in the model, How many explanatory variables are 
necessary, What type of data are needed, Is it possible to get the desired data, What 
type of functional relationship is desired, What type of results are expected, What is 
the use of the model which is estimated. 
 
In this study, model specification attempts to investigate the relationship between 
FDI and institutional factors in Tanzania using multiple regression model on each 
institutional factor from 1996 to 2015. The regression equation is in natural 
logarithm in order to reduce the problem of outlier effect and the problem of 
heteroscedasticity. The regressions are in first difference in order to reduce the 
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problem of multicollinearity which is likely to affect the precision of estimation by 
overstating its estimates.Variables and data included in the model have been adopted 
from the World Governance indicators, World Bank (Kaufmann, 1996), and Kurul 
and Yalta (2017).  Bank of Tanzania (BOT). The model used for this study is well 
shown in the equation below: 
According to Dunning’s theory (2006) of institutional factors, FDI is a function of 
institutional factors:  
   , , , , , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1F D I F C C R L R Q G E P S V V A A L  
 
Model in equation one cannot be measured since it is a mere mathematical function; 
therefore, equation one transformed into econometric model so as to facilitate the 
measurement of the variables. Based on the nature of the data, the study employed 
semi-log modeling. The study instituted the natural logarithm in FDI in order to 
minimize the problem of outliers. The present study did not institute natural 
logarithm in independent variables since all the variables are in ratios; as such there 
is no problem of outliers. 
 tttttttt ALVAPSVGERQRLCCFDI  7654321ln
... (2) 
 
where FDI is the dependent variable and the independent variables are the   
institutional factors namely, Rule of law (RL), Government effectiveness (GE), 
Regulatory Quality (RQ), Control of Corruption (CC), Political stability and non- 
violence (PS), Voice and accountability (VA), and Accessibility to land (AL) and t is 
time series, α is the constant, β1 to β7 are coefficients of CC, RL, RQ,GE, PV, VA, 
AL, where the sign of coefficient of any independent variable is negative it means 
the relationship between independent variables and dependent variable is negative, 
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and where the sign of coefficient of  any independent variable  is positive  it implies 
that the relationship between independent variable and dependent variable is 
positive.  
 
The constant α  and the coefficient β are regression parameters to be estimated.  FDI 
is the variable for which we want to explain its behavior while α is a constant term or 
vertical intercept which represents the value of FDI when none of the independent 
variables exists.  Β1 to β7 are known as the estimated partial regression coefficients or 
simply slope coefficients. They measure by how much FDI change when each of 
them changes by one unit, given that all others have been held constant. This implies 
that each of the   β1 to β7 is a measure of the partial effect of the unit change of each 
CC, RL, RQ,GE, PV, VA, and AL on the mean value of  FDI when the rest of the 
factors have been held constant.  Ln is natural log (used to minimize outlier 
problems) and ε is an error term, t is time. 
 
3.15 Econometric Tests used in Analysis 
Apart from the problems of multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and 
misspecification of the regression model, there are other problems that face 
regression analysis which include non-stationary, especially in time series data. In 
order to avoid such serious problems, various tests have been performed to correct 
such undesirable situations in the study. Problems of non-stationary at levels as such 
in many cases causes spurious regression output in many studies. In order to 
minimize problems of spurious regression the time series data were tested by a 
specified number of tests.  
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As it has been explained in the above paragraph, data particularly time series data in 
most cases are likely to be affected by non-stationarity problems as such economic 
regression on such modeling can provide spurious regression. The implication here 
is that mean and variance are time variant and thus basic assumptions of the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) are contravened or disobeyed.  In this respect it is obligatory to 
test for non-stationarity using Dickey Fuller (DF) or Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test. Additionally after testing for non-stationarity and stationarity and find 
variables are integrated in the same order then co integration and error correction 
model are employed so as to see if variables have long run relationship. 
 
Non stationary variables imply that the mean and variances are time invariant 
(Gujarat, 2009). Ordinary least square (OLS) regression under stationary variables 
usually its regression outputs are not spurious. It is crucial to note that if ‘residuals of 
the regression’ at level are ‘stationary’ then outputs at level are also not spurious 
rather they are representing the long run relationship output (Granger and Engle, 
1987; Gujarat 2009).The study tested for stationarity and non-stationarity using unit 
root test. 
 
3.15.1 Unit Root Test 
The Dickey Fuller Test based on linear regression in which case the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test (ADF) was used. 
 tjt
p
j jtt YYY p    )( 141  
The Philllips-Perron (PP) Test which is a modification of the Dickey Fuller test was 
applied to check and correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error. 
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There are various ways of carrying out unit root test, however the common ones 
include; carrying out unit root test through informal approach and carrying out unit 
root test through formal unit root testing.  
 
There are two types of unit root tests under informal approach namely; unit root test 
under time plot which may suggest the presence of unit root (non stationary) that the 
mean is not constant over time, and another type is the unit root test which can be 
inspected through the empirical correlograms for indicating the decaying time of 
time series. Under non stationarity time series empirical correlograms reveals or 
exposes the quick decay than in stationary time series.  Notwithstanding these 
techniques are said to be very weak test for unit root testing, hence this study will 
mainly focus in the formal test for unit root testing. 
 
Under formal ways there are several unit root tests which can be employed in 
investigating unit root, preferably the study may choose ‘Dickey- Fuller (DF) test,  
Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) test and Phillip Perron (PP) test  (Watson and 
Teelucksingh, 2002;   Greene, 2003; Gujarat, 2009). However in the contemporary 
econometrics the frequently employed techniques for testing unit root include DF, 
ADF test and PP test. According to Gujarat (2009), ADF test for unit root is the most 
powerful test, based on this fact this study prefers the ADF test. 
 
Very often the economic series data are non-stationary which suggest that its mean 
does not fluctuate around its fixed mean. Whenever stationary time series mean 
fluctuates around its fixed mean, this means that whenever the mean moves away 
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from its fixed mean it returns quickly to the fixed mean. Moreover non stationary 
time series usually become a stationary series after a first difference. Formally 
written as I (1) means that time series are non-stationary becomes stationary after 
differentiating once. Thus, stationary time series is integrated of order zero and 
written as I (0). However, other time series sometimes require two differencing 
before becoming stationary, as such those series are integrated of order two and 
written as I (2) (Watson and Teelucksingh, 2002; Gujarat, 2009). 
 
 It is suggested to test unit root in order avoid ‘spurious regressions,’ because it is 
obvious that regression of non-stationary time series on another non- stationary time 
series gives spurious regression implying meaningless results, for this reason unit 
root test is absolutely important. In order to obtain realistic and meaningful results 
employing unit root test in time series data is inescapable or a grave mistake to 
ignore it.  Moreover the test for unit root is essential in order to know if variables in 
the study are integrated in the same order or not.  When variables are integrated in 
the same order, I(0) means stationary time series and its regression output will not be 
spurious.  Any regression of time series of non-stationary on the stationary time 
series will produce spurious regression or meaningless results.  
 
According to Watson and Teelucksingh, 2002; Gujarat, 2009; and Greene, 2003) 
spurious results cannot be used in predictions because variables are not integrated in 
the same order. Hence, unit root testing under formal approach particularly Dickey-
Fuller (DF) test is conducted using the random walk model. 
Under random walk model, tests are undertaken in three ways: 
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i. Random walk without deterministic and stochastic trends (constant and trend) 
Xt=σXt-1+et 
ii. Random walk with deterministic (constant)  
iii. Xt=α1+σXt-1+et 
iv. Random walk with both deterministic and stochastic trends (constant and 
trends) 
v. Xt=α1+α2T+σXt-1+et 
 
Where T is trend from time series data under this tests the H0 is σ = 0; which means 
the unit root implies non stationary. H1 (σ<0) meaning that time series is stationary. 
Notwithstanding, Dickey –Fuller test in testing unit root assumes error term (et) is 
uncorrelated, in case if ‘error term is correlated’ DF test cannot be applied. Thus for 
correlated error term DF develop the powerful which is ADF.  
ADF is done by summing equations above by adding the lagged values of the 
dependent variables. Hence ADF test is estimated with the following equation: 
Xt=α1α2δXt-1  
Where εt is pure white noise error term. ADF test include more terms in order to 
make error term in equation (3) above be ‘serially uncorrelated.’ Similarly 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test whether Ô=0 as such Augmented Dickey 
Fuller is not different from DF hence follows the same asymptotic distribution, thus 
the same critical values are utilized (Gujarat, 2009, Greene, 2003). 
 
Decision criteria: According to Zivot (2012), rho-1 =ô, where ô is regression 
coefficient and γ is rho. Therefore rho=1+ô. Thus if rho>1, the variable is non 
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stationary and if rhois<1then the variable is stationary. Gujarat points out that’ if the 
computed absolute value of the tau statistic exceeds the DF critical values reject the 
null hypothesis (non stationary) then variables are stationary. If the computed 
absolute value does not exceed the critical tau values do not reject the null 
hypothesis as such variables are non-stationary (Gujarat, 2009p 816). 
 
After establishing that variables are stationary, the study examines if the variables 
are co integrated or not. This is a very important stage in regression analysis as 
mentioned or explained earlier as it prevents the study from doing meaningless 
regression or spurious regression. This study adheres to the rule that co integration 
analysis is inevitable for this study. Gujarat (2009) and Greene (2003) insist the 
importance of testing for co integration by stating that ‘regression of time series 
variable on one or more time series variables often can give no sense or spurious 
results. This kind of phenomenon is popularly referred to as spurious regression. One 
of the means to guard against it is to find out if the time series variables are co 
integrated (Greene, 2003; Gujarat, 2009). Therefore after unit root test the study 
tested for co integration on time series variables. 
 
3.15.2 Cointegration Test 
Variables are said to be co integrated if they have a long-term or equilibrium 
relationship between them. A test for co integration is a pre-test to avoid spurious 
regression situation. 
 The test for co integration was carried out by employing the Johansen test of co 
integration.   
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Co integration analysis is important in any time series economic regression.  A linear 
‘combination of one dependent variable and one or more independent variables can 
be either integrated of order I (1) or integrated of zero I (0)’. 
 
When the mean of error term vary around a fixed mean (zero mean) these variables 
are co integrated. If the linear combination is integrated of order one then variables 
are said to be non-stationary as such variables are not co integrated. Co integration 
variables tend to move together in the long run (long run equilibrium) Gujarat 2009; 
Greene, 2003; Watson and Teelucksingh, 2002). As a matter of fact, model 
estimation and hypothesis testing employing the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
become viable only when variables involved in regression are ‘integrated of order 
zero’. In most cases macroeconomic time series data are non-stationary meaning that 
they are ‘integrated of order one’ as such that linear combination ‘violates the basic 
assumptions for OLS estimation.’ 
 
Using or applying estimation in such situation is more likely to produce meaningless 
regression or spurious regression. This implies that correlation or linear combination 
cannot establish any causal relationship among the variables.  It has been pointed 
that in order to resolve the problem regression analysis should be run in the first 
difference both in dependent and independent variables; this is according to Granger 
and New bold (1974) as cited by Watson and Teelucksingh 2002. Davidson as cited 
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by Watson and Teelucksingh (2002) claims that differencing the variables ignores 
the important information about long- run. It suggests that differencing equation 
should take into account short-run dynamics i.e. static or long-run relationship 
among un-differencing values. Usually static values enter in differencing equation as 
‘Error Term Mechanism (ECM). 
 
Consistently Engle and Granger (1978) suggest that Davidson et al propositions are 
possible if and only if the variables associated in the relationship are integrated.  
Thus ‘if two or more variables are integrated are so integrated’ then OLS regression 
used on the variables which ‘is not integrated of order zero’ is still possible or valid. 
Where the study have  seen or recognized that dependent variables and one or more 
independent variables are integrated or combined of order one I (1) but its residuals 
( t)  are integrated of order zero I (0), then the variables are said to be co-integrated 
(Engle and Granger, 1978)’ therefore OLS application is possible. According to 
Engle and Granger (1978) if dependent and independent variables are co integrated, 
then there exists an error connection, and if it is found, then the dependent and 
independent variables are co integrated.  This is ‘Granger representation theorem’ it 
makes the use of error correction mechanism or model (ECM) imperative in most 
studies of this nature. 
 
A number of approaches are used in testing for co integration, which include Dickey 
Fuller or Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test on the residuals regression 
(estimation) from co integration regression commonly referred to as Engle Granger 
(EG) or Augmented Engle-Granger (AEG) test. Other approaches include Co-
integrating Regression Durbin- Watson (CRDW) and Johansen (1988) co integration 
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test. The first two techniques have some weaknesses in testing for co integration in 
every variable under study. Since the first two techniques have some weaknesses or 
deficiencies as such it has become necessary to reinforce those weak techniques with 
the powerful technique or approach such as Johansen (1988) co integration test.  
 
3.15.3 Augmented Engle- Granger (AEG) Test 
Dickey Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests are known as Engle- 
Granger (EG) and Augmented Engle- Granger (AEG) tests in the present context 
(Gujarat, 2009).The Engle- Granger for integration (EG) was proposed by Engle- 
Granger in 1978 and enjoyed wide spread acceptance in 1990. Its wide popularity by 
economists is due to the fact that it is simple to understand, to use and interpret than 
its competitors namely Johansen (1988). One of its weaknesses is that it is not 
capable to determine more than one co integration equation, thus it is best to employ 
in bivariate regression analysis rather than in multivariate regression analysis. 
Despite this shortcoming however, it is still capable in multiple regression analysis, 
since it has the power to determine the co integration amongst the variables.  Engle- 
Granger (EG) test follows two procedures in its operations. 
 
The Engle- Granger (EG)  first step requires to run co integration regression using 
ordinary least squares where variables are at level and are integrated of order one(1) 
which means they are non stationary. The second step requires to test the residuals 
obtained from step one (co integrating regression) using the unit root technique 
being Dickey- Fuller or Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF).  Once residuals of 
regression are stationary then null hypothesis is rejected of no co integration On the 
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other hand if they are non stationary the study do not reject null hypothesis then 
variables are not co integrated (Granger, 1986; Granger and Engle, 1987). 
(i) Co integrating regression equation 
 tttttttt ALVAPSVGERQRLCCFDI  7654321ln
…  (3) 
(ii) Residual estimation equation 
 tttt UU  1 …………………...………………………………….. (4) 
H0: α1 0; no co integration (unit root), Variables are not co integrated 
H1:α1 0; Co integrated (no unit root, variables are co integrated. 
 
Decision Criteria: 
Rejecting H0implies residuals are stationary. If the regression residuals are stationary 
then included variable must be co integrated (Zivot, 2012; Gujarat, 2009). Therefore 
where residuals of the equation (4) are stationary then co integrating regression in 
step one is not meaningless (spurious) even if variables individually are non 
stationary (Granger and Engle, 1987, Gujarat, 2009). Moreover, given that this study 
has cross-checked or gone through the residuals from co integration regression 
‘integrated of order zero’ meaning ‘stationary’ thus the normal regression technique 
which includes the  t statistic and F statistic test which are valid in data which are 
also non stationary.  
 
Engle and Granger (1987) held or alleged that the valuable contribution of the 
concept of unit and co integration is to force us to find out if the regression residuals 
are stationary. According to Gujarat (2009) a test for co integration can be thought of 
as a pre- test to avoid spurious or meaningless regression situations and equation (4) 
in step one is referred to as co integrating regression whereas α’s  are referred to as 
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integrating parameters. Engle-Granger procedures are powerful, simple and 
effective; this makes Engle- Granger procedures the most desirable test frequently 
employed by economists as said earlier. 
 
In addition the approach separates the estimations of the long run and short run 
parameters. It employs the ordinary least squares (OLS) methods which is preferred 
by a good number of researchers. Furthermore estimators from OLS are consistent, 
constant, stable and effective asymptotically thus the standard t and F statistic can be 
used to make inferences about the parameters that are being estimated. Co 
integrating Test; Using Co integrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) Test: Co 
integrating Regression Durbin- Watson (CRDW) test is an alternative testing for co 
integration. It assumes that variables are co integrated and run regression of the co 
integration regression. Therefore this test investigates what is called “Durbin-Watson 
statistic” if regression residuals are stationary. 
 
3.15.4 The Johansen Co Integration Test 
As pointed out earlier the Engle and Granger and Co integrating Regression Durbin-
Watson (CRDW) test are not able to accommodate or show more than one 
integrating equations in multiple regression. This is a limitation in the two 
techniques for co integration testing. The Johansen Method (1988) is the proper and 
reliable method/technique to handle and provide solution to such a limitation visible 
in the two tests. Two main reasons are obvious why Johansen method/technique 
(1988) is popular and frequently used by researchers. The 1
st
 reason is that it is used 
to evaluate the maximum number of co integration vectors, 2
nd
 it is used to obtain 
the maximum likelihood estimators of the co integrating matrix. In addition 
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Johansen method (1988) has the ability to evaluate ‘long run and short run’ 
parameters using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimators. 
 
3.15.5 Testing for co Integrating Rank r 
Usually Johansen (1988) estimates the co integration among the variables using 
rank. Assume the β is of rank rclearly;   
λr+1=λ1+2=…λp=0,    
Where λ is the population parameter associated with λi. If λ1=0 then r=0. 
Therefore there are no integrating vectors. If λ2=0 and λ1≠0, then r=1. Therefore ‘one 
co integrating vector’ is obtained. Hence the process of testing goes on and on.  
If the test,  
H0: λ1=0λ 
H1:       λ1≠0 
For i=r+1, r+2…p 
Johansen proposes a test based on the trace statistics; the computation applies the 
following formula: 
Trace =−T  
 
Moreover, Johansen proposes another test referred to as ‘Maximum eigen value’ 
statistic to determine the co integrating vectors among variables. The computation is 
based on the following formula: 
LRMAX= −t ln (1− 1) 
Where   is the largest eien value under Johansen method (1988) 
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Johansen (1988) developed the distribution of the two statistics under the null 
hypothesis that r is the co-integrating rank. Moreover, Osterwald-Lenum (1992) as 
cited in Watson and Teelucksingh (2002) computes the critical values at various 
levels of significance by simulation methods. Osrewald- Lenum (1992) however 
gives only two critical values which are one percent (1%) and five percent (5%) 
respectively, and are available in EViews 10 (Watson and Teelucksingh, 2002, pg 
270-271). This is an advantage to this study since it is using the EViews 10 in 
computing the co integration using Johansen method (1988).  Thus Johansen (1988) 
co integration test usually gives two sets of results, one on the basis of trace statistics 
and the other on the basis of the maximum eignvalue statistic and is one of the most 
powerful tests for co integration in comparison to other competitors. Tests have 
proved and established that the variables are co integrated. 
 
The present study estimates short run coefficients in equation being in stationary 
form. However, it is important to understand that the study may estimate long run 
coefficients before computing short run coefficients (Granger and Engle, 1987). In 
order to estimate long run coefficients using variables at level, it is necessary that 
regression residuals should be co integrated as a necessary condition otherwise 
regression may lead to spurious results (Granger and Engle, 1987; Gujarat, 2009; 
and Utkulu, 2012). 
 
3.15.6 Error Correction Model  
After establishing  and confirming through a number of tests that  variables are co 
integrated,  it is certain that error correction model (ECM) can be formulated in order 
to be incorporated in the re regression equation in which variables are integrated of 
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order I(0). The error correction term should be incorporated in the short run 
coefficient because the short run will certainly be in disequilibrium. Thus the error 
term is used to tie the short run behavior to its long run value in order to make 
regression meaningful (information of the long run) (Granger and Engle, 1987; 
Watson and Teelucksingh, 2002; Gujarat, 2009).  
 
Historically Error Correction Model (ECM) was first employed by Sargan and later 
it became common in 1987 by Engle-Granger through their seminar paper on 
correction for disequilibrium. They developed a theorem called ‘Granger 
representation theorem’ which states that: ‘If two variables Y and X are co 
integrated, then the relationship between them can be expressed as error correction 
mechanism (ECM) (Gujarat, 2009). Therefore to form the short run equation 
(equation 5) the study transforms equation (3) into first difference except dummy 
variables. 
 
The short run equation is expressed as follows: 
∆lnFDIt=α0+α1∆CCt+α2∆RLt+α3∆RQt+α4∆GEt+α5∆PSVt+α6∆VAt+α7∆ALt+εt….. (5) 
The equation above (equation 5) contains only the short run information as such it is 
necessary to incorporate ECt-1 so as to fix the short run characteristics into long run 
value. So the error term model is expressed as follows: 
∆lnFDIt=α0+α1∆CCt+α2∆RLt+α3∆RQt+α4∆GEt+α5∆PSVt+α6∆VAt+α7∆ALt+ECt-1+εt ……………………  (6) 
The equation is (6) was called error correction model (ECM) by Engle and Granger 
(1987) since it has incorporated the error term (ECt-1) in the short run model. Error 
Correction Model (ECM) states that dependent variable (in this case FDI) depends 
on the independent variables and also on ECt-1. If the error term is non zero, it means 
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that the model is out of equilibrium and vice versa. Therefore, if the dependent 
variable (FDI values) exceeds equilibrium values, it should decline to ―correct the 
equilibrium error‖. Thus, from there they derived the name ―error correction 
mechanism‖ (ECM).  
 
Similarly if the error term (ECt-1) is negative, it implies that dependent variable (FDI 
values) is below its equilibrium value. Indeed, the absolute value of ECt-1 reflects 
how faster equilibrium is adjusting (restoring). If the error term is statistically equals 
to zero (insignificant values), it suggests that dependent variable (FDI values) adjusts 
in independent variables in the same time period (Gujarati, 2004). Furthermore, if 
regression residuals of co integrating equation are stationary then the research report 
those results as ―long run coefficients‖ and coefficients obtained from -error 
correction model (ECM)‖ are reported as short run coefficients (Gujarati, 2004).  
Therefore the short run equation does not have any inference making decision in the 
long run due to the fact that the differenced equation in ECM model has lost the vital 
information (Maddala, 1992 in Ahmed, 2000). Thus dealing with the loss of valuable 
information, the theory of co integration came into place so as to mitigate the 
problem. Co integration theory solved the problem by instituting ECt in model. Error 
term (ECt) lagged once (ECt-1) so as to ―integrates short run dynamics in the long 
run‖.  
 
3.15.7 Granger Causality Test 
The existence of a relationship between variables does not prove causality or the 
direction of influence. This study employed the Direct Granger Method to test 
causality between a dependent variable and the independent variables; 
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Source: Granger (1969). 
 
 
According to Granger (1969), Granger Causality test is a statistical hypothesis test 
for determining whether one time series is useful in forecasting another which was 
first proposed in 1969.  Leamer (1985) attests that Granger Causality is a way to 
investigate causality between two variables in a time series.  Moreover, causality is 
closely related to the idea of cause-and-effect, although it is not exactly the same. A 
variable X is causal to variable Y if X is the cause of Y or Y is the cause of X.  
However with Granger Causality   we are not testing a true cause- and-effect 
relationship; what the study wants to know is if a particular variable comes before 
another in the time series (Leamer, 1985). 
 
According to Leamer (1985), the Granger- causality test is part of many popular 
economics software packages, including E-Views and PC-Give. Before running the 
test, time series must be stationary before proceeding. Data should be transformed to 
eliminate the possibility of autocorrelation. It should also be made sure that the 
model does not have any unit roots, as well as these will skew the test results. A time 
series X is said to Granger cause Y if it can be shown usually through a series of t-
test and F- tests on lagged values of X (and with lagged values of Y included), that 
those X values provide statistically significant information about future values of Y. 
Is a popular method for causality analysis in time series due to its computational 
simplicity. 
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The direct Granger Causality test is one of the three granger causality tests which not 
only tell us if x granger cause Y but also indicate the direction of causation between 
the two variables (Lion, 2005). Granger (1969) proposed the idea of Granger- 
Causality in his 1969 paper to describe the “causal relationships” between variables 
in econometric models. Before this econometricians and economists understood the 
idea of “causal relationships” as asymmetrical relationship. Causal relations are 
studied because policy makers need to know the consequences of various actions 
which they consider to take. The idea of Granger-Causality is that a variable X 
Granger-causes variable Y if variable Y can be better predicted using the histories of 
both X and Y than it can be predicted using the history of Y alone. This is shown if 
the expectation Y given the history of X is different from the unconditional 
expectation of Y.  E(Y/Yt–k,  Xt−k) ≠ E(Y/Yt−k). 
 
A second definition for causality has been offered by Granger (1969) which states 
that if σ2(X/U) σ
2
(/U−Y) which means that if the variance of X predicted using the 
universe of information, U, is less than the variance of X predicted using all 
information except variable Y) then we can say that Y is causing X, denoted Y→X. 
However, he then clarified that using the whole universe of information, U, is 
unrealistic so it is replaced with all relevant information. However, this change now 
makes testing more than a statistical procedure as there is a subjective element 
regarding what information is relevant. Another element to define is that of 
Feedback. A feedback system occurs if variable X Granger –causes variable Y, and 
Y Granger-causes X,denoted X   Y. However, all these definitions assume that 
only stationary series are involved, as non-stationary series stop these definitions 
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being testable. 
 
Granger- Causality has several components including: The first one is based on the 
principle that only past values of X can Granger- cause Y, because the future cannot 
cause the past or the present. If X occurs after Y then we know that X cannot cause 
Y. Similarly, though, If X occurred before Y then that does not necessarily imply 
that X caused Y.  The second component is based on the component of Granger-
causality is exogeneity; Sims (1972) stated that for variable X to be exogeneous of 
variable Y, X must fail to Granger- cause Y; this component was confirmed by 
Engle, Hendry, and Richard (1983). The third component of Granger- causality is 
Independence, because the variables X and Y are only independent of each other if 
both fail to Granger cause the other. The final component of Granger causality is that 
of asymmetry; if X Granger –cause Y, then changes in Y have no effect on the future 
values of X. 
 
Granger – Causality tests observe two time series to identify whether series X 
precedes series Y, Y precedes X, or if the movements are contemporaneous. The 
notion of Granger-causality does therefore not simply “true causality” but instead 
identifies whether one variable precedes another.  For example: do changes in output 
occur before changes in money or does the opposite occur, or do these changes occur 
at the same time. In his 1972 paper, Sims showed that money Granger causes output, 
but output does not Granger- cause money.  This result supported existing business 
cycle models which hypothesize that money plays an important role in output. We 
can therefore use Granger- Causality tests to test for things we might have assumed 
to occur from elsewhere or which we have taken for granted. 
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The Granger- Causality tests employed in this paper are bivariate, however 
multivariate tests can be carried out similarly using a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
and in fact the Direct Granger causality test is a bivariate case of VAR. It is 
important to remember that when testing for Granger –causality the models should 
be fully specified. If the model is not well specified, then spurious relationships may 
be found despite the fact that there actually are no relationships between the 
variables. Another situation to be mindful of is that all variables in the model  could 
be reacting to some unmodelled factor,  a war for example, and if the reactions of 
both X and Y are staggered in time then it will display Granger-causality even 
though the real causality is obvious different. There are three main tests for Granger- 
causality within the context of the bivariate analysis of stationary time series which 
include: The Direct Granger test, Sims test, and Modified Sims test. 
 
3.15.8 The Direct Granger-Causality Test  
The direct Granger –causality test is a very useful tool as it allows econometricians 
to test for the direction of Granger- causality as well as for its presence. Following 
the definition for Granger- causality, the direct Granger test regress each variable on 
lagged values of itself and the other explanatory variables. Empirically, the direct 
Granger test has been found to be more powerful than both the Sims and Modified 
Sims test outperforming both of these by rejecting a false null 3.26% and 2.64% 
more respectively. If in a regression of Ft on lagged values of Yt and Yt and Xt , the 
coefficients of the Xt values are zero then the series Xt fails to Granger- cause Yt. 
The Direct Granger –causality test is expressed or summarized under the following 
regression model: 
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Where Dt are the determinants, εt is the random error term, αj is the coefficient on 
the lagged Y values, and βiis the coefficient on the lagged X values. We start with 
one period lag instead of setting j=i=0 because we are not including instantaneous 
causality in the model (instantaneous causality is when the changes in Y and X occur 
at the same time and are correlated). If βi=0 (for i=1, 2…n) then X fails to Granger-
cause Y. To decide this, an F-test must be carried out to examine the null hypothesis 
of non –causality. 
H0: β1=β2=…βn=0. For F-test, the unrestricted model will include lagged values of 
the other variables, whereas the restricted model will only include lags of the 
dependent variable. 
The direct Granger test’s effectiveness is measured by minimizing the mean square 
error (MSE) of the forecast:   2ˆmin
ktkt
YYE

 The test is carried out using E views 
econometrics software. 
 
3.15.9 The Sims Test 
Sims proposed a new direct test for the existence of unidirectional Granger-Causality 
which had not been used before in his 1972 paper. At the same time, Sims realized 
that the “direction of causation” between two variables is normally identified and so 
he created his test to be able to identify the directions of causation. The Sims test 
starts by assuming that both time series being tested are jointly covariance- 
stationary. The time series will becovariance-stationary if neither its mean nor its 
auto covariance (the variance of the variable against a lagged version of itself) 
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depends on time. He achieves this by using only linear predictors and by using the 
mean squared error of the forecast as his gauge for predictive accuracy. 
 
Sims starts by considering two Stochastic series X and Y which are both linearly 
regular so we can write them in the form : Xt=αut+bvt 
Yt=Cut+dvt 
Where Ut and Vtare uncorrelated white nose error terms with unit variance, and a, b, 
c and d will all vanish for t 0. Expression (1) represents the moving average of the 
vector ( ). His test is to regress Y on past and future values of X whilst accounting 
for generalized least squares and prefiltering of the serial correlation. 
 
Granger –Causality can then be detected because if testing for X   Y only; then all 
future values of X should have coefficients in the regression that are not significantly 
different from zero. Because this test requires accurate F- tests, the assumptions of 
no serial correlation in the residuals must be upheld. As such all variables used in the 
regression will be measured in natural logarithmic form and pre-filtered using the 
filter.1-1.5L+0.5625L
2
, such that each variable Xt will be transformed into 
Xt 1.5Xt-1+0.5625Xt-2
3.  
 
It was suggested to use filtering in order to change the residuals from the regression 
into white nose. Although pre-filtering was used but there was but it failed to 
identify two problems which arose due to their use. The first problem is that if the 
filter fails to produce white nose residuals, then it is quite unlikely to fail by leaving 
substantial positive first order serial correlation. The second problem he identified 
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was that the pre-filtering can produce a perverse effect on approximation error when 
lag distributions are subject to prior smoothness restrictions (Sims, 1972, p. 545).     
After this transformation, they used the following regression:  
 tt
m
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i DXY t


 

1
 
Y

 and X

 are being used instead of the original variables because they have been 
transformed. 
Null hypothesis were tested of no causality. H0: β-1=β-2=0 
Wald test used to compare the restricted and unrestricted models which in turn 
produce an F- statistic which can be compared to critical values in order to decide 
whether the null hypothesis is true or false. 
The Sims test is the weakest of the three main Granger- Causality tests and coupled 
with the flaws regarding spurious regression and its higher costs than the Direct 
Granger test, it is used to least in empirical testing. 
 
3.15.10 The Modified Sims Test 
Geweke, Meese and Dent (1983) suggested a modified version of the Sims test 
which is based on the ordinary least squares estimation of;  

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Where θj is the coefficient on the leads and lags of Xt  , σt is the coefficient  on lags of 
Yt, μ is the stochastic error term. The test deals with serial correlation by including 
lagged values of Yt in the regression. 
To test whether Yt causes X tis the test that ϴj=0 for j= -1, -2…-m. The equation 
above is then estimated in both unrestricted and restricted (ϴj=0 for j= -1, -2… -m) 
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forms. The null hypothesis for this test is of no causality from Y→X, which is based 
on comparing the F-statistics to the critical values. The Modified Sims test is applied 
using E views econometrics software with both variables assumed to be stationary 
processes. 
 
In terms of performance, Guilkey and Salemi (1982) found that when there is 
unidirectional causation, the Modified Sims test outperforms the Sims test in its 
ability to reject a false null. Sims test also has a much higher rate of type 1 errors 
than the Modified Sims test. The Modified version still outperformed the Sims test 
for frequency of correct decisions. When compared to Granger test, they found that 
the Direct Granger test rejected a false null 3.26% and 2.64% more than the Sims 
and Modified Sims tests respectively, confirming that the Modified version is more 
powerful even though both are weaker than the Direct Granger test. Therefore this 
study employed the powerful test. 
 
3.15.11 Structural Break Test 
In order to accomplish the study, the structural break test is imperative. This helps to 
examine the coefficients stability under period of study. Testing for stability is done 
to confirm whether the variables in the study have stable contributions to the FDI 
inflows in Tanzania.  The study employs the ―cumulative sum (CUSUM) and 
cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) ‖ tests. Brown et.al (1975) proposed 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ to test the coefficients stability if it is stable or not 
(Dufour, 1982). Decision criteria state that ―if the plots of the CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ falls within 5% critical bound then H0 which states that all coefficients 
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are stable cannot be rejected. And if one of the bound lines is crossed then H0 is 
rejected‖ (Dufour, 1982; Hosein, 2007). 
 
3.16  Hypothesis  
This study employed F-Test (Joint test) to examine the study hypothesis as stipulated 
below. The decision criteria suggested that if the computed F-statistics is greater than 
the critical values at 5 percent level of significance then we reject H0 and vice versa 
is true. 
H0:  Institutional factors in Tanzania have no (zero) have no influence on` FDI 
inflows in Tanzania. 
β1=β2=β3=β4=β5=β6=0 
H1: Institutional factors in Tanzania influence the   FDI inflows in Tanzania. 
β1≠ β2≠ β3≠ β4≠ β5≠β6≠ 0 
 
3.17  Ethical Considerations 
Ethics refers to the appropriateness of your behavior in relation to the rights of those 
who become the subject of your work or are affected by it; while research ethics 
relates to questions about how we formulate and clarify our research topic, design 
our research and gain access, collect data, process and store our data, analyze data 
and write up our research findings in a moral and responsible way (Kumar, 2005, 
Cooper and Schindler, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al, 2012).To ascertain 
ethical practice in this study the researcher adhered to the following ethical issues: 
i. Before data collection exercise the researcher had to obtain permission letter 
from the Open University authority. 
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ii. Accurate account of information was given as obtained from the data analysis.  
iii. The study acknowledged sources of information obtained from various sources 
and put the sources on reference.  
iv. The   researcher avoided fraudulent practices by not suppressing, falsifying 
findings to meet my own needs or requirements.  
v. This study neither engaged in both plagiarism and duplicates nor hid what had 
been disclosed in the study or highlighted something disproportionately to its 
true existence in the country. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter includes analysis and discussion of descriptive statistics, econometric 
test results, research findings and diagnostic test results. Below is descriptive 
statistics (Table: 4.1) showing the maximum, minimum, mean, median and standard 
deviations   values for  the variables employed in this study.    
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics Results 
Descriptive statistics examined the behavior of data in general, under the foreign 
direct investment (FDI) variable, the maximum inflow was 7.664 USD while the 
minimum FDI inflow was 5.001USD, while its mean inflow was 6.393 USD, median 
was 6.197 USD, and the standard deviation was 0.850 USD. Under government 
effectiveness (GE) variable, the maximum FDI inflow was - 0.340 USD, while the 
minimum FDI inflow was -0.730 USD.  Mean FDI inflow was -0.5036 USD the 
median value was -0.450, standard deviation was 0.127. Under regulatory quality 
(RQ) variable, maximum FDI inflow was  -0.250 USD while minimum FDI inflow 
was -0.560 USD, mean was -0.403 USD and median was -0.405 USD, Standard 
deviation was 0.070.  
 
Under rule of law (RL) variable, the maximum FDI inflow was 0.390 USD, 
minimum FDI inflow was -0.550 USD, mean was -0.351 USD, median was -0.375 
USD, standard deviation was 0.196.  Under control of corruption (CC) variable, the 
maximum FDI inflow was -0.220 USD, minimum FDI inflow was -1.030 USD, 
mean was -0.725 USD, median was -0.785 USD, standard deviation was 0.241. 
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Under voice and accountability (VA) variable, the maximum FDI inflow was -0.130 
USD, minimum FDI inflow was -0.740 USD, mean FDI inflow was -0.351 USD, 
median was -0.280. Under political stability and absence of violence (PS) variable, 
the maximum   FDI inflow was -0.020 USD, minimum FDI inflow was -0.850 USD, 
mean FDI inflow was -0.415 USD, median was -0.445 USD, and standard deviation 
was 0.252USD. 
 
For FDI the maximum and minimum values mark a small range where as mean and 
median are almost the same, its distribution is normally distributed. On the other 
hand in government effectiveness (GE) the maximum and minimum values mark a 
big difference where as mean and median values mark a small range, its distribution 
is normally distributed. In regulatory quality (RQ) maximum and minimum values 
mark a big difference where as mean and median values are the same and its 
distribution is normally distributed. In the rule of law (RL) maximum and minimum 
values mark a small range where as mean and median values mark a very small 
difference; however its distribution is not normally distributed.  
 
In control of corruption (CC) the maximum and minimum values mark a big range 
where as mean and median values have a small range but its distribution is normally 
distributed. For voice and accountability (VA) maximum and minimum values mark 
a big range where as mean and median values mark a small difference, and its 
distribution is normally distributed. Moreover in political stability and absence of 
violence (PSV) maximum and minimum values mark a big range where as mean and 
median values mark a very small range, but its distribution is normally distributed.   
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Table  4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 LNF
DI GE RQ RL CC VA PSV 
 Mean  6.393636 -0.503000 -0.403500 -0.351000 -0.725000 -0.351000 -0.415500 
 Median  6.197110 -0.450000 -0.405000 -0.375000 -0.785000 -0.280000 -0.445000 
 Maximum  7.664300 -0.340000 -0.250000  0.390000 -0.220000 -0.130000 -0.020000 
 Minimum  5.001258 -0.730000 -0.560000 -0.550000 -1.030000 -0.740000 -0.850000 
 Std. Dev.  0.850285  0.127696  0.070208  0.196627  0.241170  0.204139  0.252680 
 Skewness -0.032217 -0.435545 -0.076888  2.732117  0.531923 -0.570080  0.002887 
 Kurtosis  1.880635  1.665310  3.343749  11.33487  2.166410  1.907949  1.944737 
        
 Jarque-Bera  1.047608  2.116828  0.118176  82.77332  1.522198  2.077118  0.928011 
 Probability  0.592263  0.347006  0.942624  0.000000  0.467153  0.353964  0.628760 
        
 Sum  127.8727 -10.06000 -8.070000 -7.020000 -14.50000 -7.020000 -8.310000 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  13.73670  0.309820  0.093655  0.734580  1.105100  0.791780  1.213095 
        
 Observations  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
4.3. Econometric Tests Results  
Time series data in most cases are likely to be affected by non stationary problems; 
as such economic regression on such modeling can provide spurious regression. The 
implication here is that, mean and variance are time variant and thus basic 
assumptions of the ordinary least square (OLS) are contravened or disobeyed. In this 
respect it is obligatory to perform the unit root test, through testing for non-
stationary using Dickey Fuller (DF) or Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. 
Additionally after testing for non-stationary and find variables are integrated in the 
same order, then co integration and error correction models are employed so as to 
see if variables have long run relationship. 
 
4.4. Unit Root Test Results 
After specifying the model, then the study performed the unit root tests at level for 
all variables under study which are government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
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rule of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability, and political stability and 
absence of violence, except these variables, FDI is in natural logarithms. After 
performing unit root test, the study estimated all these variables at level and in first 
difference to see if the variables are stationary at first difference as expected. The 
research performed by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test which is powerful 
than normal Dickey-Fuller (DF) testing. This study tested unit root at level and first 
difference both at without constant and linear trend, with constant and with constant 
and linear trend as shown in the Table 4.2. 
 
Table  4.2: Unit Root Test Results at Level and at First Difference  
AT LEVEL 
Coefficients 
Variables Without 
constant and 
trend 
With 
constant 
With constant 
and trend 
Order of 
integration 
FDI -0.095075 -1.248943 -2.874111 I(1) 
GE -0.829047 -1.230101 -1.757632 I(1) 
RQ -0.546389 -3.341347 -3.288502 I(1) 
RL -0.525860 -3.774881 -5.545396 I(1) 
CC -0.990298 -1.566254 -1.205750 I(1) 
VA -2.520006 -2.076496 -1.464094 I(1) 
PV -1.647288 -3.257592 -3.475757 I(1) 
FIRST DIFFERENCE 
Coefficients 
Variables Without 
constant 
and trend 
With constant With constant 
and trend 
Order of 
integration 
FDI -5.555956 -5.735503 -5.554372 I(0) 
GE -4.731109 -4.606481 -3.736172 I(0) 
RQ -4.817341 -4.689134 -4.830897 I(0) 
RL -3.934138 -3.833169 -3.685318 I(0) 
CC -4.472285 -4.399707 -4.540220 I(0) 
VA -5.154702 -5.946990 -6.842073 I(0) 
PV -4.552371 -4.395425 -6.291721 I(0) 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Without constant and trend: Test critical values: 1%, 5% and 10%, with constant: 
Test critical values: 1%, 5% and 10%, with constant and trend: Test critical values: 
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1%, 5% and 10%. Notes: If variables are integrated of order one I (1) means 
variables are non stationary. If variables are integrated of order zero I (0) mean 
variables are stationary. 
 
Unit root test at level reveals that all variables are non stationary and are integrated 
of order one I(1) since the computed absolute values of tau statistics does not exceed 
the critical tau values.  On the other hand, at first difference all variables are 
stationary as such are integrated of order zero I (0) because the computed values of 
tau statistics exceeds the critical tau values.  Therefore the specified model is 
properly formulated. 
 
4.5. Co Integration Test Results 
In this part study employed two main co integration tests which are Johansen co 
integration test and Engle–Granger Residuals (EG) or Augmented Engle–Granger 
residuals (AEG) co integration test. 
 
4.5.1. Johansen co Integration Test Results 
Having established that all variables are non stationary at level and stationary at first 
difference, and then the study estimated the Johansen co integration test. The 
empirical results reveal that variables are co integrated. The powerful test that is 
trace statistic confirms that there are five co integrating equations at the 0.05 critical 
levels whereas Max-Eigen statistic test indicates three co integrating equations at the 
0.05 critical levels. See the Table 4.3. 
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Table  4.3: Johansen Co-Integration Test Results 
Rank Test (Trace) Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
 
Trace 
Statistic 
 
0.05  
Critical 
Value 
 
 
P-
values 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
 
Max-
Eigen 
Statistic 
 
0.05 
Critical Value 
 
P-values 
None *  117.5269  69.81889  0.0000 None*  42.78395  33.87687  0.0034 
At most 1*  74.74299  47.85613  0.0000 At most 1*  32.24674  27.58434  0.0117 
At most 2*  42.49624  29.79707  0.0010 At most 2*  26.32897  21.13162  0.0085 
At most 3 *  16.16727  15.49471  0.0396 At most 3   11.25328  14.26460  0.1420 
At most 4*  4.913990  3.841466  0.0266 At most 4*  4.913990  3.841466  0.0266 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
Notes: Trace test indicates there are five co integrating equations at the 0.05 
critical levels whereas Max-Eigen statistic test indicates three co integrating 
equations at the 0.05 critical levels.  
*denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 critical level under MacKinnon-
Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
 
 
4.5.2. Engle–Granger Residuals (EG) or Augmented Engle–Granger residuals 
(AEG) co integration Results 
Similarly the study estimates Engle-Granger residuals co integration test using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Findings reveal that computed value of the tau 
statistic (-4.251410) in absolute value exceeds the Engle – Granger critical tau values 
(-2.86154) at 5 percent level (MacKinnon, 2010) then the study rejected the null 
hypothesis means residuals are stationary and variables are co integrated. Since tau 
statistic obtained is (-4.251410) and it is significant at 5 percent level of significance.  
Thus, research concludes that, the regression outputs obtained in non stationary 
variables (at level) are no longer spurious as such the empirical results representing 
the long run relationships amongst the variables(See table: 4.4).  
 
Table 4. 4: Engle–Granger Residuals (EG) or Augmented Engle–Granger 
residuals (AEG) co integration Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 61.08873 81.13557 0.752922 0.4618 
RESID02 -0.820093 0.192899 -4.251410 0.0005 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
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4.6. Discussion of Findings in Long Run and Short Run Coefficients   
Since this study employs time series data, it discusses both long run and short run 
coefficients results as shown in sections below.  
 
4.6.1. Long Run Coefficients Results 
In the long run, coefficients of some variables have the expected sign as such results 
are in line with the theoretical expectations. Some variables are significant 
determinants of FDI in Tanzania since they are statistically significant at 5 percent 
level of significance, and some are not. Government Effectiveness (GE), this 
variable as an indicator gauges or measures insights of the quality or attributes of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (Kurul and Yalta, 
2017; and Wernick 2014; Erkekoglu and Kilicarslan, 2016), has negative sign and it 
is statistically insignificant at 5 percent level of significance.   
 
The findings from the analysis indicate that the relationship between the two 
variables, FDI and government effectiveness (GE) is negative; implying that 
government effectiveness (GE) is not attractive to FDI inflows in Tanzania.   
Moreover  this empirical observation contradicts the theory (Dunning’s theory, 
2006) and with  findings of  previous studies; such as Salem and Baum (2016) who 
found out  that  government effectiveness (GE) had positive but insignificant 
influence in attracting FDI, Yalta and Kurul (2017)  findings in 113 developing 
countries (including Tanzania) showed that reducing excessive burden of 
bureaucracy and improving transparency and government effectiveness  led to an 
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increase in FDI inflows and encouraged MNEs to bring capital into the country, 
implying that government effectiveness (GE) had and was expected to have 
significant positive impact on FDI inflows. Gani (2007) found out that improvement 
in government effectiveness had a positive effect on FDI inflows is some Latin 
American countries.  Yimer (2017) and Phung (2017) noted that government 
effectiveness positively and significantly affected FDI inflows and tended to attract 
more FDI and was more appealing to investors. Rodriguez-Pose and Cols
2
 noted that 
government effectiveness was not only important determinant for FDI inflows but 
had a significant influence in attracting FDI inflow.  
 
Mengistu and Adhikary (2011) carried out a study and found out that six indicators 
of good governance had impact on FDI inflows in 15 Asian countries for the period 
between 1996-2007. Using panel data model with fixed effects, the findings revealed 
that government effectiveness (GE) indicator was found to be one of the main factors 
which determined FDI inflows in those countries. On the contrary Erkekoglu and 
Kilicarslan (2016) carried out a study in 91 countries between 2002 and 2012 and 
found out that an increase in government effectiveness reduced FDI inflows, while 
Kersan-Skabic (2013) study results showed that government effectiveness (GE) had 
no impact on FDI inflow contrary to the expectations. Daude and Stein (2004) found 
out and concluded that sometime unpredictable policies were a threat to FDI inflow.     
    
 On the other hand the study finding regarding government effectiveness (GE) 
variable appears to be consistent with the allegations presented by the Tanzania 
                                               
2
 http://econ.geog.uu,nl/peeg/.html 
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Private Sector Foundation (2015) that, government effectiveness (GE) was not 
favorable to FDI inflow in Tanzania. The allegations categorically stated that, among 
the challenges facing foreign investors include bureaucracy, whereby investors spent 
a lot of time in processing licenses, property registration, in paying taxes, difficult in 
obtaining and registering land, enforcing contracts and starting business operations.  
 
Foreign investors also alleged that policy instability is among of the challenges 
affecting their investment decisions. Frequently and unpredictable changes in 
policies in various sectors interfere and frustrate foreign investors’ decisions. In this 
case government effectiveness (GE) appears to be deterrent and unfriendly to foreign 
direct investors and to some extent confirm the allegations presented by the Tanzania 
Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) (2015), Tanzania Investment Climate Statement 
(2015) who complained that government effectiveness (GE) was not favorable to 
FDI inflow in Tanzania.   
 
According to the Tanzania Investment Climate Statement (2015) there were a lot of 
issues which they felt were not favorable to them as foreign investors, issues such as; 
incentives offered to foreign investors were unpredictable and were offered on 
discriminatory basis, performance requirements were not considered.  Foreign 
investors complained that much as they were aware of their obligations and their 
rights, but their rights and obligations were not readily accessible. The Tanzania 
Investment Climate Statement (2015) further alleged that during the privatization 
program, there were frequent complaints by foreign investors that the bidding 
criteria were not transparent and clear to bidders. Information was not sufficient to 
enable bidders make decisions whether to participate or not. This implied that 
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foreign bidders were denied chances to participate in the exercise due to lack of 
enough information about the privatization exercise.   
 
Very often there have been agreements between foreign investors and the 
government, but available evidence indicates that the government has been ignoring 
or does not respect or honor such agreements. For example, there are cases whereby 
government fails to pay on time for services or goods received from foreign 
investors, such delays affected investors’ day to day business operations. According 
to the Tanzania Investment Climate Statement (2015) there were also hurdles which 
foreign investors faced, especially during the foreign exchange transfer, the current 
policy appears to have bureaucratic hurdles which delay and eventually affect 
transfers because it takes longer time. While proposed laws and regulations by the 
government have impact on foreign investors,’ it is very rare to find government 
being responsive to comments raised by the private sector or foreign direct investors.  
 
In other words foreign investors’ concerns are not fully considered, this attitude by 
the government discourages foreign investors. There is sufficient evidence that even 
when foreign investors submit their views, their comments are not incorporated in 
the new regulations or legislations.   In another study by Siddica and Angkur (2017) 
it was revealed that government effectiveness had negative effect on FDI flow but it 
was statistically significant. The findings further explained that existing policies 
were not attractive to foreign investors. Foreign investors complained that 
bureaucracy was one of the critical or core problems which raised investment costs 
to their businesses.  
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Government effectiveness as an institutional variable is responsible for investment 
policy formulation and implementation; it is a key determinant of FDI inflows since 
it sets direction of investment in the country. Being negative and insignificant, it 
implies that the government effectiveness is not in favor of FDI inflow in the 
country. However, Daude and Stein (2004) stressed that not all institutional factors 
have similar importance for the decision of where to invest.   However due to its 
critical position or role in investment decisions, deliberate  strategies should be 
adopted in order to reform the government effectiveness (GE), so that it becomes 
attractive to FDI inflow in Tanzania.  The government’s credibility to FDI comes 
from its commitment to her investment policies.   
 
Regulatory Quality (RQ), gauges or captures insight of the ability of the government 
to initiate or formulate, generate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development in the country. It has positive sign 
and has a significant impact on FDI inflows, it is statistically significant at 5 percent 
level of significance, stressing that regulatory quality (RQ) matters in attracting FDI 
and has a strong cause and effect on FDI inflows in Tanzania. Statistically it implies 
that one unit increase in RQ increases FDI inflows in Tanzania by 3.746330 percent. 
This finding indicates that regulatory quality (RQ) matters substantially in attracting 
FDI inflows in the country and it is also consistent with Dunning’s theory (2006).  
 
Therefore improving regulatory quality (RQ) in Tanzania is crucial in order to attract 
more FDI inflows in the country. As a policy implication the government should 
keep on improving and maintaining regulatory quality (RQ) in order to create 
conducive business environment for FDI inflows and for the development of the 
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private sector in the country. The finding appear to be consistent with the findings 
and conclusions of the following studies; Gani (2007) who found out  that regulatory 
quality had positive effects on FDI inflows in some Latin American countries.  
 
Mottaleb and Kalirajan (2010), found out that good  regulations, motivated FDI 
inflows, Daude and Stein (2004) concluded that excessive regulations were  a burden 
to FDI as result they deterred foreign direct investment inflow. In another study, 
Buse, and Goizard (2006), concluded that in the most regulated economies, 
excessive regulations very often restrict foreign direct investment inflow. Both 
Daude and Stein (2004), Buse and Goizard (2006) agree with the finding that 
multiplications of regulations very often may happen to be barriers to foreign 
investors and it is difficult to comply with. On the other hand, Sedik and Seoudy 
(2012) conducted a study in 20 MENA countries in the period between 1999 and 
2010; and revealed that regulatory quality seemed to have positive and significant 
effects on FDI inflows in MENA countries.  
 
Saidi et al (2013) investigated the relationship between institutional variables and 
FDI inflows in 20 developed and developing countries in the period between 1998 
and 2011, the result was that the regulatory quality had positive impact on FDI 
inflows. Yonis, Ochi and Ghadri (2013) noted and concluded that regulatory quality 
(RQ) had positive and statistically significant impact on FDI inflows. Erkekoglu and 
Kilicarslan (2016) in his study which covered 91 countries in the period between 
2002 and2012 he found and concluded that regulatory quality increased FDI inflow 
in a host country.  Lucke and Eichler (2016) carried out a study on institutional 
determinants of FDI in 94 countries between 1995 and 2009 the result indicated that 
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regulatory quality had positive impact on FDI inflow. Nunes and Castro (2013) 
found out that low burden of regulations was identified as an important factor in 
attracting FDI inflows. 
 
On the other hand the finding on this variable is contradicting with a good number of 
research findings including those of Bellos and Subasat (2013) who revealed that 
under certain circumstances regulatory quality (RQ) deters FDI inflows.  Mramba; 
(2015) noted and concluded that regulatory quality (RQ) had no significant 
relationship with FDI inflows in Tanzania. These findings also contradict with 
Hailu’s (2016) findings which noted that institutional factors including regulatory 
quality (RQ) had no statistical significant relationship with FDI inflows in Sub-
Saharan African countries. This research finding is also contradicting with 
allegations and complaints presented by the Confederation of Tanzania Industries 
(CTI), (2013) which alleged that regulatory quality (RQ) in Tanzania had negative 
impact on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow Tanzania.   
 
The complaints further alleged that much as the enterprises in the food processing 
sector in Tanzania understood the importance of regulations and laws, however the 
complaints presented by the Confederation of Tanzania Industries (2013), that there 
were multiple laws and regulations governing food processing sector in the country 
and were overlapping, as result increased regulatory costs payable by business 
ventures in the sector. They asserted that instead of facilitating compliance with 
regulations, regulators focused on maximizing revenue collections from business 
operators in the sector.  
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Moreover they further alleged that the sector was the most regulated with 22 laws 
and regulations, governing business registration, licensing, permits and inspections. 
These laws and regulations were enforced by various regulatory bodies which also 
were found to be overlapping in various areas of their activities. For example; the 
responsibility of inspecting premises was assigned to six (6) regulatory authorities 
namely; Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS), National Environmental Management 
Council (NEMC), Tanzania Dairies Board (TDB), Tanzania Food and Drugs Agency 
(TDFA), Fire and Rescue Force (FRF), and Local Government Authority (LGA); 
TDB, TFDA, TBS and Weights and Measures Agency (WMA)  were responsible to 
inspect production. 
 
 TDB, TFDA, Vertinary Department were charged with the duty to inspect product 
transportation while  TDFA, TBS, LGA, NEMC, Occupational Safety and Health 
Agency (OSHA) were assigned to inspect premises and equipment. The labeling 
function was undertaken by TDFA, TDB, and WMA. The registration was carried 
out by TDB and Business Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA), licensing 
was undertaken by TFDA, TBS, LGA and the related government ministry. It must 
be noted that these regulatory bodies are located in different locations and the duties 
are done separately. 
 
Regardless of the good intention behind formulation of these laws, regulations and 
regulatory bodies, their impact on the sector is huge and ultimately affects the 
performance and development of the sector in the country. Moreover it discourages 
foreign direct investors (FDI) and development of the private sector. It is also killing 
private initiative and spirit towards industrialization which is currently the 
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government campaign. What does it mean where you find TBS, TFDA, and 
Government and Chemist Laboratory Agency (GCLA) performing the same 
function? This tendency of having unnecessary, redundant and proliferation of 
institutions, regulations and laws in the country is detrimental towards the whole 
exercise of attracting FDI in the country. Complaints by   the TPSF (2015) conclude 
that regulatory quality in Tanzania is restrictive to foreign direct investment inflow.  
 
This conclusion reinforces the findings of the CTI (2013), that business regulations 
namely tax regulations, labor regulations in the country are barriers, restrictive and 
not favorable to attract foreign investors, in this circumstances both TPSF (2015) and 
CTI (2013) conclusions contradict the finding of this study regarding the regulatory 
quality variable. While result of this study found positive and significant impact of 
regulatory quality (RQ) on FDI inflow, Tanzania Investment Climate Statement also 
(2015) complained that regulatory quality in Tanzania was an obstacle to FDI inflow 
in the country.  
 
Availed evidence tells that fees and charges for registering foreign companies are 
extremely high when compared with the local companies, also terms and conditions 
for competing in the market happen to affect foreign companies more that they affect 
local companies, for example Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC) enjoys 
favorable business conditions and terms if it is compared with other private media 
companies, may be because it gets subsidies from the government. Sometimes 
foreign investors complain about availability of skilled labor in the country, but the 
current immigration and labor laws and regulations restrict employment of 
foreigners in foreign companies up to five people in senior posts only, the remaining 
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positions should be filled or sourced from within the country.  
 
Consistently, OECD (2013) concluded that regulatory quality in Tanzania is still 
restrictive to foreign direct investors. This conclusion underscores and reinforces the 
complaints by Tanzania Investment Climate Statement (2015) with the following 
allegations; that it should be made clear that in Tanzania agricultural sector is the 
biggest employer, it employs over 90 percent of Tanzanians, it is the source of raw 
materials to some manufacturing firms, but it is also a source of food and income to 
majority of the country’s population. It is a backbone of the country’s economy.  
 
The complaints allege that since agriculture is a source of income restricting or 
banning agricultural outputs like rice, maize and other agricultural related outputs 
undermines FDI investment in the agricultural sector which is the biggest employer 
and backbone of the country’s economy.  Investors aim at accessing larger markets 
which are potentially profitable for their crops. Restricting exports on crops might 
affect investors’ incentives to expand production. Moreover, a restriction on 
agricultural exports does not only undermine investment in the sector but also affects 
growth and development of the sector in the country. This finding is also 
contradicting with the findings of Wangwe and Rweyemamu (2004), Bellos and 
Subasat (2013), and the allegations presented by TPSF (2015), Tanzania Investment 
Climate (2014, 2015), CTI (2013), and OECD (2013), which complained that, 
despite having rules and regulations, enforcement was poor, because poor quality 
imported products could be sold in the local market along with locally higher quality 
products without legal measures by the government.  
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Foreign investors were actually against unfair market competition which they are 
facing from poor quality and low priced goods or products. Clients also complained 
that tax administration officials used abusive language against them during tax 
collection exercise. They also complained about multiplicity of regulations the 
compliance of which is not only difficult but costly and expensive foreign investors.  
Foreign investors suggested synchronization and consolidation for coherence and 
simplicity.  
 
Regulatory Quality has a high significant impact on FDI inflows in Tanzania, 
nevertheless there are still complaints by foreign investors which are typically 
related to RQ variable. Sometime this may suggest that investors in their home 
countries with high, or medium, or low regulatory quality indices may consider their 
regulatory quality indices level to be the threshold for what they seek in institutional 
factors conditions in host countries. Here investors look at the importance of 
regulatory quality in the host country, but they link it back to institutional factors in 
their home countries. This observation is also supported by Kunsch, Schnarr, and 
Rowe (2014).    
 
Rule of Law (RL), according to Saleh and Baum,( 2016); Bimal, (2017) catches  the 
insights regarding the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, as well as the 
quality of contract enforcement, the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rule of society, property rights, the police, and the courts as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The results for this variable have positive sign but 
statistically insignificant associated with FDI inflows at 5 percent level of 
significance. This implies that rule of law (RL)   has small impact on FDI inflows in 
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Tanzania. This finding contradicts Dunning’s theory (2006) which expected that in 
order for the FDI to flow in a certain foreign market; rule of law should be positive 
and should have a certain degree of significant impact to FDI inflow. This finding 
also contradicts with a number of various studies including the following; the study 
by Grosse and Trevino (1996), Tallman (1998),   found and concluded that a better 
rule of law attracted more FDI, implying that there was a positive relationship 
between rule of law and FDI inflow. Jensen, (2003) concluded that rule of law had a 
positive effect on FDI.  
 
Daude and Stein (2004) also concluded that deficiency of enforcement of property 
rights and lack of commitment on the part of the government seems to play major 
role in deterring FDI flow. Asiedu (2005) found out that reliable legal system has a 
positive impact on FDI inflow. Busse and Hefeker (2007) concluded that rule of law 
was a determinant of FDI inflow. Mishra and Daly (2007) observed that, the legal 
system in host countries have a direct impact on FDI inflows in those countries.  
Mottaleb and Kalirajan (2010) argued that good rules motivated FDI flows. In 
another study by Alam et al., (2005) it was revealed that strengthening the rule of 
law had positive influence on FDI inflows in Bangladesh. 
 
 Samini and Ariani (2010) studied the impact of political stability, control of 
corruption and rule of law; they found out that improvement of rule of law had a 
positive and significant impact on FDI inflows in MENA countries. Mengistu and 
Adhikary (2011) concluded that rule of law was one of the main determinants of FDI 
inflow in the host country.  Siddica and Angkur (2017) also revealed that rule of had 
statistically significant positive effect on FDI inflow.  Dehshiri and Sameti (2012) 
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studied the impact of human development index and rule of law to attract FDI in 
selected developing countries in the period between 2001 and 2010, the results 
showed that rule of law had positive and significant impact on attracting FDI in 
developing countries. Saidi, Ochi and Ghadri (2013) found out that a reliable legal 
system had a positive and a significant impact on FDI inflow in developing 
countries.  Kunsch, et al., (2014), Tanzania Investment Climate Statement (2014, 
2015), and Gangi, Y. (2017), had similar conclusion, that rule of law was one of the 
main institutional factors which attract FDI inflow in the host country.  
 
Kapuria- Foreman, (2007) found out that greater assurances to conform or comply 
with contracts agreements honor or respect for property rights were among the 
important determinants for attracting more FDI. Ali et al., (2010) concluded that 
property rights were more critical determinants of FDI inflows. On the other hand 
Staats and Biglaiser (2012) asserted that panel data analysis showed that rule of law 
and judicial strength were important determinants of FDI inflows in 17 Latin 
American countries.  Moreover, Henisz (2000), Henisz and Williamson (1999) 
argued that in countries where property rights are poorly protected Multi-National 
Companies’ (MNC) investments faced expropriation risks.  Henisz (1998), Wei 
(2000), Jensen (2003), Richard and Nwankwo (2005) argued that institutional factors 
particularly protection of property rights are among the important determinants of 
multinational investment and FDI inflows. 
 
However on the other hand the findings of this study are consistent with the study 
findings conducted by Bayar and Alakbarov (2016) who concluded that rule of law 
had statistical insignificant impact on attracting FDI in overall panel of emerging 
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market economies. Another study by Basemera and Mutenyo (2012) concluded that 
rule of law had no significant impact on FDI inflow in East African countries.  Peres 
at al., (2018), findings indicate that rule of law had statistically significant impact on 
FDI inflow in developing economies. The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC, 
2013, 2015) alleged  that investors were using political and financial influences to 
displace traditional land owners from their lands in Tanzania, and in some areas 
foreign investors acquired land through various displacement tricks or justifications.  
 
On the other hand in Mtwara region residents were removed from their lands to give 
room for a foreign company to build a factory, it took very long time to get their 
compensation payments after they were removed from their lands. In Ruvuma 
region, some residents were compensated after twenty years later, some are still 
struggling to get their compensation, the villagers were ordered to vacate their lands 
so that part of the land could be used as industrial area. Some places with similar 
disputes include Mwanza, Babati (Manyara), Geita conflict, Kahama, Loliondo saga, 
North Mara dispute, Bulyankhulu conflict,in  Nzega. 
 
More studies including a study by Kunsch et al., (2017) and Dehshir et al., (2017) on 
the relationship between rule of law (RL) and FDI inflows in various economies, 
argue that rule of law is an important indicator which must be given due 
consideration by an investor for FDI decisions, simply because investors should 
want to know whether there will be protection for their investments in the foreign 
location or in the host country.  Investors believe that is only through the presence of 
reliable rule of law protection of their investment is guaranteed. Therefore, it logical 
to accept that one among of the risks to be assessed before investing in a foreign 
 
 
118 
market should be the country’s rule of law. In the absence of rule of law investors 
would have no confidence in security of various issues related with their business 
operations.  
 
Investors need to be certain of protection of their property rights, they need fair 
competition in the market, they need fair exchange in the market, and they need 
appropriate conformation and loyalty to contracts and contract supervision. They are 
interested to see a reliable legal system, in which there is sufficient independence of 
the judicial system and there is trust in the judicial system for resolving legal 
disputes.  These observations and views are also supported by recent and previous 
studies by; Dehshiri and Sameti, (2017),  Kunsch, et al.,(2014), Wang, Xu and Zhu 
(2012),  Wenick et al., (2014), LHRC (2013, 2015), Biglaiser and Staats (2010),  
Haggard, Maclntyre and Tiede, (2008), Globerman and Shapiro (2003), La Porta et 
al., (2000).   
 
Another controversial issue whether rule of law (RL) appears to be less critical or 
insignificant for FDI decisions, as it is the case with this study; it might depend on 
country source of an investor. Kunsch et al., (2014), argue that foreign investors 
from countries with high-level rule of law indices will not prefer to invest in 
countries with low-level or mid-level rule of law indices, and foreign investors from 
countries with mid-level or low-level indices might not find it difficult to invest in 
countries with corresponding or similar circumstances.  
 
The reason behind is, they consider their rule of law  indices level in their home 
countries/ markets to be the threshold for what they seek in institutional factors 
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conditions in the foreign market or in the host country. This is why FDI still flow in 
the country despite the fact that rule of law variable has insignificant or trivial 
impact on FDI inflow in Tanzania. In other studies Anyanwu (2012), Fiodendji 
(2013) and, Wenick et al., (2014), argue that countries with abundance natural 
resources (minerals oil and gas) might enjoy a huge flow of FDI regardless of the 
quality of their rule of law.  
 
Moreover, it is argued that countries without abundance of natural resources need to 
develop and ensure that their institutions and institutional indicators are not only 
strong but also competitive. Some additional findings and conclusions which 
corroborate with the finding of this variable include a study by Yalta and Kurul 
(2016) who revealed that not all institutional factors have a significant effect on FDI 
inflows in developing countries. This result also underscores the results by Saidi, 
Ochi and Ghadri (2013) who noted that sometime foreign investors are interested 
just in few institutional factors in their choice in investment abroad, Babayan (2015) 
underscored that some institutional factors are most critical for attracting FDI and 
some are not. This implies that some institutional factors matter more than others in 
attracting FDI inflows, but it all depends on the foreign investors’ assessment.  May 
be one of the circumstances described above could be one or among the reasons for 
the finding of this variable. 
 
Control of Corruption (CC) which according to Baum and Salem, (2016) captures 
the span or space to which public power is exercised for individual benefits, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by 
elites and private interest. This variable has a negative sign and statistically 
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significant at 5 percent level of significance. The finding illustrates that corruption 
has a negative impact on FDI inflows; and therefore deters or reduces FDI inflows in 
Tanzania. The finding is consistent with the expectations of Dunning’s institutional 
theory (2006), which argues that high corruption index scores in the host country 
have cause and effect on FDI inflows in the host country.  
 
The finding is consistent with the conclusions of the previous studies including those 
of Wang and Swain (1997) who concluded that corruption harms the business 
climate and deters foreign direct investment inflow, Morisset (2000) who concluded 
that corruption increases administrative costs and therefore reduce FDI inflow, Wei, 
(2000) who found out that corruption reduced FDI; and had a negative impact on 
capital structure and capital volume. Gani (2007) who found out that improvement in 
control of corruption had positive effects in some Latin American countries.  Alam 
et al., (2005) revealed that ineffectiveness in controlling corruption in Bangladesh 
deterred FDI inflows to Bangladesh. 
 
Jensen (2003) concluded that corruption had negative effect on FDI, Asiedu (2005) 
using panel data for 22 countries during the period 1984-2000 concluded that 
corruption had negative impact on FDI flow in Africa, and less corruption had 
positive impact on FDI inflows.  Smith-Hilman and Omar (2005) accomplished a 
study employing survey to investigate the effects o regulations and political stability 
on 121 English firms between 1994 and1996. The findings indicated that countries 
with weak governments and corruption received less FDI. Another study by Busse 
and Hefeker (2007) examined the relationship between political risk, corporations 
and FDI in 83 developing countries between 1984-2003, showed that corruption was 
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detrimental to FDI inflow.  
 
Nilsson-Hakkala, et al., (2008) carried out a study on effects of corruption on FDI; 
using panel regression and found out that corruption had negative effects on FDI 
inflows. Al-Sadig (2009), conducted a study on the impact of corruption on FDI 
inflows in 117 countries between 1984-2004 using regressions and found out that 
corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows. Woo (2010) conducted study on the 
impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 90 countries during 1984-2004 period 
employing panel regression model and found out  that corruption had negative 
impact on FDI inflows. Samini and Monfared (2011) examined the impact of 
corruption on FDI inflows in 16 organizations of Islamic cooperation countries 
between 2002-2008 periods and concluded that there was negative correlation 
between corruption and FDI inflows. 
 
 Mengistu and Adhikary (2011) concluded that corruption was one of the factors 
determining FDI location. Brada et al., (2012) conducted a study on the relationship   
between corruption and FDI in 84 countries during 2000-2003 period. They 
concluded that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows.  On the other hand 
Pupovic (2012) investigated the impact of corruption in FDI inflows in Montenegro 
using questionnaire method and concluded that corruption had negative impact on 
FDI inflows. Another study was   conducted by Alemu (2012) to investigate the 
impact of corruption on FDI inflows in 16 Asian countries in the period between 
1996-2009 using panel regression  found out that corruption had negative impact on 
FDI inflows. Another study by Kersan-Skabic (2013) on institutional determinants of 
FDI inflows in 8 South Eastern European countries between 2001-2010 periods 
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found out that corruption had significant impact on FDI inflows.  Castro and Nunes 
(2013) did a study on the relationship between corruption and FDI inflows in 73 
countries during 1998-2008 periods and concluded that countries with lower 
corruption level attracted more FDI inflows. 
 
On the other hand Quazi (2014) carried out a study on the impact of corruption on 
FDI in 14 South and Eastern Asian countries in the period between 1995 and 2011 
and found out that corruption had negative impact on FDI inflows. The finding is 
consistent with the allegations presented by the Tanzania Investment Climate 
Statement (2014, 2015), and TPSF (2015) that corruption had negative impact on 
FDI inflow. Ofori, Ato-Mensah and Jinsheng (2015) also revealed that corruption 
was a social menace because it created social disorder and instability in the form of 
social unrest, poor provision of social services; it posed threat due to the high costs 
of business operations to both private and public sectors and business investment in 
the long run.  
 
Peres, Ameer and Xu (2018), who noted that one of the most important institutional 
factors that deterred FDI inflows was corruption while, Yalta and Kurul (2018) noted 
that reducing corruption increases FDI. Wei (2000), Gastanaga, Nugent and 
Pashamova (1998), Compos, Asiedu and Villamil, (2000) Lien and Pradhan (1999), 
confirmed that majority of investor surveys suggested that one of the most critical 
institutional factor that deters FDI inflows was corruption. Consistently,  Cuerzo-
Cazura, (2006, 2008) Wei, (2000)  further  argued that generally countries which are 
more corrupt received fewer FDI inflows, and those with lower corruption  index 
scores had positive relationship with investment inflows, as corruption levels would 
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be lower. Henisz (1998), Wei (2000), Jensen (2003), Richard and Nwankwo (2005) 
who argued that institutional factors particularly corruption, was among the 
important determinants of multinational investment and FDI inflows. 
 
The finding of this study contradicts   other   previous  findings including a study by 
Bradhan (1997) who noted that corruption had a significant positive impact on FDI 
inflows, Bellos and Subasat (2011) was conducted to find out the relationship 
between FDI inflows and corruption in 15 transition economies during 1990-2005 
employing panel gravity model, found out  that corruption had no statistical 
significant impact on FDI inflows. Bellos and Subasat (2012), Basemera and 
Mutenyo (2012), Gutierrez (2015), who noted that corruption did not significantly 
deter or influence FDI inflow negatively.   
 
 Mudambi, et al. (2013) carried out a study on the relationship among corruption, 
government regulations in 55 countries in the period between 1985-2000 employing 
panel regression models, they and concluded that corruption had no independent 
impact on FDI inflows. Helmy (2013)accomplished a study on the impact of 
corruption on FDI in 21 countries of Middle East and North Africa (MENA 
countries) over  the period between 2003 -2009  and concluded that corruption had 
no significant impact on FDI inflows. Bayar and Alakbarov (2016) concluded that 
control of corruption had no statistical significant impact on attraction of FDI in 23 
emerging market economies.  However, the findings of this study are inconsistent 
with the findings and conclusions of most of the studies in the reviewed literature. 
 
The findings suggest that corruption reduces FDI inflow in Tanzania by 1.567183 
percent and it is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. It 
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transpires from the findings that, despite the efforts by the government to control 
corruption, there are some elements of corruption still existing in the country, which 
deter FDI inflows. However since  corruption is still a threat to FDI inflow, the 
government should keep on fighting it until it is  reduced to  the level where it can no 
longer be an impediment  to FDI inflows in the country. Voice and accountability 
(VA) which according to Kurul and Yalta (2017) captures  insights or perceptions of 
the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. 
 
The result for this variable had a positive sign and is statistically significant at 5 
percent level of significance. This implies that other factors remaining constant; one 
unit increase in voice and accountability (VA) increases the FDI inflow in Tanzania 
significantly and statistically at 5 percent level of significance. Voice and 
accountability therefore has significant and positive impacts on FDI flows, it has a 
positive relationship with FDI inflow in Tanzania, and it is also consistent with 
Dunning’s (2006) theory of institutional factors.  Other studies which are consistent 
with this finding include: a study by Yalta and Kurul (2017)who performed a study 
which revealed and concluded that voice and accountability (VA) had significant and 
positive impacts on FDI inflows, consistent with the institutional theory by 
Dunning’s (2006).   
 
Other studies with significant results on FDI for voice and accountability (VA) 
variable include; a study by Gangi (2017) who investigated the impact of governance 
or institutional factors on FDI inflow in 50 African countries in the period between 
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1996-2010,and found out that voice and accountability (VA) was statistically 
significant in attracting FDI in African countries. Chaib and Siham (2014) found  
that voice and accountability (VA) had the expected positive impact on FDI inflows 
in Algeria, the result which was consistent with Dunning’s (2006) theory. Another 
study by Bannaga et al., (2013) was carried out in 18 Arab countries in the period 
between 2000-2009, the conclusion was that voice and accountability(VA) 
negatively and significantly affected FDI inflow in 18 Arab countries, this finding  
contradicted Dunning’s (2006) theory.  
 
Berden, et al (2012) analyzed the impact of institutional factors in attracting FDI in 
Algeria between 1995 and 2011. The findings and conclusion was that high level of 
voice and accountability reduced inward FDI in Algeria. This conclusion 
contradicted Dunning’s (2006), theory of institutional factors. However, there are 
extremes whereby instead of democracy being or becoming constructive becomes 
destructive to the extent of causing chaos in the country, an undesirable situation 
which most likely deters foreign investors. These findings lead to the conclusion that 
under certain circumstances some institutional factors appear to be much more 
important than others to foreign direct investors in their investment decisions. 
Governments of different countries wishing to attract foreign investors, particularly 
those in Africa should be aware of these situations and should consider improving 
their institutional factors in order to suit the tastes of foreign investors. 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS), which gauges/ measures insight or 
perception  of the possibility of political instability and/or politically inspired 
violence Wernick et al., (2014) and Kurul and Yalta (2017).  This variable had a 
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positive sign and was statistically insignificant at 5 percent level of significance. It 
had a positive impact on FDI inflow in Tanzania, and this finding is consistent with 
Dunning’s theory (2006) expectations that political stability and absence of violence 
has   influence on FDI inflows. This implies that maintaining political stability and 
absence of violence (PS) by one unit, increases FDI inflow by 0.364062 percent.  
 
Political stability and absence of violence has influence on FDI inflows in Tanzania, 
though the influence appears to be insignificant.  These findings lend support to a 
number of several studies including studies by Gani (2007) who found out  that 
improvement in political stability had positive effects on FDI inflows for some Latin 
American countries. Tanzania Investment Climate Statement (2014, 2015) 
confirmed that political stability and absence of violence had positive and significant 
impact on inward FDI flows in Tanzania. Nunes and Castro (2012) found that stable 
political environment was an important factor for attracting FDI, while Kurecic and 
Kokotovic (2017) concluded that political stability was quite relevant to FDI inflows 
in developing countries. 
 
Historically Tanzania has been politically stable and free of political violence since 
independence in 1961, and it is a multiparty democratic state. It might be possible 
that foreign investors feel that the issue of political stability and absence of violence 
was not of critical concern to them. Also another reason might be that foreign direct 
investors are already satisfied with the prevailing political stability and absence of 
violence situation record in the country, and they are also aware that Tanzanian 
government is always on alert to maintain political stability and absence of violence 
in the country.  Therefore much of their attention is directed to other institutional 
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factors which are of critical importance to their FDI inflows decisions. If political 
stability and absence of violence had harmful effects to foreign investors it would 
have carried a negative sign implying that it is a threat to FDI inflows. However, we 
are also cautioned by other scholars that some institutional factors matter more than 
others in attracting more FDI (Kurul and Yalta, 2017). Daude and Stein (2004), in a 
related study, they concluded that, not all institutional factors have the same 
importance for the decision of where to invest.  
 
 Salem and Baum (2016) who revealed that political stability and absence of 
violence (PS) has a positive impact on FDI and is significant at 5% level. Political 
stability and absence of violence was found to be a significant determinant in 
attracting FDI in real estate. Yalta and Kurul (2017) revealed that improvements in 
political system, exercising policies that enhance participation of citizens in selecting 
their government, as well as protecting civil rights tends to increase FDI inflows in 
the country, Basu and Srinivasan (2002) concluded that political stability and 
absence of violence is a key determinant of FDI inflow, this indicates consistency 
with empirical findings of this study.  Henisz (1998), Wei (2000), Jensen (2003), 
Richard and Nwankwo (2005) argued that institutional factors particularly political 
restrictions are among the important determinants of multinational investments and 
FDI inflows. 
 
The studies by Erramilli and Rao (1993), Gastanaga et al    (1998), Wei (2000), 
Grosse and Trevino (2005), Demirhan and Masca (2008), found out and concluded 
that lack of political stability and prevalence of violence deters FDI inflow. 
Moreover, Grosse and Trevino (1996), Tallman (1998), concluded that absence of 
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political stability in the home country reduces foreign investment inflow in the host 
country.  Reinforcing the above previous studies; Wang and Swain (1997)Stevens 
(2000)Stein and Daude (2001) Asiedu (2005), Vadlamannati (2012), Lee and Rajan 
(2009), Krifa- Schneider and Matei (2010) Mishra and Daly (2007), Samini and 
Ariani (2010), Saidi, et al. (2013), Al-khour and Khalik (2013)), Pan (2003), Baek 
and Qian (2011), Smith-Hilmaon and Omar (2005) concluded that political stability 
had a positive and significant impact on FDI inflow, they support positive 
relationship between institutional factors, and hence they are also consistent with 
Dunning’s (2006) theory. 
 
However the finding Contradicts other studies, including the study finding and 
conclusion by Erkekoglu and Kilicarslan (2016) who argued  that increase in 
political stability and absence of violence reduced FDI inflow.  Erkekoglu and 
Kilicarslan (2016) performed a study on whether political stability had effect on FDI 
inflow in 91 countries in the period between 2002-2013, the findings were that an 
increase in political stability and absence of violence reduced FDI, this finding 
contradicts the theory.  
 
However under certain circumstances this could be true, particularly in natural 
resource–intensive countries like Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Libya, 
in these countries, political stability does not exist, and political conflicts create 
rooms for weak governments and weak institutions to enter investment contracts 
which to a large extent benefit the foreign investor rather than the host government. 
But once stable governments come into existence such investment contracts will be 
reviewed as a result some of the foreign investors will disappear. Alam et al., (2005) 
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carried out a study on FDI inflows in Bangladesh and found out that improving 
political stability had a positive influential in determining FDI inflows in 
Bangladesh. 
 
On the other hand Wheeler and Moody (1992), Noorbaksh et al., (2001), Sedik and 
Seoudy (2012)found out  and concluded that political stability had no effect on FDI 
flows. Another study by Haksoon and Kim (2010) concluded that countries with low 
level of democracy have high FDI inflows, and political rights have negative 
relationship with FDI inflows. In addition they concluded that politically unstable 
countries attracted FDI from developed countries with high political stability. Based 
on the findings and conclusions of majority of studies, political stability and absence 
of violence (PS) appears to be among the key determinants of FDI inflows in many 
countries all over the world. Countries wishing to attract FDI consistently should 
ensure that they maintain political stability and absence of violence in their 
countries. All data analysis and discussion of findings described above are well 
shown in the Table number 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5: Long Run Coefficients Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 8.339260 0.821610 10.14990 0.0000 
GE -0.345463 0.887772 -0.389135 0.7035 
RQ 3.746330 1.266878 2.957135 0.0111 
RL 0.111570 0.554516 0.201202 0.8437 
CC -1.567183 0.601616 -2.604956 0.0218 
VA 4.426003 0.702916 6.296633 0.0000 
PS 0.364062 0.411848 0.883970 0.3928 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018: Adjusted R-squared: 0.560861 
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The long run equation; 
LnFDI=8.33-0.345463GE+3.746330RQ+0.111570RL-I.567183CC+4.4260 03VA+0.364062PS+εt 
Access to land (AL),  though access to land (AL) variable is highly collinear with 
voice and accountability (VA) variable, however the regression results with all 
variables AL had a positive sign (0.135993) indicating that access to land variable is 
statistically insignificant on FDI inflows in Tanzania  (see table 4.9). This implies 
that land accessibility in Tanzania is not favorable to FDI inflows. This finding is 
quite similar to the allegations raised by OECD (2013); and Investment Climate 
Statement (2015).  
 
Moreover, these findings are also underscored by Tagini (2009) in his study revealed 
that a lack of attention to land tenure and security of land discourages foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows in Solomon Islands. In addition the United States of 
America Agency for International Development (2010) in its study of land tenure 
issues in Southern Sudan disclosed that a higher rate of FDIinflows occurs where 
land policy is transparent and security of tenure is guaranteed. Where policy is 
unclear and there is uncertainty about the security of tenure, there is a lower rate of 
FDI inflows. The access to land (AL) variable is important variable in this study, 
though it is highly collinear with voice and accountability variable (VA).  Co 
linearity is undesirable since it affects the level of significance of other institutional 
variables in the study.   
 
4.6.2. Short Run Coefficients Results  
In the short run coefficients, government effectiveness (GE) has a negative sign (-
0.5563873) but statistically insignificant at 5 percent level of significance. This 
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suggests that by not improving government effectiveness (GE) reduces the FDI 
inflows in Tanzania by 0.345463 percent. This implies that government effectiveness 
(GE) in short run has no significant impact in attracting foreign investors in 
Tanzania. It is of interest to note that both in long run and short run government 
effectiveness (GE) has negative influence on FDI inflows in Tanzania. Thus, 
government effectiveness (GE) in Tanzania is still a challenge in attracting FDI; 
deliberate reforms are required to address this challenge in order to make 
government (GE) attractive to FDI.   
 
Contrary to government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ) has a positive 
sign (4.501375) and statistically significant at 5percent level of significance. This 
connotes that when regulatory quality (RQ) is improved by one unit, it increases the 
FDI by 4.5014 percent. In fact, this empirical result in short run is similar with the 
one obtained in long run, regulatory quality (RQ) is attracting FDI significantly in 
Tanzania. On the other hand, rule of law (RL) has a positive sign (0.135295) but 
statistically insignificant at 5 percent level of significance. This implies that 
improving rule of law (RL) by one unit increases the FDI inflow in Tanzania by 
0.135295 percent. The study has revealed that though rule of law  (RL) has positive 
influence on FDI but its impact is insignificant both in long run and in short run, 
however rule of law (RL) is still attracting FDI inflow at insignificant level as such it 
requires improvement in future.  
 
 Furthermore, Control of Corruption (CC) has a negative sign and is statistically 
significant at 5 percent level of significant. This suggests that control of corruption 
has negative contribution in FDI inflow in Tanzania by 1.683905 percent and it is 
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statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. The analysis further 
suggests that the country (Tanzania) is still facing some challenges of corruption.  
Control of corruption (CC) has similar impact in long run and in short run. It is 
affecting the FDI inflows in Tanzania negatively and its impact is significant. 
Therefore, from these results it is important to adopt severe measures in order to 
reduce the level of corruption from the current level in the country which appears to 
be deterrent to FDI inflows.   
  
Voice and Accountability (VA) has positive influence in FDI inflow both in long run 
and short run. In short run voice and accountability (VA) has a coefficient of 
3.743725 and it is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. This 
implies that improving voice and accountability (VA) by one unit increases the FDI 
inflows in Tanzania by 3.7437 percent if at all other factors remain constant. From 
the empirical analysis there it is evident that voice and accountability (VA) has 
immense contribution in attracting FDI inflows in Tanzania. Therefore it should be 
given more attention so as to maintain FDI inflows in our economy.  Voice and 
accountability (VA) refers to the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, and a free press. It is a situation in which democracy prevails and in 
most cases citizens are involved in decision making. 
 
Political Stability and absence of Violence (PS) has a positive sign and is statistically 
insignificant at 5 percent level of significance. This implies that, other factors 
remaining constant increasing political stability and absence of violence (PS) by one 
unit increases the FDI inflows by 0.5469 percent as shown in Table 4.6 below. 
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However, its influence in attracting FDI inflow in Tanzania is statistically 
insignificant.  Actually, in long run and short run political stability and absence of 
violence (PS) gives similar results that are positive but statistically insignificant. In 
order to increase the FDI inflow positively and significantly, then political stability 
and absence of violence (PS) should be upheld and enhanced tremendously in the 
country.  
 
Moreover, error term (ECt-1) found with expected negative sign (-0.911184) and 
statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. This result suggests that 
variables, Government Effectiveness, (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law 
(RL), Control of Corruption (CC), Voice and Accountability (VA) and Political 
Stability and absence of Violence (PS) have long run relationship and are adjusting 
to restore the equilibrium at the speed of 91 percent per annum. Thus, error term 
obtained in short run confirmed the co integration among the variables. Furthermore, 
this error term gives similar findings as the one obtained in Engle-Granger residuals 
and Johansen co integration tests as such are correct. Therefore, variables are 
adjusting in short run in order to capture the long run relationships (long run 
equilibrium) when these variables are shocked with any factor (s).The implication of 
the findings is that the speed of adjustment is quite sufficient as such requires 
minimal government intervention to restore to its equilibrium. 
 
These empirical results lead the researcher to conclude that weakness in control of 
corruption, government effectiveness have negative effect on FDI inflows in 
Tanzania. Improving institutional factors for favorable investment environment to 
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attract FDI should be an important agenda in Tanzania. Table 4.6 show short run 
results. 
 
Table 4.6: Short Run Coefficients Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DGE -0.556387 1.303899 -0.426711 0.6771 
DRQ 4.501375 1.346486 3.343054 0.0059 
DRL 0.135295 0.344103 0.393183 0.7011 
DCC -1.683905 0.761992 -2.209873 0.0473 
DVA 3.743725 1.441352 2.597370 0.0233 
DPS 0.546887 0.335215 1.631450 0.1287 
ECt-1 -0.911184 0.348217 -2.616713 0.0225 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
4.7. Granger Causality Tests Results 
The present study conducted the pair wise granger causality test at level at different 
lag order that is lag 2 and lag 4. Findings below showing the outcomes of the granger 
causality at lag 2 and lag 4 respectively. 
 
4.7.1. Granger Causality Tests Results at Level -Lag 2 
 In these results the empirical findings reveal that control of corruption (CC) and 
political stability and absence of violence (PV) they granger-cause the FDI since 
their p-values (0.0007 and 0.0141) are statistically significant at 5 percent level of 
significance. But FDI does not granger-cause the control of corruption (CC) and 
political stability and non violence (PV), since their p-values (0.3805 and 0.9100) are 
statistically not significant at 5 percent level of significance. Thus, from these 
findings it is one way direction (unidirectional) of granger causality relationship 
among the variables (See Table 4.7 and Table 4.11 below). Other variables like rule 
of law (RL), regulatory quality ( RQ), government effectiveness (GE),  and voice 
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and accountability(VA) are not granger causing FDI and FDI as well does not 
granger cause those variables as shown in  Table 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.12.  
 
Table   4.7: Pair wise Granger- Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
CC does  Granger Cause FDI 18 13.2076 0.0007 
FDI does not Granger Cause CC 18 1.04165 0.3805 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table    4. 8: Granger Causality Test Pair wise Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Probability 
 RL does not Granger Cause FDI 0.94400 0.4142 
FDI does not Granger Cause RL 0.83242 0.4569 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table  4.9: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Result at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
RQ does not Granger Cause  FDI 18 1.73546 0.2148 
 FDI does not Granger Cause RQ 18 0.79040 0.4743 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table   4. 10: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations Statistic Probability 
 GE does not Granger cause FDI 18 0.41243 0.6704 
FDI does not Granger Cause GE 18 0.46806 0.6364 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table    4. 11: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
PS does  Granger cause FDI 18 6.02654 0.0141 
FDI does not Granger cause PS 18 0.09497 0.9100 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
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Table   4.12: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
VA does not Granger cause FDI 18 1.69311 0.2221 
FDI does not Granger cause VA 18 0.26384 0.7721 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
4.7.2. Pair wise Granger Causality test results at Level -Lag 4 
In these results the empirical findings reveal that control of corruption(CC) and 
political stability and non violence (PS)  granger-cause the FDI but FDI does not 
granger cause control of corruption,  political stability and non violence (PS) since 
their p-values (0.0334, and 0.00017) are statistically not significant at 5 percent level 
of significance. Thus, from these findings it is one way direction (unidirectional) of 
granger causality relationship among the variables. (See Table 4.13 and Table 4.17). 
Other variables like rule of law (RL),regulatory quality (RQ), government 
effectiveness (GE) and voice and accountability (VA) do not granger cause FDI and 
FDI as well does not granger cause those variables as shown in the Table 4.14, 4.15, 
4.16, and 4.8. 
 
Table 4. 13: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
CC does Granger Cause FDI 16 4.90649 0.0334 
FDI does not Granger cause CC 16 0.80267 0.5604 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 14: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic  Probability 
RL does not Granger cause FDI 16 0.40389 0.8007 
FDI does not Granger cause RL 16 2.16968 0.1747 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
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Table 4. 15: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
RQ does not Granger Cause FDI 16 1.74114 0.2448 
FDI does not Granger Cause RQ 16 0.64373 0.6486 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4.16: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic  Probability 
 GE does not Granger Cause FDI 16 1.67682 0.2582 
 FDI does not Granger Cause GE 16 1.41211 0.3232 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 17: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
PV does Granger Cause FDI 16 14.4614 0.0017 
FDI does not Granger Cause PV 16 0.30060 0.8688 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 18: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Level 
Null Hypothesis Observations Statistic Probability 
VA does not Granger Cause FDI 16 1.49093 0.3020 
FDI does not Granger Cause VA 16 0.33225 0.8481 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
4.7.3. Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short Run-Lag 2 
In these results the empirical findings reveal that control of corruption (CC) granger-
cause the FDI but FDI does not granger because the control of corruption since its p-
value (0.0189) is statistically not significant at 5 percent level of significance. Thus, 
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from these findings it is one way direction (unidirectional) of granger causality 
relationship among the variables. See the Table 4.19 below. Other variables namely 
rule of law (RL), regulatory quality ( RQ),  government effectiveness (GE), Control 
of Corruption (CC), political stability and non violence (PV) and voice and 
accountability (VA) do not granger-cause FDI and FDI as well does not granger 
cause those variables as shown in Tables 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, 4.23, 4.24, and  4.25. 
 
Table 4.19: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short Run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
CC does Granger Cause FDI 17 5.62918 0.0189 
FDI does not Granger Cause CC 17 0.92333 0.4237 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 20: Pair wise Granger Causality Test results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
RL does not Granger Cause FDI 17 0.75048 0.4931 
FDI does not Granger Cause RL 17 1.18443 0.3393 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 21: Pair wise Granger Causality Test results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
RQ does not Granger Cause FDI 17 0.08826 0.916I 
FDI does not Granger Cause RQ 17 1.23994 0.3240 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 22: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
GE does not Granger- Cause FDI 17 1.16878 0.3437 
FDI does not Granger- Cause GE 17 0.21512 0.8095 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
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Table 4. 23: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
PSV does not Granger- Cause FDI 17 1.97683 0.1811 
FDI does not Granger- Cause PV 17 0.97831 0.4040 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 24: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
VA does not Granger- Cause FDI 17 0.35044 0.7113 
FDI does not Granger –Cause VA 17 0.19402 0.8262 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
4.7.4. Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short Run-Lag 4 
In this analysis the empirical findings reveal that political stability and absence of 
violence (PS) granger-cause foreign direct investment (FDI) since its p-value 
(0.0208) is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. But FDI does 
not granger cause the political stability and absence of violence (PS) Thus, from 
these findings it is one way direction (unidirectional) of granger-causality 
relationship among the variables running from PV to FDI. See Table 4.29 below. 
Other variables namely, control of corruption (CC), rule of law (RL), regulatory 
quality (RQ), government effectiveness (GE) and voice and accountability (VA) do 
not granger-causing FDI and FDI as well does not granger-cause those variables as 
shown in  Tables, 4.25 4.26, 4.27, 4.28, 4.30. 
Table 4. 25: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
CC does not Granger- Cause FDI 15 3.59797 0.0794 
FDI does not Granger- Cause CC 15 0.36343 0.8268 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
 
140 
Table 4. 26: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probility 
RL does not Granger- Cause FDI 15 0.17355 0.9441 
FDI does not Granger-Cause RL 15 1.21562 0.3948 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 27: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
RQ does not Granger-Cause  FDI 15 1.18894 0.4039 
FDI does not Granger –Cause RQ 15 0.50221 0.7369 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 28: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
GE does not Granger Cause  FDI 15 0.53895 0.7139 
FDI does not Granger Cause GE 15 0.58018 0.6887 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4.29: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
PS does Granger Cause FDI 15 6.74754 0.0208 
FDI does not Granger Cause PS  0.85886 0.5380 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
Table 4. 30: Pair wise Granger Causality Test Results at Short run 
Null Hypothesis Observations F-Statistic Probability 
VA does not granger cause FDI 15 0.93636 0.5024 
FDI does not granger cause VA  0.07546 0.9871 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
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4.8. Diagnostic Test Results 
Diagnostic test is one of the set of procedures available for regression analysis which 
seek to assess the validity of a model in a number of different ways. The assessment 
might be carried out through, exploration of the model’s underlying assumptions, 
examination of the structure of the model by taking into account formulations that 
have fewer, more or different explanatory variables, and also by examining a study 
of sub groups of observations, looking for those which are either poorly represented 
by the model (outliers) or which have a relatively large effect on the regression 
model’s predictions.  
 
Diagnostic testing is a necessary process in economic analysis, since many time 
series data are faced by or confronted by multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and 
serial correlation just to name few. This test is therefore crucial since it handles 
problems associated with time series data regression analysis. In this study the areas 
addressed by this test include: normality test, serial correlation test, 
heteroscedasticity test, and multicollinearity test.   
 
4.8.1. Normality Test Results 
The  study employed the Jarque-Bera test to detect normality errors,  Jarque –Bera 
statistic1.066673 and its p value 0.586644 is higher than 5% significant level, so the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, which implies that there is no normality problem, so 
the error terms are normally distributed (Figure: 4.1).The empirical findings are 
showing that there is no problem of normality since the computed probability values 
are statistically insignificant as such we cannot rejected the null hypothesis of no 
problem of normality.  
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Figure 4.1: Normality Test Results     
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
 
4.8.2. Serial Correlation Results  
The  study employed the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM (Lagrange 
Multiplier) Test to identify the issue of serial correlation and the empirical findings 
showing that there is no problem of serial correlation since the computed probability 
chi-square values (0.3795) is higher than 5% (0.05) significant level. Thus, 0.3795 is 
statistically insignificant as such we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no problem 
of serial correlation. Thus, the empirical results have no problem of serial correlation 
(See the Table 4.31). 
 
Table 4. 31: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
F-statistic 0.590092 Prob. F(2,11) 0.5709 
Obs*R-squared 1.937875 Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.3795 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
The result from this study which is 0.3795 is statistically insignificant (since it is 
higher than 0.05) significant level as such we cannot reject null hypothesis of no 
problem of serial correlation. 
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4.8.3. Heteroscedasticity Test Results Heteroscedasticity Test Results 
Normally a good regression model is free from heteroscedasticity. The test is 
therefore used to examine whether there is a difference in the residual variance of 
observation to another period of observation.  The study used the Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test to detect heteroscedasticity error, the Observed R-squared is 4.239918 
and the p value 0.6442 is higher than 5% significant level, so the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected proving that there is no heteroscedasticity problem. Empirical 
findings are showing that there is no problem of heteroscedasticity since the 
computed probability chi-square values are statistically insignificant as such we 
cannot rejected the null hypothesis of no problem of serial correlation. Therefore, the 
empirical results are correctly inferred (Table 4.32).  
 
Table 4.32: Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Results 
F-statistic  0.582896 Prob. F (6,13) 0.7382 
Obs*R-squared 4.239918 Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.6442 
Scaled explained ss 1.099637 Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.9816 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
4.8.4. Multicolinearity Test Results  
After meeting the conditions of normality and linearity assumptions it was required 
to determine whether there was a similarity between the independent variables in a 
model. This condition as a principle it requires that, the independent variables in the 
model should not be a linear function of one another. The Pair Wise Correlation and 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests were employed to detect the existence of 
multicollinearity in the data.  In order to detect the issue of multicollinearity we run 
the regression at level in all seven independent variables against FDI as dependent 
variable and found that six variables were statistically insignificant and that signifies 
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the presence of multicollinearity and only one variable was significant as shown on 
Table 4.33. 
 
Table 4. 33: Regression Results With all Variables Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 2.672464 5.329642 0.501434 0.6251 
GE 0.592964 1.240716 0.477921 0.6413 
RQ 3.023853 1.427099 2.118881 0.0556 
RL 0.151679 0.552442 0.274562 0.7883 
CC -1.305376 0.645608 -2.021934 0.0661 
VA 3.116065 1.403694 2.219902 0.0464 
PS 0.211763 0.433153 0.488887 0.6337 
AL 0.135993 0.126392 1.075967 0.3031 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018Adjusted R-Square: 0.811955 
 
Pair Wise Correlation Test Results: After suspecting the presence of 
multicollinearity then the study conducted tests using two main tests namely Pair 
Wise Correlation and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF). Computation findings under 
pair wise correlation revealed the presence of multicollinearity between VA and AL 
as shown in the table below. The rule of thumb states that if the coefficient is more 
than 0.8 then there is a problem of multicollinearity. VA has 0.805712 similar to AL 
which has 0.805712 as such they are above 0.8 as suggested, (See Table 4.34). 
 
Table 4. 34: Pair- wise Correlation Results 
Variable GE RQ RL CC VA PSV AL 
GE  1.000000 -0.251319  0.397098  0.151589 -0.240588 -0.342594 -0.665099 
RQ -0.251319  1.000000 -0.132562 -0.130396 -0.027064  0.017252  0.249395 
RL  0.397098 -0.132562  1.000000 -0.350836 -0.451875 -0.490376 -0.536582 
CC  0.151589 -0.130396 -0.350836  1.000000  0.718827  0.326513  0.357122 
VA -0.240588 -0.027064 -0.451875  0.718827  1.000000  0.438231  0.805712 
PS -0.342594  0.017252 -0.490376  0.326513  0.438231  1.000000  0.539863 
AL -0.665099  0.249395 -0.536582  0.357122  0.805712  0.539863  1.000000 
Source: Researcher’s Computation; 2018 
 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test Results: Having established that variables have 
multicollinearity problem under pair wise correlation test and then we conducted 
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again the VIF test to verify the above computation findings. In fact, the variables 
were found to be collinear even under VIF results as shown in Table 4.12 since the 
VA has (11.47520) and AL has (13.54687), all have more variance inflation factor 
that is above10 as required by rule of thumb (See Table 4.35). 
 
Table 4.35: VIF Test Results 
Variable 
Coefficient Uncentered Centered 
Variance VIF VIF 
GE  1.539376  60.80363  3.508041 
RQ  2.036612  50.18231  1.402974 
RL  0.305192  7.180314  1.649007 
CC  0.416809  35.61758  3.388048 
VA  1.970358  47.18602  11.47520 
PS  0.187621  6.439145  1.674124 
AL  0.015975  3896.823  13.54687 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
 
Therefore the study concluded that VA and AL have problems of multicollinearity.  
And there after we estimated again and found that the problem was resolved as 
shown by findings under Pair Wise Correlation and Variance Inflation Factor. 
 
Pair- Wise Correlation Test Results: Computation findings revealed that there was 
no problem of multicollinearity as shown in Table 4.35 since no any variable has 
coefficients above 0.8 as a rule of thumb suggested. 
 
Table 4.36: Pair- wise Correlation Test Results 
 GE RQ RL CC VA PV 
GE  1.000000 -0.251319  0.397098  0.151589 -0.240588 -0.342594 
RQ 0.251319  1.000000 -0.132562 -0.130396 -0.027064  0.017252 
RL 0.397098 -0.132562  1.000000 -0.350836 -0.451875 -0.490376 
CC 0.151589 -0.130396 -0.350836  1.000000  0.718827  0.326513 
VA -0.240588 -0.027064 -0.451875  0.718827  1.000000  0.438231 
PS -0.342594  0.017252 -0.490376  0.326513  0.438231  1.000000 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
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Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test Results: Similarly under VIF there is no 
problem of multicollinearity as shown in the table below since no any variables have 
VIF above 10 as rule of thumb suggested. See Table 4.37.  
 
Table 4.37: VIF Test Results 
 Coefficient Uncentered Centred 
Variable Variance VIF VIF 
C  0.675043  98.11497  NA 
GE  0.788140  30.75751  1.774542 
RQ  1.604980  39.07286  1.092381 
RL  0.307488  7.147619  1.641499 
CC  0.361942  30.55827  2.906792 
VA  0.494091  11.69063  2.843052 
PS  0.169619  5.751535  1.495351 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018 
 
 
NOTE: ‘C’ stands to signify the presence of multicollinearity. 
Decision Criteria: 
Under pair-wise correlation test: To determine the correlation of independent 
variables if it is too high or too low, this test suggests that the pair-wise or zero-order 
correlation coefficient between two independent variables is high if it exceeds 0.8, 
thus multicollinearity becomes a problem and if it is less there is no problem of 
multicollinearity among independent variables. 
 
Under Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test:  The closer tolerance to 0 (zero) 
implies that there are problems of co linearity among independent variables; whereas 
closer tolerance to 1 (one) implies that independent variables are not collinear to 
each other. VIF values exceeding 10 signifies that variables are collinear, but if or 
when less than 10 then there is no problem of multicollinearity among the 
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independent variables (Gujarat, 2009). When the variables are highly correlated with 
each other their inclusion in the regression equation causes a high degree of 
multicollinearity. Under these circumstances, Wooldridge (2009) suggests either 
dropping one variable or combining them. Hailu et al., (2016) in their study they 
combined the two variables, however Kiangi et al., (2017) in their study they 
decided to retain the variable since it was a key variable in their study. Since the two 
variables were key in this study, the study decided to retain them. The decision has 
been adopted from previous studies as explained above. 
 
4.9. Structural Break-Stability Test Results 
 This study estimates the stability of the coefficients between FDI and control of 
corruption (CC), Regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), government 
effectiveness (GE), political stability and non violence (PV).  The stability test 
results reveal that all the variables their plots are within 5 percent critical bounds, 
implies that there is stable relationship amongst variables (dependent variables and 
independent variables).  
 
The straight lines in the figures below represent critical bounds at 5 percent 
significant level. Therefore, structural break test in this study is important for policy 
formulation and forecasting purposes in FDI inflows in Tanzania. The Figure 4.2 
below show the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plot for variable under study. If the 
relationship between institutional variables and FDI is stable. Then institutional 
factors must be given proper attention or improved due to their contribution towards 
FDI inflows in Tanzania. See the Figures 4.2 and 4.3. 
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Figure 4.2: CUSUM of Squares Plot Results  
Source: Researcher’s, 2018           
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Figure 4.3: CUSUM of Squares Plot Results 
Source: Researcher’s, 2018      
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4.10. F-Test Research Hypothesis Results 
The present study employed F-Test which is called joint test to test null hypothesis 
and the study found that the null hypothesis was rejected since computed values 
(14.47148) is greater than critical values (3.58) at 5 percent level of significance. 
Thus, all variables have contributions to the FDI inflow in Tanzania. The empirical 
results are well shown in Table 4.38. 
 
Table 4.31: Hypothesis Test Results 
Computed value Values 
F-statistic 14.47148 
Source: researcher’s computation: Compare against critical values 3.58 at 5% 
 
Hence we reject null hypothesis and conclude that all variables (CC, RQ, RL, GE, 
and PSV & VA) have contributions to the dependent variable (FDI inflow in 
Tanzania). 
 
4.11. Contribution of the Study 
The ultimate objective of the study was to find out the relationship between 
institutional factors (GE, RQ, RL, CC, PS, and VA, including AL) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows in Tanzania. The contribution of this study includes: 
 
4.11.1. Contribution to the Body of Knowledge and Literature 
This study has been carried out amid the ongoing economic reforms in Tanzania 
which involved reforms and restructuring of institutions, policies, laws and 
regulations to pave the way which provided impetus for private sector development. 
However since the adoption of economic reforms almost twenty two (22) years ago, 
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no comprehensive study has been carried out to find out the impact of institutional 
factors (IF) on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in Tanzania.  
This study is filling a gap in our understanding or knowledge by providing a more 
robust explanation of a phenomenon in more depth. Moreover the study has also 
disclosed the nature of causation (direction of relationship) between some variables 
by employing Granger-causality test which revealed that FDI inflows in Tanzania is 
granger-caused by political stability(PS) and control of corruption(CC) variables.    
  
4.11.2. Theoretical contribution 
 Dunning (2006) theory of Institutional factors is a popular theory in the study of 
FDI inflows though it has often been criticized for being rigid. In order to cope with 
the phenomenon being studied this study suggests expanding the domain of a theory  
by adding ‘access to land’ as a new construct to be included to the existing variables 
in the theory. The addition of the new variable affects the accepted relationship 
between the variables. AL variable indicates close relationship with VA variable; the 
two variables are co linear.  Moreover, the finding for AL variable indicates 
statistically insignificant relationship with FDI inflows in Tanzania which implies 
that ‘accessibility to land’ in Tanzania discourages FDI inflows in the country. These 
observations justify the suggestion to expand the domain of a theory.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
5.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter addresses three major areas, namely conclusion, recommendations, 
policy implications, and areas for further research. 
 
5.2. Conclusion 
The study examined “the relationship between institutional factors and foreign direct 
investment inflows in Tanzania”.  Not much was known to what extent institutional 
factors were related with FDI inflows in Tanzania since Tanzania adopted economic 
reforms in 1990s. In order to achieve the objective the study employed quantitative 
approach, time series data from 1996 to 2015 were used in this study and multiple 
linear regression analysis model was applied to analyze data. The computer software 
E-views version 10 software which is based on multiple linear regression estimators 
was employed for this task. 
 
This conclusion is based on the findings from empirical analysis as follows:  
Government effectiveness variable (GE) has negative sign (-0.345463) and it is 
statistically insignificant at 5 percent level of significance. This implies that 
government effectiveness (GE) has negative relationship with FDI inflows and 
therefore not attractive to FDI.  Regulatory quality variable (RQ) has positive sign 
(3.746330) and it is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance, and it is 
attractive to FDI inflows in Tanzania. Rule of law variable (RL) has positive 
(0.111570) sign but it is statistically and insignificantly related at 5 percent level of 
significance.  This implies that rule of law (RL) was not attractive to FDI inflows in 
 
 
152 
Tanzania. This result is also underscored by Saidi, Ochi and Ghadri (2013) who 
noted that sometime foreign investors are interested just in few institutional factors 
in their choice in investment abroad, Babayan (2015) underscored that some 
institutional factors are most critical for attracting FDI and some are not. This 
implies that some institutional factors matter more than others in attracting FDI 
inflows, but it all depends on the foreign investors’ assessment and backgrounds 
(Kunsch et al., 2014). 
 
Control of corruption variable (CC) has a negative sign (-1.567183) and it is 
statistically significant at 5percent level of significance. The result illustrates that 
corruption has a negative impact on FDI inflows; and therefore not attractive to FDI 
inflows in Tanzania. Voice and accountability (VA) has a positive sign (4.426003) 
and it is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. This implies that it 
is attractive to FDI inflow in Tanzania.  Political Stability and absence of violence 
variable (PS), has a positive sign (0.364062) but it is statistically insignificant at 5 
percent level of significance. This means that improving and maintaining Political 
Stability and absence of violence will attract more FDI inflow in the country by 
0.364062 percent. However granger causality test shows that political stability and 
absence of violence (PS) granger-causes foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Tanzania. 
 
Access to land (AL) has positive sign (0.13593) but it is statistically insignificant at 
5 percent level of significance. This implies that access to land   is not attractive to 
FDI inflows in the country. In the short run coefficients, government effectiveness 
variable (GE) has a negative sign (-0.5563873) but statistically insignificant at 5 
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percent level of significance. This suggests that government effectiveness is not 
attractive to FDI inflow in Tanzania. It is of interest to note that both in long run and 
short run government effectiveness (GE) has negative influence on FDI inflows in 
Tanzania.   
 
Regulatory quality (RQ) has a positive sign (4.501375) and is statistically significant 
at 5percent level of significance. This suggests that regulatory quality (RQ) is 
attractive to FDI inflows.  This empirical result in short run is similar with the one 
obtained in long run, which showed that regulatory quality (RQ) is attracting FDI 
significantly in Tanzania. Rule of law (RL) has a positive sign (0.135295) but it is 
statistically insignificant at 5 percent level of significance. This implies that rule of 
law (RL) is not attractive to FDI inflow in Tanzania by 0.135295 percent.  
 
Control of corruption (CC) has a negative sign (-1.683905) and is statistically 
significant at 5 percent level of significant.  Control of corruption variable (CC) has 
similar impact both in long run and in short run, it deters FDI inflows in Tanzania. 
Voice and accountability (VA) has positive influence in FDI inflow both in long run 
and short run. In short run voice and accountability (VA) has a coefficient of 
3.743725 and it is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. This 
implies that improving voice and accountability (VA) by one unit increases the FDI 
inflows in Tanzania by 3.7437 percent. 
 
Political stability and absence of violence (PS) has a positive sign (0.546887) and is 
statistically insignificant at 5 percent level of significance. This implies that, 
increasing political stability and absence of violence (PS) by one unit increases the 
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FDI inflows by 0.5469 percent.  Actually, in long run and short run political stability 
and absence of violence (PS) gives similar results that are positive but statistically 
insignificant.  Moreover, error term (ECt-1) found with expected negative sign (-
0.911184) and statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. This result 
suggests that variables (GE, RQ, RL, CC, VA and PS) have long run relationship 
and are adjusting to restore the equilibrium at the speed of 91 percent per annum. 
Thus, error term obtained in short run confirmed the co integration among the 
variables. Furthermore, this error term gives the similar findings as the one obtained 
in Engle-Granger residuals and Johansen co integration tests as such are correct. 
Therefore, variables are adjusting in short run in order to capture the long run 
relationships (long run equilibrium) when these variables are shocked by any factor 
(s). 
 
 Since the study used time series data it was imperative for the data to pass through 
various tests including unit root, co integration, Granger causality, serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity, normality, and multicollinearity tests in the whole process of data 
analysis exercise. The Unit Root Test, this was carried out using Augmented Dickey 
Fuller test (ADF), the Phillips-Perron PP Test which is a modification of the Dickey 
Fuller test was applied to check and correct for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity in the error. Unit root testing was done in order to avoid spurious 
regressions or meaningless results. Moreover the test for unit root was essential in 
order to know if variables in the study are integrated in the same order or not. 
 
Co integration test; is another test employed by this study; the study employed two 
main co integration tests which are Johansen co integration test and Engle–Granger 
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Residuals (EG) or Augmented Engle–Granger residuals (AEG) co integration test. 
The empirical results revealed that variables are co integrated. The study rejected the 
null hypothesis which means that residuals are stationary and variables are co 
integrated and tau statistic is obtained and is significant. This leads to the 
conclusions that, the regression outputs obtained in non stationary variables are no 
longer spurious as such the empirical results represent the long run relationship 
amongst the variables. The Granger causality test results at Long- run and Short- run 
at Level-Lag2 and at Level-Lag 4 reveal that control of corruption (cc) and political 
stability and absence of violence (PS) granger- cause FDI but FDI does not granger –
cause the control of corruption (cc) and political stability and non violence (PS).  
 
Thus from these findings it is one way direction (unidirectional) of granger-causality 
relationship among the variables. Other variables, namely rule of law (RL), 
regulatory quality (RQ), government effectiveness (GE), and voice and 
accountability (VA) are not granger-causing FDI and FDI as well is not granger-
causing those variables. Normality was tested using the Jarque- Bera test and the 
empirical results indicate that there is no problem of normality. Serial Correlation 
was tested using Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test; the empirical 
findings show that there is no problem of serial correlation. Heteroscedasticity, the 
study used Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test to detect heteroscedasticity error and 
empirical findings indicate that there is no problem of heteroscedasticity. 
 
Multicollinearity tests, pairwise correlation and variance inflation factor tests were 
used to detect multicollinearity in this analysis. A test under pair wise correlation 
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revealed the presence of multicollinearity problem between voice and accountability 
(VA) variable and accessibility to land (AL) variable. Despite the biasing effect over 
other variables, the study retained both variables because both were crucial to this 
study and in the regression of all variables (table, 4.9) AL variable had influence on 
FDI inflows in Tanzania. The structural break stability was tested by stability test the 
results of which revealed that all the variables their plots are within critical bounds 
implying that there is stable relationship among the variables (dependent variable 
and independent variables). 
 
However these findings provide indication that in certain circumstances, some 
institutional factors are not as critical as others in determining investment decisions. 
Under similar circumstances, in the study of Yalta and Kurul (2016) concluded that 
not all institutional factors have significant effect on FDI inflows in developing 
countries. Moreover in a study of Daude and Stein (2004) they concluded that not all 
institutional factors have the same importance for the decision of where to invest. 
 
5.3. Policy Implications 
The government is currently struggling to attract FDI inflows in order to boost her 
economy the main emphasis being promoting the manufacturing sector which 
actually is an implementation of industrialization policy. Attractive institutional 
factors motivate FDI inflows in the country. These findings indicate that some 
institutional factors are not attractive to FDI inflows in Tanzania. The list includes 
government effectiveness (GE), rule of law (RL), control of corruption (CC), and 
access to land (AL). 
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In order for the government to meet its goals it must address the main issues/findings 
as revealed by this study as follows. Generally, measures should be adopted to 
regularly evaluate the performance or rather the attractiveness of the institutional 
factors. Moreover the government should periodically review institutional factors in 
order to improve their quality or attractiveness.  The aim should be to create a much 
more competitive investment climate that will be able to attract FDI inflows in the 
country. In this study government effectiveness (GE), rule of law (RL), access to 
land (AL) and control of corruption (CC) have been revealed to be unfavorable to 
FDI inflows in Tanzania. Policy and Structural reforms which target improving these 
institutional factors for better business and investment environment in the country 
should be initiated and implemented. For example the current land policy and 
security of tenure should be reviewed to make it favorable to foreign direct investors. 
 On the other hand appropriate strategies should be identified that will help to get rid 
of corruption (CC) in country. 
 
In addition, measures should be taken to maintain the prevailing political stability 
and absence of violence, for attracting more FDI inflows in Tanzania. Regulatory 
quality (RQ) and Voice and accountability (VA), these institutional factors should 
be maintained in order to keep them more and more attracting to FDI inflows in 
Tanzania. 
 
5.4. Recommendations to Policy Makers 
The empirical findings of this study highlight the relationship between institutional 
factors and FDI inflows in Tanzania. These results have reflected the quality of   
institutional factors and their potential impact in attracting FDI inflows in Tanzania.   
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Evidence from findings indicates that government effectiveness (GE) has a negative 
sign which implies that government effectiveness has negative impact on FDI inflow 
in Tanzania.   
 
Rule of law (RL) has a positive sign but it is statistically insignificant which implies 
that it is unfavorable to FDI inflows.  Control of corruption (CC) has a negative sign, 
which is an indication that the current level of corruption deters FDI inflows.  Voice 
and accountability (VA), and regulatory quality (RQ) have positive signs and are 
statistically significant which means they are attractive to FDI inflows in Tanzania. 
Political stability and absence of violence (PS) has a positive sign; and its influence 
on FDI inflows in Tanzania is significant as revealed by the Granger causality test. 
Access to land (AC) has a positive sign but statistically insignificant impact to FDI 
inflows.  This means it is not attractive to FDI inflows in the country. 
 
Regulatory quality (RQ) and Voice and accountability (VA) have positive and 
significant influence on FDI inflows in Tanzania. The two institutional factors 
should be maintained in order to keep them more and more attracting to FDI inflows 
in Tanzania. Control of corruption (CC) has significant negative influence on FDI 
inflows. This means the level of corruption in the country is still high. If the 
government does not wage sufficient effort to control, it will keep on making 
investment climate unattractive to FDI inflows in the country. The study suggests 
that the current campaign undertaken by our 5
th 
phase government under His 
Excellency President Dr. John P. Magufuli against corruption need to be intensified 
in order to stamp out the vice from our society.  
 
 
159 
Government effectiveness (GE) has negative influence on FDI; this implies that GE 
is not attractive to FDI investors. The study suggests that, GE should be improved by 
reducing excessive burden of bureaucracy, improving the quality of civil service, 
reforms in policy formulation and implementation and the government should ensure 
high commitment to her investment policies and there should be regular review and 
follow up of policies. Rule of law (RL) is positive but has insignificant relationship 
or influence on FDI inflows in Tanzania. This implies that it is not attractive to FDI 
inflows in the country. Improvement is required in aspects related to, among other 
things; property rights, quality of contracts and contract enforcement, and the courts 
in order to win more confidence from foreign investors.  
 
Political stability and nonviolence (PS), politically Tanzania is stable and one of the 
factors making Tanzania attractive to FDI inflows is political stability. The causality 
test between political stability and FDI indicate that political stability causes FDI 
inflows in Tanzania.  The study recommends that since political stability is a key to 
FDI inflow in Tanzania, the government should keep on taking measures   to 
maintain the prevailing political stability and absence of violence, for attracting more 
FDI inflows in the country. 
 
Access to land (AL), although land is a key factor to FDI investors’, evidence from 
this study revealed that land policy and land tenure system were not favorable to FDI 
inflows in the country. However since access to land is among the key determinants 
of FDI inflows the process to acquire or access it by foreign investors should be 
improved by removing unnecessary bureaucracy. This study recommends that the 
current land policy and land tenure system should be reviewed to make them 
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attractive foreign investors. 
 
5.5. Limitations of the Study 
Some observations were missing particularly those of 1997, 1999 and 2001 years. 
Rolling mean or moving average technique was applied to obtain the missing 
observations in the time series. Rolling or Moving average (MA) is a statistical 
technique to get an overall idea of the trend in a data set. It is an average of any 
subset of numbers and it is extremely useful for forecasting long term trends. Rolling 
or Moving average (MA) as a statistical technique to get an overall idea of the trend 
in a data set was also employed in previous studies including those of; Kolkova 
(2018), Silva de Souza  et al.,(2018), and Wang et al.,(2014).  
 
5.6. Suggested Areas for Further Research 
The scope for this study covers the period from 1996 to 2015; the study has 
considered two regimes.  From November, 2015, Tanzania held general election 
which put the country under another regime or political administration with different 
personalities implementing the country’s investment policy in the country. The 
change of regime might have some new shake up on the institutional factors leading 
to or causing different impacts on FDI inflows. Since this study used data from 1996 
to 2015, another further study is recommended which will capture the data for 2016, 
2017 and 2018 respectively which were not captured by this study as they were not 
within the scope of this study. Moreover another study is required which will 
consider inclusion of “access to land”, and “cultural distance “as new variables to be 
included in the domain of Dunning’s Institutional theory (2006). 
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This study used quantitative approach, it would be better to have another study 
which will employ mixed method. Based on these recommendations, further studies 
should be carried out to find out the contribution of institutional factors towards 
attracting FDI inflows in various sectors in Tanzania. Moreover, the study also 
suggests further studies on the relationship between “cultural distance” and FDI 
inflows. Cultural distance is defined as the study of principal differences in national 
cultures between the home country of MNEs and their countries of operations. It 
refers to the differences between national cultures. It is an important determinant of 
organizational actions, and performance. 
 
Fitting to local cultural values (in the foreign market or location) which are 
transmitted through nations’ political economy, education, religion, and language 
may create an additional challenges and burden for multinational corporations 
operating their businesses in different countries (Schwartz, 1999). It is assumed that 
foreign and home country cultures increase the cost of entry, decrease operational 
benefits, and hamper the firm’s ability to transfer core competencies to foreign 
markets (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Palich and Gomez-Mejia, 1999). MNEs need 
to consider this variable before they make investment decisions or before they shift 
their operations to foreign market locations.   
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX I: GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:23 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags:2 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs ERV Prob. 
    
    SER02 does not Granger Cause SER01 18 13.2076 0.0007 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER02 1.04165 0.3805 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:25 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags2   
    
    
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    
SER03 does not Granger Cause SER01 18 0.94400 0.4142 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER03 0.83242 0.4569 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:25 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 2   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER04 does not Granger Cause SER01 18 1.73546 0.2148 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER04 0.79040 0.4743 
    
     
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:26 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 2   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER05 does not Granger Cause SER01 18 0.41243 0.6704 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER05 0.46806 0.6364 
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Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:27 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 2 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER06 does not Granger Cause SER01 18 6.02654 0.0141 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER06 0.09497 0.9100 
    
    
 
 
 
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:28 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags2   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER07 does not Granger Cause SER01 18 1.69311 0.2221 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER07 0.26384 0.7721 
    
     
LAG: 4 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:38 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 4   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER02 does not Granger Cause SER01 16 4.90649 0.0334 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER02 0.80267 0.5604 
    
     
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:41 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 4 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER03 does not Granger Cause SER01 16 0.40389 0.8007 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER03 2.16968 0.1747 
    
    Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:42 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 4   
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    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER04 does not Granger Cause SER01 16 1.74114 0.2448 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER04 0.64373 0.6486 
    
    
 
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:47 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 4 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER05 does not Granger Cause SER01 16 1.67682 0.2582 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER05 1.41211 0.3232 
    
     
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:48 
Sample: 1996 2015 
Lags 2  
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER06 does not Granger Cause SER01 16 14.4614 0.0017 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER06 0.30060 0.8688 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:50 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags:2 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    SER07 does not Granger Cause SER01 16 1.49093 0.3020 
SER01 does not Granger Cause SER07 0.33225 0.8481 
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GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST-AT SHORT RUN 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:34 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 2 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER02 does not Granger Cause DSER01 17 5.62918 0.0189 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER02 0.92333 0.4237 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:35 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 2 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER03 does not Granger Cause DSER01 17 0.75048 0.4931 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER03 1.18443 0.3393 
    
    
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:35 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 2   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER04 does not Granger Cause DSER01 17 0.08826 0.9161 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER04 1.23994 0.3240 
    
     
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:36 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 2   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER05 does not Granger Cause DSER01 17 1.16878 0.3437 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER05 0.21512 0.8095 
    
     
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:37 
Sample: 1996 2015  
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER06 does not Granger Cause DSER01 17 1.97683 0.1811 
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DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER06 0.97831 0.4040 
    
     
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:38 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 2 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER07 does not Granger Cause DSER01 17 0.35044 0.7113 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER07 0.19402 0.8262 
    
    
 
LAG: 4 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:51 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 4 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER02 does not Granger Cause DSER01 15 3.59797 0.0794 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER02 0.36343 0.8268 
    
    
 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:53 
Sample: 1996 2015  
 
Lags: 4 
   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER03 does not Granger Cause DSER01 15 0.17355 0.9441 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER03 1.21562 0.3948 
    
     
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:54 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 4   
    
    Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER04 does not Granger Cause DSER01 15 1.18894 0.4039 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER04 0.50221 0.7369 
    
    
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:54 
Sample: 1996 2015  
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Lags: 4   
    
    
Null Hypothesis: Obs 
F-
Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER05 does not Granger Cause DSER01 15 0.53895 0.7139 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER05 0.58018 0.6887 
    
     
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:55 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 4   
    
    
Null Hypothesis: Obs 
F-
Statistic Prob. 
    
    
DSER06 does not Granger Cause DSER01 15 6.74754 
0.020 
 
8 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER06 0.85886 0.5380 
    
     
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 05/11/18   Time: 09:56 
Sample: 1996 2015  
Lags: 4   
    
    
Null Hypothesis: Obs 
F-
Statistic Prob. 
    
    DSER07 does not Granger Cause DSER01 15 0.93636 0.5024 
DSER01 does not Granger Cause DSER07 0.07546 0.9871 
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APPENDIX II: RESEARCH CLEARANCE  
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
th 
April, 2018 
Our Ref: PG2016 
Bank of Tanzania, 
P. o Box 2939, 
Dar es salaam. 
 
RE: RESEARCH CLEARANCE 
The Open University of Tanzania was established by an act of Parliament No. 17 of 
1992, which became operational on the 1st March 1993 by public notice No. 55 in the 
official Gazette. The act was however replaced by the Open University of Tanzania 
charter of 2005, which became operational on 1st January 2007. In line with the later, 
the Open University mission is to generate and apply knowledge through research. 
litate and to simplify research process therefore, the act empowers the Vice Chancellor 
of the Open University of Tanzania to issue research clearance,on behalf of the 
Government of Tanzania and Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology,to 
both its staff and students who aring research in Tanzania. With this brief background, 
the purpose of this letter is to introduce to you Mr David Said M.Mfalamagoha Reg 
No:PG201609287 pursuing Doctor of Philosophy in Business(PhD Business).We here 
by grant this clearance to conduct a research titled“The relationship between 
Institutional Factors and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows in Tanzania. "He 
will collect his data in Dar es Salaam Region From 15th April 2018 to 15^^6 2018. 
In case you need any further information, kindly do not hesitate to contact the Deputy 
Vice Chancellor (Academic) of the Open University of Tanzania, P.O. Box 23409, Dar 
es Salaam. Tel:  
 
022-2-2668820.We lastly thank you in advance for your assumed cooperation and 
facilitation of this research academic activity. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Prof. Hossea Rwegoshora 
For Vice Chancellaor 
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APPENDIX III: INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS DATA 
 
WGI DATASET 2015 
THE WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS (WGI) DATASET 
Aggregate Governance/Institutional Indicators 1996-2015                
 SOURCE:     www.govindicators.org  (World Bank) 
The Worldwide Governance/Institutional Indicators constructs aggregate indicators 
of six broad dimensions of: 
1. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PSV)2. Government Effectiveness 
(GE) 3. Regulatory Quality 4. Rule of Law (RL)5. Control of Corruption (CC)6. 
Voice and Accountability (VA) and 7.Access to land (AL) 
 
YEAR PS  
index 
GE 
index 
RQ 
index 
RL 
index 
CC 
index 
VA 
index 
AL 
1996 -0.71 -0.73 -0.42 -0.26 -1.03 -0.74 37.8 
1997 -0.60 -0.58 -0.42 -0.28 1.00 -0.67 38.0 
1998 -0.48 -0.42 -0.41 -0.29 -0.97 -0.60 38.2 
1999 0.64 -0.42 -0.33 -0.34 -0.96 -0.56 38.3 
2000 -0.80 -0.42 -0.25 -0.39 -0.95 -0.51 38.4 
2001 -0.58 -0.41 -0.41 -0.39 -0.95 -0.46 38.5 
2002 -0.35 -0.40 -0.56 -0.39 -0.94 -0.41 38.6 
2003 -0.88 -0.37 -0.50 -0.29 -0.78 -0.37 38.7 
2004 -0.65 -0.42 -0.44 -0.39 -0.58 -0.47 39.7 
2005 -0.57 -0.39 -0.45 -0.26 -0.65 -0.29 39.9 
2006 -0.33 -0.34 -0.37 -0.45 -0.22 -0.20 39.9 
2007 -0.35 -0.38 -0.40 -0.36 -0.35 -0.14 40.2 
2008 -0.21 -0.48 -0.50 -0.34 -0.42 -0.17 41.7 
2009 0.07 -0.59 -0.42 -0.48 -0.44 -0.16 42.1 
2010 0.02 -0.58 -0.41 -0.49 -0.54 -0.13 42.3 
2011 -0.05 -0.63 -0.40 -0.54 -0.62 -0.14 43.2 
2012 0.02 -0.68 -0.39 -0.55 -0.80 -0.18 44.8 
2013 -0.17 -0.70 -0.32 -0.50 -0.81 -0.21 44.8 
2014 -0.57 -0.65 -0.32 -0.41 -0.79 -0.19 44.3 
2015 -0.45 -0.60 -0.36 -0.43 -0.72 -0.21 44.6 
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WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
Access to land indices data for Tanzania    
YEAR                          INDEX 
1996………………………37.8 
1997……………………....38.0 
1998……………………... 38.2 
1999……………………....38.3 
2000……………………...38.4 
2001……………………....38.5 
2002 …………………..…38.6 
2003…………………..…..38.7 
2004………………..……..39.7 
2005………………………39.9 
2006………………………39.9 
2007………………………40.2 
2008………………....……41.7 
2009…………..…………..42.1 
2010…………………...….42.3 
2011………………....……43.2 
2012……………….…..….44.8 
2013……………..…….….44.8 
2014………….……..…….44.3 
2015…………………...….44.6 
 
SOURCE:  World Bank Group (2017): IBDR, IDA, IFC, MIGA, ICSD    
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APPENDIX IV 
              FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOW (DAT) DATA  
   REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN TANZANIA 
  FDI INFLOWS (IN MILLION USD) 1996-2015 
YEAR FDI inflows in million of  USD;    1996-2015 
1996 148.6 
1997 157.8 
1998 172.2 
1999 516.7 
2000 463.4 
2001 467.2 
2002 387.6 
2003 308.2 
2004 330.6 
2005 935.52 
2006 403.04 
2007 581.55 
2008 400.09 
2009 953.1 
2010 1813.3 
2011 1229.4 
2012 1799.6 
2013 2130.9 
2014 1673.0 
2015 1605.0 
SOURCE:  Bank of Tanzania (BOT) 1996-2015 
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APPENDIX VII 
DATA FOR TRADE OPENNESS AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
YEAR TRADEOPENNESS INDEX INFRASTRUCTURE INDEX 
1996  1.33 
1997  2.05 
1998 37.42 3.16 
1999 35.38 4.65 
2000 33.5 6.77 
2001 38.29 8.10 
2002 37.42 10.6 
2003 41.37 12.28 
2004 45.72 14.17 
2005 39.08 15.79 
2006 44.89 17.60 
2007 50.70 20.53 
2008 49.40 23.27 
2009 43.70 25.76 
2010 43.70 29.15 
2011 56.8 31.73 
2012 54.40 34.95 
2013 48.7 37.42 
2014 49.20 40.65 
2015 48.00 44.00 
SOURCE: World Bank :2017 
